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Abstract 
This thesis examines the role that the Hindu epic the Ramayana plays in shaping the 
relationship between conservative Hindu Indian nationalism and gender in post-colonial 
India. It demonstrates how the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has manipulated understandings 
of the Ramayana to best serve its political aims since 1980, and to further an inherently sexist 
and discriminatory agenda.  
Chapter One outlines the role of exclusionary narrative in constructing national 
identity along conservative and fundamentalist lines. Drawing from this, it goes on to present 
and expand upon the key research questions explored in this thesis. Chapter Two examines 
the various relevant fields of literature which are involved in this discussion. Chapter Three 
outlines the key methodological fields from which this thesis draws as an intersectional study. 
Chapter Four analyses Valmiki’s Ramayana in considering its depiction of gender constructs, 
and touches upon the significance of the 1987 Ramayan television serial by Ramanand Sagar. 
Chapter Five explores the role of gender in the Indian Independence movement and the 
development of Hindu nationalism. It then examines postcolonial secularism and nationalism, 
and women’s rights till the BJP’s founding in 1980.  
Chapter Six focuses on India, the rise of the BJP, and the shape of women’s issues 
over the past forty years. Chapter Seven focuses upon three separate endeavours to approach 
the Ramayana from unconventional perspectives, one of which is my experience writing and 
directing the 2014 production Fire to Earth with the UNSW Indian Society. Chapter Eight 
outlines the BJP’s attempts to moderate in recent years, summarises the current state of 
women’s affairs, and concludes by highlighting some of the lacunae that still need to be 
addressed in this field. 
This thesis situates itself at the intersection of Ramayana studies, Indian women’s 
studies, and postcolonial Indian politics. It takes a multifaceted methodological approach to 
answering its principal questions, incorporating narrative studies, politics, gender studies, and 
literature studies. I acknowledge the numerous perspectives in these fields and synthesise 
their various contributions to illustrate the deep-rooted connections between Hindu 
nationalism, gender exclusion and oppression, and the Ramayana. 
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1. Introduction 
Everyone was endowed with auspicious marks 
Everyone was devoted to righteousness 
And so, for ten thousand years, Rama ruled his kingdom. 
(The Ramayana, Yuddhakāṇḍa, 116:90.)1 
 
1.1. Intolerance in Nation Building and Narrative Interpretation: 
Gender, the Ramayana, and the Exclusionary 
Narrative is a fundamental part of communal unification and togetherness.2 Whether 
lived or imagined, these origin stories form the basis for developing notions of group identity. 
Narrative based nationalism is a common phenomenon, where nations rely on a semi-
historical ‘origin story’ to serve as the foundation for their pride and sense of identity. In a 
similar fashion, mythic religious narratives can, even in modern and apparently secular 
nations, have deep political ramifications.  Literature Studies scholar Lisa Zunshine refers to 
“…the thorny issue of the “truth” of literary narrative and the distinction between “history” 
and “fiction.””3 In the blurring of history and myth, foundational narratives captivate the 
imagination, while also rooting themselves within personal and national understandings of 
history and shared origin.  
Understanding these narratives offers valuable insight not only into the specific region 
in which they are told, but also the formation and nature of the political, social, and religious 
dimensions of that place’s inhabitants. However, nation-building narratives often espouse 
                                                 
1 Vālmīki, Robert P. Goldman, and Sheldon Pollock, The Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmīki: An Epic of Ancient India. 
Yuddhakāṇḍa (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009), 494. 
2 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (Verso, 
1991); Lisa Zunshine, Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel (Columbus: Ohio State University 
Press, 2006). 
3 Zunshine, Why We Read Fiction, 5. 
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rigid parameters and roles for society that can easily be used to justify conservative rhetoric 
and dogma, including the discriminatory exclusion of minorities who do not fit the 
established image of the state. Hannah Arendt refers to the notion of the ‘stateless’ condition, 
where minorities are isolated from political power and marginalised in society.4 In this 
manner, such narratives can serve as a powerful vehicle for fundamentalist and radical 
political/social groups, particularly those who are presenting a model of religious nationalism 
as an alternative to secularism.5  
This thesis explores the role of narrative in constructing national identity through the 
process of exclusion, through by examining the relationship between the Hindu religious text 
the Ramayana and the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in postcolonial India.  In doing 
so, I will examine the process by which the Ramayana has become a major narrative of the 
religiously intolerant Hindu nationalism movement, and its impact on normative Hindu 
gender paradigms as well as the gendered politics of the BJP. This thesis aims to examine the 
following questions: how has the Ramayana been used to serve a conservative political 
agenda since 1985 in India? To what extent has the Ramayana shaped the relationship 
between conservative Hindu nationalism as represented by the BJP, and gender politics and 
structures in the post-colonial period? In doing so, it will demonstrate the manner in which 
the BJP has used the Ramayana to further a fundamentalist agenda which is inherently sexist 
and discriminatory, based on a patriarchal and male-driven social ideal.  
 
                                                 
4 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Florida: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1973), 290. 
5 Brian Hole, “A Many-Cornered Thing: The Role of Heritage in Indian Nation-Building,” Journal of 
Intervention and Statebuilding 7, no. 2 (June 1, 2013): 197. 
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1.2. Background 
The Ramayana is one of the two key narratives intertwined with Indian nationalism 
(the other is the Mahabharata.) The Ramayana, literally the ‘Story of Rama’, is attributed to 
the semi-mythic sage Valmiki. Due to its sheer length, it encompasses a whole range of 
interlinked narratives; the key story, however, focuses on Prince Rama of Ayodhya and his 
wife, Princess Sita of Mithila.  Rama is portrayed as a strong and noble warrior, while Sita is 
traditionally revered as the ideal daughter and wife due to her loyalty, obedience, and grace.6 
Key themes of the poem emphasise an expected social order, kingly dharma (loosely, 
“duty”), physical and moral purity, and ethical combat and military warfare. Female 
characters do play a significant role in the Ramayana – indeed, the primary complication of 
the narrative revolves around the abduction of Rama’s wife, Sita. However, female characters 
in the text are placed by and large in passive roles, where obedience, grace and humility are 
considered vital traits for the ‘ideal’ woman. This is made more complicated by the fact that a 
number of these female personalities are, like Rama, popularly considered to be avatars of 
Hindu deities.7 Therefore, these traits are linked to the notion of the ‘divine’ feminine; further 
cementing them as a mould that Hindu women should aspire to fill.8 This is despite the fact 
that Rama, interpreted by the BJP as the embodiment of violent masculinity and ideal 
manhood, is actually more complex and measured than they choose to acknowledge. 
Similarly, they have heavily edited their depictions of Sita and other women from the 
                                                 
6 Linda Hess, “Rejecting Sita: Indian Responses to the Ideal Man’s Cruel Treatment of His Ideal Wife,” Journal 
of the American Academy of Religion 67, no. 1 (1999): 2. 
7 Luis Gonzalez-Reimann, “The Divinity of Rama in the ‘Ramayana’ of Valmiki,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 
34, no. 3 (2006): 203; Sukumari Bhattacharji, “A Revaluation of Valmiki’s ‘Rama,’” Social Scientist 30, no. 
1/2 (2002): 32. 
8 Hess, “Rejecting Sita,” 2. 
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Ramayana, to suit a streamlined narrative that aligns with their hard-line traditionalist 
agenda.9  
The Ramayana has been a significant source of artistic and cultural inspiration across 
the centuries. Diverse regional manifestations and interpretations of the text exist, many of 
which have overtaken the canonical text in prominence among less erudite Indians. The work 
and its characters also feature heavily in many classical Indian music and dance forms, such 
as Bharatanatiyam and Kathak.10 In addition, the Ramayana has a strong presence in 
Buddhism, Sikhism, and Jainism, and has been incorporated into the cultures of other 
countries in South and South-East Asia. Its strongest association, however, remains with 
Hinduism, and alongside the epic poem Mahabharata and the philosophical Upanishads and 
Vedas, makes up the core normative canon of Indian Hinduism.11 
The widespread and far-reaching significance of the Ramayana’s narrative and 
characters means that it influences not only cultural and artistic spheres, but also socio-
political constructs, agendas, and rhetoric. Therefore, it has played a significant political role 
in India shaping notions of Indian identity (alongside the Mahabharata).12 Narratives and 
characters from both are used by politicians in speeches to emphasise political or moral 
points.13 This was a commonly used tactic of principal figures in the lead-up to and aftermath 
of Indian independence in 1947, including but not limited to Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal 
Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister, who were both anxious to emphasise that the envisaged 
                                                 
9 Ved Mehta, “The Mosque and the Temple: The Rise of Fundamentalism,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 2 (1993): 
16. 
10 Monica Dalidowicz and Michael Jackson, “Being ‘Sita’: Physical Affects in the North Indian Dance of 
Kathak,” in Phenomenology in Anthropology, A Sense of Perspective (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 
2015), 90. 
11 Axel Michaels, “India’s Spirituality, the Plurality of Hinduism and Religious Tolerance,” India International 
Centre Quarterly 41, no. 2 (2014): 148. 
12 Andreas Huyssen, “Geographies of Modernism in a Globalizing World,” New German Critique, no. 100 
(2007): 198. 
13 Kanti Bajpai, Saira Basit, and V. Krishnappa, India’s Grand Strategy: History, Theory, Cases (New Delhi: 
Routledge, 2014), 204. 
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postcolonial state would be the product of what Nehru called “the unbroken chain which goes 
back to the dawn of history in the immemorial past of India”.14 His speeches and popular 
discourse used these texts to frame an ideal of tolerance and culturally diverse secularism. 
The conservative right wing of Indian politics, however, has also used the Ramayana in their 
rhetoric, to promote an alternative to secularism: a male-driven patriarchal militant society 
based in the maintenance of “traditional” Hinduism where men occupy leadership in both the 
domestic and public spheres, while women are constrained to caregiving and motherhood.15  
Decades after independence, the Ramayana’s popularity has only expanded, in part 
due to the release of the television series Ramayan, directed by Ramanand Sagar, which aired 
from 25 January 1987 to August 1989.16 This series, broadcast on national television, saw 
record viewership across the country.17 It also reintroduced, even more than the narrative, the 
character of Rama, whose representation in the series was capitalised upon by the BJP. They 
proposed that Rama was a divine representation of the masculine spirit of India, and looked 
to him as a role model in their efforts to construe themselves as protectors of Indian identity 
against the threat of Western and Islamic influence. This deliberately ignores the fact Islam 
has been present on the Indian subcontinent since the eighth century, and politically and 
culturally powerful since the first Muslim empire in North India was established in the 
thirteenth century.18 Rama has come to represent the ‘masculine ideal’ of India, and to serve 
as a role model for Hindu nationalists as protectors of Indian identity against the unspoken 
14 Ainslee T. Embree, “Nehru’s Understanding of the Social Function of Religion,” India International Centre 
Quarterly 20, no. 1/2 (1993): 168. 
15 Himani Bannerji, “Making India Hindu and Male: Cultural Nationalism and the Emergence of the Ethnic 
Citizen in Contemporary India,” Ethnicities 6, no. 3 (2006): 373. 
16 Shanti Kumar, Gandhi Meets Primetime: Globalization and Nationalism in Indian Television (Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 2006), 2. 
17 Arvind Rajagopal, Politics After Television: Hindu Nationalism and the Reshaping of the Public in India 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 30. 
18 Stephan Schlensog, “Hinduism and Politics: On the Role of Religious Antagonisms in Indian History and 
Politics,” Die Friedens-Warte 82, no. 2/3 (2007): 161. 
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threat of Western and Islamic influence, as well as against the perceived weakness of Indian 
secularism.19  
In 1992 the Babri Masjid, a long-standing Mughal mosque in Ayodhya, Rama’s 
mythic birthplace, was destroyed as the culmination of a campaign by the BJP and other 
extremist Hindu organisations.20 Subsequent rioting across India resulted in more than 2000 
deaths.21  This swift and violent reaction was also a result of the popular belief that a temple 
to Rama had previously existed on the site, and had been destroyed during the Mughal 
Empire to make way for a mosque.22 The destruction of the mosque was paraded as a 
manifestation of and a triumph for militant Hinduism as espoused by the BJP, and a 
representation of Rama’s virile powers. 23 The act also represented a clear stance against the 
quasi-feminine weakness of secularisation which had allowed another religious place to 
continue to stand on Hindu land. 24 Ten years later, these themes once again manifested 
themselves violently in the northern Indian state of Gujarat. Gujarat has been under BJP 
control since the 1990s; and unsurprisingly displays potent and troubling examples of the 
repercussions of the inherent violence in conservative masculine militancy.  Riots in the state 
broke out in 2002 after the deaths of fifty-eight Hindus in a train fire. The train, which was 
returning from Ayodhya (Rama’s birthplace) might have caught alight for any number of 
reasons. However, Hindu fundamentalists placed the blame squarely on Muslim shoulders 
which led to widespread rioting and destruction, displacing thousands and causing the deaths 
                                                 
19 Rekha Datta, “Hindu Nationalism or Pragmatic Party Politics? A Study of India’s Hindu Party,” International 
Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 12, no. 4 (1999): 574. 
20 Mehta, “The Mosque and the Temple,” 16. 
21 Sanjay Ruparelia, “Rethinking Institutional Theories of Political Moderation: The Case of Hindu Nationalism 
in India, 1996-2004,” Comparative Politics 38, no. 3 (2006): 317. 
22 Carole M. Cusack, “The Gods on Television: Ramanand Sagar’s Ramayan, Politics and . Popular Piety in 
Late Twentieth-Century India,” by Alex Norman and Cusack (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 279. 
23 Mehta, “The Mosque and the Temple,” 17. 
24 Nikita Sud, “Cracks in the Facade: The Gujarat BJP and Elections 2009,” Economic and Political Weekly 44, 
no. 28 (2009): 15. 
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of as many as two thousand civilians.25 As well as demonstrating Arendt’s argument that the 
establishment of a nation-state along a strict ideal of the nation involves the alienation and 
marginalisation of minorities, these incidents demonstrate the continuing use of collective 
memory by the BJP to promote an aggressive, masculine model for Hindu India.26  
The emphasis on the restoration of a traditionalist male-driven society as the prime 
tool for the advancement of India also sidelines and diminishes the potential offered by the 
feminine or female half of the population, as well as ignoring the utility of non-violent 
‘feminine’ methods of governing and nation-building.27 The thesis will explore the 
dichotomy of the deification and subjugation of femininity and women in the Ramayana, and 
the way these themes have shaped conservative discourse regarding gender in modern India. 
This thesis therefore contends that the post-colonial narrative of India as intrinsically Hindu 
has been reinforced by an emphasis on the Ramayana as representative of a shared past, and 
on a narrow reading which shunts women into the domestic sphere and silences dissenting 
voices. Thus, the text is used to maintain a sense of monopolitical national unity which is 
inherently patriarchal and exclusionary.28  
 
1.3. Academic significance 
This thesis explores the narrative ecology of “nationalist”, “fundamentalist” “right 
wing” and overtly “masculine” India, at the expense of the notion of the feminine, and the 
multiplicity of narratives differing from Valmiki’s original Ramayana.29  Here I seek to 
                                                 
25 Ruparelia, “Rethinking Institutional Theories of Political Moderation,” 318. 
26 Badri Narayan, Fascinating Hindutva: Saffron Politics and Dalit Mobilisation (New Delhi: SAGE 
Publications India, 2009), 35; Hole, “A Many-Cornered Thing,” 208. 
27 Praful Bidwai, “Confronting the Reality of Hindutva Terrorism,” Economic and Political Weekly 43, no. 47 
(2008): 10. 
28 Bannerji, “Making India Hindu and Male,” 363. 
29 Velcheru Narayana Rao, Text and Tradition in South India (New York: SUNY Press, 2017), 232. 
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demonstrate how the BJP uses the Ramayana to underscore and justify its particular brand of 
religious nationalism, and the kind of masculine/anti-feminine gender politics that it supports 
through a particular reading of this text. While the link between the Ramayana, concepts of 
Hinduism, and the BJP has been explored in the academy, there appears to be a deficiency in 
examining the extremely potent role of the Ramayana in shaping Indian conceptions of 
gender.  
In 2014, while working with the Indian Society at the University of New South Wales 
on a theatrical production of the Ramayana intended to address issues of gender inequality 
and problematic elements of Valmiki’s narrative, I encountered opposition from some 
members of the organisation. The production, entitled Fire to Earth: A Story of Rama and 
Sita, was my second attempt at staging a play critical of Rama’s actions and patriarchal social 
structures; a first attempt, with a conservative Hindu organisation, had failed dismally. By 
applying a theoretical exploration of the use of the Ramayana to reinforce conservative 
philosophies based on the exclusion and diminishment of the feminine to the process of 
staging Fire to Earth, this thesis will demonstrate the impact of this relationship on a 
microcosmic level in the Indian diaspora. 
The BJP has an undeniable and troubling focus on legitimising Hindu nationalist 
views and using a normative concept of ‘Hinduism’ as a homogenising force.30 This, 
therefore, is intrinsically bound up in their conceptions of gender and the political choices 
they make. One of the reasons for this is the oppression and silencing of female voices, 
particularly through the imposition on women of restrictive and unrealistic models of ideal 
behaviour.31 By framing the ideal of womanhood as ultimately passive and submissive, 
                                                 
30 Ruparelia, “Rethinking Institutional Theories of Political Moderation,” 319. 
31 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, by 
Lawrence Grossberg and Cary Nelson (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 271–314. 
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attempts by women to break this mould and speak out are sabotaged.32 The perpetuation of 
this oppressive gender binary in the postcolonial era, despite significant legal advances, is 
powered at least in part by the influence of narrow readings of the Ramayana and its 
promotion as a depiction of ideal Indian society by Hindu nationalists.33  It is vital, therefore, 
to have a concrete understanding of the limitations and reach of the influence of this text in 
order to develop effective methods of counteracting its negative social consequences. 
Finally, this thesis explores the unique lived experience of attempting to combat 
issues of gender in religious narrative, particularly in the ex-patriate community. Through 
examining my own efforts in creating and staging a production aimed at challenging 
assumptions regarding gender roles in the Ramayana, this thesis will provide a combined 
experiential and analytical understanding of the personal and small-scale impact of the 
relationship between gender and the Ramayana in a conservative Hindu Indian context, set 
against the backdrop of these paradigms and their impact on gendered structures in modern 
India under a BJP government. 
 
1.4. Key Terms and abbreviations 
India 
This thesis refers to three periods of ‘Indian history’ and geography: Classical India, 
British/pre-Independence/colonial India, and modern/postcolonial India. Classical India 
refers to the period within which the Ramayana was written, ranging from approximately 
1000 BCE to 500 CE. British India refers officially to the period between 1857 and 1947, but 
unofficially may be viewed as beginning in the latter half of the sixteenth century, as the 
                                                 
32 Spivak. 
33 Purnima Mankekar, Screening Culture, Viewing Politics: An Ethnography of Television, Womanhood, and 
Nation in Postcolonial India (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999). 
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decline of the Mughal Empire led to the growing political and economic influence of the East 
India Trade Company.34 This region also included the areas now known as Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, and Burma. Modern/postcolonial India, officially known as the 
Republic of India, came into being on 15 August 1947, on the same date as the Dominion of 
Pakistan was formed. As of July 2017, the United States Central Intelligence Service has 
estimated the country’s population to be approximately 1.3 billion people.35 
Normative Hinduism (‘Hinduism’) 
I use this phrase to refer to several diverse practices, rituals, and beliefs in the 
subcontinent which are loosely grouped into a definitive religious tradition in mainstream 
Western understandings of religion in India.36 The concept of Hinduism as a cohesive belief 
system is relatively new, and is rooted in colonialism, though the word was first used in the 
nineteenth century by the Indian social reformer Raja Rammohan Roy.37  The term was 
popularised in the West by British scholars, and in India by cultural figures to maintain a 
sense of unified tradition in the face of colonial influence.38  The term also aims to establish a 
notion of community and communion across India, as per Benedict Anderson’s notion of the 
“imagined community” – where ‘Hindus’ are linked by an often false notion of shared 
                                                 
34 Acyuta Yājñika and Suchitra Sheth, The Shaping of Modern Gujarat: Plurality, Hindutva, and Beyond (New 
Delhi: Penguin Books India, 2005), 61. 
35 Central Intelligence Service, “The World Factbook — Central Intelligence Agency,” January 17, 2018, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html. 
36 Brian K. Pennington, “Constructing Colonial Dharma: A Chronicle of Emergent Hinduism, 1830-1831,” 
Journal of the American Academy of Religion 69, no. 3 (2001): 579. 
37 Nayanjot Lahiri and Elisabeth A. Bacus, “Exploring the Archaeology of Hinduism,” World Archaeology 36, 
no. 3 (2004): 313. 
38 Brian A. Hatcher, “Bourgeois Vedānta: The Colonial Roots of Middle-Class Hinduism,” Journal of the 
American Academy of Religion 75, no. 2 (2007): 299. 
11 
 
belief.39 This notion of Hinduism is based around a selection of core texts, mostly in 
Sanskrit.40  
The principal narrative texts which form part of this canon are the Ramayana and the 
Mahabharata, and are supplemented by the Puranas, which contain secondary mythology 
and divine narrative pertaining to cosmology and the genealogy of the gods. Philosophical 
texts are broken into two groups: Shruti (authorless and rigid); and Smriti (texts attributed to 
an author, frequently revised, and generally more open-ended).41 The most well-known and 
revered of the Shruti are the Upanishads. The Smriti are considered by orthodox Hinduism to 
be secondary to the Shruti as they are attributed (and therefore definitively mortal creations) 
and may be rewritten. This hierarchy of texts is the basis for Hindutva; a particular ideology 
which may be traced to the period of Hindu cultural revival in the nineteenth century.42 
Another important element of Hinduism is the concept of dharma, which is woven 
into the body of canonical texts – both Shruti and Smriti texts – as well as into the Hindutva 
movement. There is no direct English translation for the term, but a succinct description of 
the term is best articulated by P.V. Kane, who says that it encompasses “…the privileges, 
duties and obligations of a man, his standard of conduct as a member of the Aryan 
community, as a member of one of the castes, as a person in a particular stage of life”.43 
Hindutva expands this term to loosely describe the notion of individual and social duty 
according to ethical and moral guidelines. 
                                                 
39 Tim Phillips, “Imagined Communities and Self-Identity: An Exploratory Quantitative Analysis,” Sociology 
36, no. 3 (2002): 600. 
40 Thomas R. Trautmann and Carla M. Sinopoli, “In the Beginning Was the Word: Excavating the Relations 
between History and Archaeology in South Asia,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 
45, no. 4 (2002): 497. 
41 Leela Prasad, “Conversational Narrative and the Moral Self: Stories of Negotiated Properties from South 
India,” The Journal of Religious Ethics 32, no. 1 (2004): 156. 
42 Yogendra K. Malik and V. B. Singh, Hindu Nationalists in India: The Rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party 
(New Delhi: Vistaar Publications, 1995), 1995. 
43 Klaus K. Klostermaier, A Survey of Hinduism: Second Edition (New York: SUNY Press, 1994), 50. 
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Hindutva  
Hindutva is a term of British origin emerging from the late colonial period (its first 
usage was in the late nineteenth century and popularised by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar in 
his 1928 book Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?44 The term refers to the ideology of Hindu 
nationalism and “…is based on a combination of received tradition and active refashioning of 
this tradition…stressing the inimical traits of Hindu religious myth and imagery while 
completely ignoring…other religious streams like Buddhism, Islam and Christianity in the 
Indian tradition”.45 
Varna (Caste) system 
The concept of the Varna system has its origins in ancient India, and refers to the four 
social classes and roles that are outlined in the Vedas. While officially abolished, this 
hierarchy continues to permeate and affect Indian Hindu society. The caste system has been 
long-considered to be hereditary (a notion which is not mentioned in the Vedas) and is linked 
strongly to the concept of reincarnation (samsara), where good deeds and adherence to the 
duty (dharma) of one’s varna results in rebirth into a higher caste.46   
The Brahmin caste was the highest in this hierarchy, and formed the religious and 
scholarly sector of society. While belonging to the Brahmin caste has never signified 
increased wealth, Brahmins are generally well-educated with high literacy rates, and 
dominated politics in the first half of the twentieth century. The second caste, the Kshatriyas, 
were traditionally warriors and nobility. Many protagonists in Hindu religious narratives 
come from this caste (including Rama and Sita). Vaishyas, the third caste, were assigned 
                                                 
44 Christophe Jaffrelot, “Hindutva,” in Key Concepts in Modern Indian Studies (New York: NYU Press, 2015), 
108. 
45 Sumanta Banerjee, “‘Hindutva’: Ideology and Social Psychology,” Economic and Political Weekly 26, no. 3 
(1991): 97. 
46 Nandini Chavan and Qutub Jehan Kidwai, Personal Law Reforms and Gender Empowerment: A Debate on 
Uniform Civil Code (Delhi: Hope India Publications, 2006), 51. 
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agricultural roles in Hindu religious texts but came to occupy middle class positions as 
landowners and merchants. The lowest rank of the Varna system was that of the Shudras, 
who were generally assigned labour and service roles.47  
Another significant group is the Dalit ‘caste’ (though there is no mention of this 
category in Vedic texts). The term, meaning ‘oppressed’ in Sanskrit, is a self-chosen name by 
the population of the subcontinent who were excluded from the Varna system. The legal term 
for this group, as recognised in the Indian Constitution, is “scheduled castes and scheduled 
tribes”, and refers to historically disadvantaged groups.48 Dalit women in particular have 
faced significant levels of exclusion and disadvantage, as they are situated at the intersection 
of religious, class, and gender discrimination. 
Sangh Parivar 
The umbrella term Sangh Parivar refers to the various Hindu nationalist organisations 
in India. These organisations operate in a variety of fields, including those of politics, 
education, communication, economics, and religion. While Sangh Parivar groups draw their 
members from various political and economic backgrounds, they all share the core values 
espoused by Hindutva. 
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)  
Known as the National Volunteer Corps in India, the RSS is a right-wing volunteer 
organisation with paramilitary and Hindu nationalist leanings, formed in 1925.49 The RSS is 
the largest and most powerful organisation under the umbrella of the Sangh Parivar.50  
                                                 
47 Geetanjali Gangoli, Indian Feminisms: Law, Patriarchies and Violence in India (New York: Routledge, 
2016), 10. 
48 Though this is the technical Sankrit term for the Dalit caste (literally translating to “not-varna”) the chosen 
term used by scheduled castes is Dalit, particularly by social and political activists. 
49 Pralaya Kanungo, “Myth of the Monolith: The RSS Wrestles to Discipline Its Political Progeny,” Social 
Scientist 34, no. 11/12 (2006): 51. 
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Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP)  
The VHP is a non-political pan-Hindu organisation founded in 1964 for religious 
purposes, by leading RSS figures and Swami Chinmayananda, a Hindu spiritual teacher who 
formed the worldwide non-profit Chinmaya Mission.51 The organisation’s objective is “…to 
organise- consolidate the Hindu society and to serve – protect the Hindu Dharma.”52  
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)  
The BJP is the most powerful and widespread political organisation of the Sangh 
Parivar. The party was founded in 1980, though its origins lie in the Bharatiya Jana Sangh 
(BJS), which was formed in 1951.53 The party was considered a fringe party till 1991, when it 
managed to defeat the Congress Party (INC) in the Gujarat state elections. As of early 2017, 
the party has been led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the former BJP chief minister of the 
state of Gujarat. 
Indian National Congress (INC or Congress party) 
The Indian National Congress is a political party in India, founded in 1885. The 
organisation was the leading figure in the Indian Independence movement, and was the party 
of both Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi, and India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. The 
INC’s President is currently Rahul Gandhi, the grandson of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
50 Sutapa Lahiry, “Jana Sangh and Bharatiya Janata Party: A Comparative Assessment of Their Philosophy and 
Strategy and Their Proximity with the Other Members of the Sangh Parivar,” The Indian Journal of Political 
Science 66, no. 4 (2005): 833. 
51 Manjari Katju, “The Early Vishva Hindu Parishad: 1964 to 1983,” Social Scientist 26, no. 5/6 (1998): 35. 
52 Vishva Hindu Parishad, “Swagatam | Vishva Hindu Parishad | Official Website,” 2010, http://vhp.org/, 
http://vhp.org/swagatam/. 
53 Rajagopal, Politics After Television, 51. 
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1.5. Text edition 
The Ramayana has a rich and complex written history, further confused by its 
inherent structure as an orally transmitted narrative. Valmiki’s Ramayana is considered to be 
the original version of this narrative. There are however other, more popular versions of the 
story, such as the Ramcharitmanas; the Hindi-language54 epic poem by 16th century poet 
Goswami Tulsidas which made the Ramayana available and accessible to the wider 
population in North India, who would have not necessarily have been competent in Sanskrit. 
The Tamil version by Kamban from the twelfth century aided in the popularity of the text in 
South India. However, it is the Valmiki Ramayana that remains the most detailed extant 
version of the story. It is from this version that others appear to be reworkings, adaptations, or 
rewritings to suit different languages.55 Therefore, this thesis quotes primarily from Valmiki’s 
Ramayana, particularly in light of the BJP’s veneration of its author (in 2016, the party 
celebrated the sage’s purported birth anniversary and hailed him as the creator of the 
Ramayana).56 Where possible, references to the text use Robert Goldman’s The Rāmāyaṇa of 
Vālmīki: An Epic of India series (1985-2009).57  
 
                                                 
54 More accurately, the Ramcharitmanas is in Awadhi, a dialect of Hindi spoken in the Awadh region of Uttar 
Pradesh. 
55 Mukti Lakhi Mangharam, “‘Rama, Must I Remind You of Your Divinity?’ Locating a Sexualised, Feminist, 
and Queer Dharma in the Ramayana,” Diacritics 39, no. 1 (2009): 75; Philip Lutgendorf, “Ramayan: The 
Video,” TDR (1988-) 34, no. 2 (1990): 130. 
56 Press Trust of India, “BJP Celebrates Valmiki Jayanti, Says Dalits a Priority for Govt,” Tribune India, 
October 15, 2016, http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/bjp-celebrates-valmiki-jayanti-says-dalits-a-
priority-for-govt/309970.html. 
57 Vālmīki, Robert P. Goldman, and Sheldon Pollock, The Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmīki: An Epic of Ancient India. 
Bālakāṇḍa (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985); Vālmīki, Sheldon I. Pollock, and Robert P. 
Goldman, The Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmīki: An Epic of Ancient India. Ayodhyākāṇḍa (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1986); Vālmīki, Sheldon I. Pollock, and Robert P. Goldman, The Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmīki: An 
Epic of Ancient India. Araṇyakāṇḍa (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991); Vālmīki et al., The 
Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmīki: An Epic of Ancient India. Kiṣkindhākāṇḍa (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1994); Vālmīki, Robert P. Goldman, and Sheldon Pollock, The Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmīki: An Epic of Ancient 
India. Sundarakāṇḍa (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996); Vālmīki, Goldman, and Pollock, The 
Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmīki: An Epic of Ancient India. Yuddhakāṇḍa. 
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1.6. Structure 
Following this introduction, the next chapter of this thesis details the separate fields of 
literature which are involved in this discussion. This covers the following: the Ramayana and 
literary and cultural interpretations; the role of narrative in the establishment of national 
identity after Indian independence; women in India; and the BJP and fundamentalism in 
Indian politics. This chapter also indicates gaps in the current literature exploring the 
intersection of these areas. The third chapter provides a methodological overview. It outlines 
the particular theoretical approaches used in this thesis regarding the relationship between 
narrative and nation building, nationalism, secularism in India, literary interpretation, and 
gender.  Finally, it will indicate how my thesis shall attempt to fill existing gaps in knowledge 
and link disparate areas of research. 
The fourth chapter provides a brief outline of the history and narrative of the 
Ramayana, before undertaking an analysis of the way gender is portrayed both in 
representations of and relations between men and women, but also of the way in which 
gendered language and rhetoric filters into the text’s understanding of power and politics. 
This chapter also touches on the broader cultural significance of the Ramayana, and explores 
how these elements are depicted in the 1985 television serial of the same name.  
The fifth chapter of the thesis explores the role of gender in the Indian Independence 
movement. It will examine the way in which Hindu narratives were used through the 
twentieth centuries and how the Ramayana became both a tool and a crutch for the 
establishment of a postcolonial unified state. Finally, the chapter highlights the place and 
representation of women in Indian politics and society in relation to general trends in the 
political landscape of the nation and its relation to religion, leading up to the rise of the BJP 
in the latter half of the 1980s. The sixth chapter focuses on India and the BJP over the past 
thirty years, since the release of the Ramayana television serial in 1985 and the resurgence in 
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mainstream popularity of its narrative and character of Rama against the backdrop of the 
events in Ayodhya and Gujarat. Following from this, this chapter examines the current 
participation of women in the BJP and the party’s current discourse regarding gender roles 
and structures in India.  
In light of this, the seventh chapter explores current efforts in India to combat and 
redress the impact of traditional patriarchal structures as supported and perpetuated by the 
Ramayana. It first outlines the current state of two key social issues – sexual violence against 
women, and arranged marriage – and the way they are being addressed and framed in modern 
Indian political and social discourse. The chapter then highlights some efforts over history to 
problematise and rectify the chauvinistic injustices and silencing of women in the Ramayana. 
From this, it concentrates on three examples of works which have questioned the Hindu 
nationalist understanding of the Ramayana, and outlines the challenges of traditionalism and 
conservatism they received which mirror the way women are framed by the BJP in Indian 
society. These works are: the film Sita Sings the Blues (Nina Paley, 2008); the essay “Three 
Hundred Ramayanas: Five Examples and Three Thoughts on Translation” (A.K. Ramanujan, 
1987); and the play Fire to Earth: A Story of Rama and Sita (Suvarna Variyar, 2014). 
The final chapter and conclusion of this thesis outlines the efforts and attempts made 
by the BJP to change and moderate in the 21st century, particularly with their move into 
popular mainstream politics. It highlights the most successful and long-lasting methods of 
redressing gender imbalances in India, as well as the employment of non-Ramayana 
narratives and gender paradigms which are used to combat its assumptions. Ultimately, it 
emphasises the importance of a wider recognition of the intrinsic link between the Ramayana 
and gender in forming a narrative upon which the BJP has built an exclusionary approach to 
post-colonial Indian nationalism. 
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2. Literature Review  
A man who always fulfilled his vows 
he taught them the whole of this great poem, The Ramayan 
which is the tale of Sita and the slaying of Paulastya… 
(The Ramayana, Bālakāṇḍa, 4:6-7.)58 
2.1. Introduction and gaps in existing literature 
The literature surrounding separate aspects of this thesis is plentiful, insofar as it slots 
into separate academic disciplines, such as Comparative Literature, Gender Studies, Politics 
and International Relations, and Religious Studies. However, literature in these fields directly 
focussed upon the Ramayana and its social influences is much scarcer.  Work on India and 
women tends to focus on either economics or politics. Work on the Ramayana is centred 
around translation, mythological analysis, or literary critique. Literature focussed on the 
Independence movement in India and postcolonial politics concentrates on the friction 
between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League.  
In the past two decades, the BJP has garnered academic interest as its social and 
political power in India has steadily increased (culminating in the 2014 election of Narendra 
Modi as Prime Minister).59 Reflecting a growing academic consensus, Arvind Rajagopal 
posits that “…the alliance between economic liberalization and Hindu nationalism was 
opportunistic and unstable, but…developed a considerable force and momentum.”60 
However, work looking at the intersection of gender, right wing Hinduism, and the 
Ramayana is quite limited and still restricted to these separate academic fields. Even though 
                                                 
58 Vālmīki, Goldman, and Pollock, The Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmīki, 1985, 132. 
59 In 1998 the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), a coalition led by the BJP, formed a government. Prime 
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee from the BJP served as Prime Minister till the NDA’s defeat in the 2004 
general elections. The 2014 election was the first won by the BJP as a single party. 
60 Rajagopal, Politics After Television, 34. 
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Hindi is the second-most common first language in the world,61 it is also hard to find venues 
to study it on a tertiary level in Australia.62 This is problematic, considering the size of 
India’s population and its economic and political influence. But more problematically, this 
results in the potential to overlook the importance of these elements to political and economic 
relations with India. Implicated in this is the failure of Western perspectives and literature to 
employ a comparative approach to regional differences and perspectives – or even to 
recognise their existence and the vital role that such an analysis must play in understanding 
the nuances of cultural heterogeneity within the country. 63   
This thesis will not address these concerns in detail, but it is important to 
acknowledge their existence, particularly when addressing a pan-national narrative such as 
the Ramayana.  It is also important to acknowledge that the socio-political landscape of India 
differs from that of Western societies in ways that are not necessarily examined sufficiently. 
Nevertheless, there are numerous academic works which offer important contributions and 
insight to an examination of the BJP and its relationship with the Ramayana as a tool for 
propagating a normative notion of Hinduism, in tandem with the continued oppression of 
women.  
 
2.2. Narrative, language, and national-building  
The role of narrative in nation-building is a key component in examining the 
relationship between the Ramayana and modern Indian national identity, and the way in 
which this identity is inextricably bound with an element of the religious. In Western 
philosophy, the concept of religious nationalism was first explored by French Enlightenment 
                                                 
61 Rick Noack, “A Look at World Languages,” Washington Post, accessed September 6, 2016, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/world-languages/. 
62 I note that the USA, UK, and Germany have in recent years developed excellent Hindi programs. 
63 Ashutosh Kumar, “Rethinking State Politics in India: Regions within Regions,” Economic and Political 
Weekly 44, no. 19 (2009): 17. 
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philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Rousseau discussed the idea in his tract Du Contrat 
Social, where he uses the term to refer to the religious dimensions of the political state.64 Of 
course, Rousseau refers specifically to the formation of national identity in countries where it 
has developed gradually, as much in response to the natural coalescence of towns and cities 
through alliance and marriage, as via a product of warfare.65 This Western model of the 
development of nationalism, which was based on organic growth, did not translate over to 
colonised states and postcolonial nations. Subrat K. Nanda refers to Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America as multi-national countries comparable to that of India, where Western frameworks 
of statehood are imposed over regions with distinct cultural communities, and where 
nationalism evolved in reaction to colonial oppression rather than as a gradual expansion of 
communal identity.66 Sudipta Kaviraj states that as the British expanded their political 
influence over the subcontinent from their initial incursion through the East India Company, a 
replica of the European state model was forced on the population.67 The lack of a centralized 
authority till the British Empire took over meant, however, that the introduction of a cohesive 
state structure and democracy was expedited rather than evolving over a long time.68 
Despite fundamental differences between the cultural landscape within which 
Western and Indian secularism formed, most scholars agree that the post-colonial state was 
still heavily shaped by British influences on notions of national identity and legal 
frameworks.69 This combined with the colonial struggle for independence to create a 
particular kind of nationalism rooted in the promotion of a broad-based and wider-
                                                 
64 Gail Gehrig, “The American Civil Religion Debate: A Source for Theory Construction,” Journal for the 
Scientific Study of Religion 20, no. 1 (March 1, 1981): 52. 
65 T. K. Oommen, “Religious Nationalism and Democratic Polity: The Indian Case,” Sociology of Religion 55, 
no. 4 (1994): 456. 
66 Subrat K. Nanda, “Cultural Nationalism in a Multi-National Context: The Case of India,” Sociological 
Bulletin 55, no. 1 (2006): 25. 
67 Sudipta Kaviraj, “Modernity and Politics in India,” Daedalus 129, no. 1 (2000): 142. 
68 Atul Kohli, “Can Democracies Accommodate Ethnic Nationalism? Rise and Decline of Self-Determination 
Movements in India,” The Journal of Asian Studies 56, no. 2 (1997): 326. 
69 Kaviraj, “Modernity and Politics in India,” 152. 
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encompassing sense of Indian identity.70 A key factor in Western nationalism and national 
identity was the existence of a shared history or origin story around which a greater 
community could form. The prominent theorist in the field of narrative and community 
building, Benedict Anderson, refers to nationalism as a paradox where modern nation-states 
find their identity in an “immemorial past”.71  
This however further complicated the process of forging a viable single state. T.K. 
Oommen readily acknowledges the significant problem of establishing a unified nation when 
there had been no occasion for a sense of shared culture and experience to develop within the 
territory; language, culture and religion had been the basis upon which individual Western 
nations had come into being. The presence of multiple languages in the subcontinent has 
therefore always been a significant obstacle in establishing a unified community in India.72 
This is further complicated by the fact that those languages are not even necessarily in the 
same language group, making multilingualism quite difficult. Hindi and other North Indian 
languages are Indo-European languages, but in South India, Dravidian languages (notably 
Telegu, Tamil, Kannada, and Malayalam) dominate.73 This is an area that has been broached 
by Indian scholars, particularly in relation to Tamil and Tamil cultural nationalism, which is 
focused on a struggle against the forced hegemony of India as a single nation with one 
national language, and gave rise to ‘Dravidianism’.74 
In regard to language, Oommen states that the plurilingual and multinational state 
could operate so long as a link language exists, as without one there would be a limited 
                                                 
70 B. C. Upreti, “Nationalism in South Asia: Trends and Interpretations,” The Indian Journal of Political 
Science 67, no. 3 (2006): 535–44; Kaviraj, “Modernity and Politics in India.” 
71 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 11. 
72 Papia Sengupta and T. Ravi Kumar, “Linguistic Diversity and Disparate Regional Growth,” Economic and 
Political Weekly 43, no. 33 (2008): 8. 
73 Burjor Avari, India: The Ancient Past: A History of the Indian Sub-Continent from C. 7000 BC to AD 1200 
(New York: Routledge, 2007), 13. 
74 N. Ram, “Dravidian Movement in Its Pre-Independence Phases,” Economic and Political Weekly 14, no. 7/8 
(1979): 381. 
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ability to conduct business and establish political structures across regional boundaries. This 
role is currently filled by English and Hindi, which are designated as official languages for 
the purposes of national Parliament or communications between national and state 
governments.75 A. Aneesh opines that this was a successful endeavour, and that “India, 
lacking a pre-existing common national language, was able to actively produce one, modern 
Hindi, from the amorphous linguistic landscape.”76 However, Oommen refers to the 
Radhakrishnan Commission on University Education from 1950, which acknowledged that:  
Hindi does not enjoy in India such natural ascendancy over provincial 
languages as to incline the inhabitants to accept a secondary position for their 
own language. Hindi is the language of the minority, although large minority. 
Unfortunately, it does not possess any advantages, literary or historical, over 
other modern languages. 77 
Such a diversity of language means that the narrative ecology of India is vastly more 
complex, particularly when considering that oral traditions continue to make up a 
considerable part of that ecology in a country where, as of the 2011 census, the literacy rate 
nation-wide was only 66.07%.78  This means that even within one language, varied dialects 
according to social class or region are liable to develop. Velcheru Narayana Rao describes the 
key Sanskrit narratives as existing in a context of broad and varied cultural systems, which 
differ greatly depending on the level at which they are operating and their target audiences 
(agricultural, pastoral, mercantile, noble, or academic).79  
                                                 
75 Government of India (1949). The Constitution of India art 120. 
76 A. Aneesh, “Bloody Language: Clashes and Constructions of Linguistic Nationalism in India,” Sociological 
Forum 25, no. 1 (2010): 89. 
77 T. Oommen, “Language and Nation: For a Cultural Renewal of India,” in Nation, Civil Society and Social 
Movements: Essays in Political Sociology (New Delhi: Sage Publications India, 2004), 88. 
78 Government of India, “Census of India Website : Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, 
India,” 2011, http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011census/Religion_PCA.html. 
79 Rao, Text and Tradition in South India, 232. 
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Unfortunately, the Independence movement in its traditional vision, as one based on a 
national identity with a shared Hindu past, has complicated this process. The act of Partition 
in 1947 meant that India was established as, if not a Hindu state, then at least a non-Muslim 
state in opposition to the Islamic state of Pakistan.80 Aneesh highlights the role of language in 
this through the separation of Hindi and Urdu, but the oral distinctions between the two 
languages are minor (they may be considered mutually intelligible) and Urdu is still 
recognised as an official language in the Indian Constitution.81 In following this, therefore, 
Sudipta Kaviraj attributes the primary basis of group identity in Indian society to religion, 
despite the existence of multiple religions and diverse manifestations of what the British 
labelled as Hinduism.82 Further, he posits that the need for the development of what she terms 
a “public spirit” was recognised by independence leaders, particularly if they wished to be an 
independent competitive force in the modern world.83 
 
2.3. The construction of Hinduism in India 
The BJP relies heavily on framing Hinduism as fundamentally bound up in the 
geography, culture, and history of India. The definition and parameters of what actually 
constitutes 'Hinduism’, however, is itself the focus of a significant body of work. As stated 
above, Hinduism became one of the main unifying forces in India. Nevertheless, creating a 
clear image of ‘Hinduism’ was – and continues to be – quite difficult. Many in the academic 
field are of the consensus that the parameters of Hinduism are fluid, and that those which do 
                                                 
80 Alan Marriott, “Nationalism and Nationality in India and Pakistan,” Geography 85, no. 2 (2000): 174. 
81 Aijaz Ahmad, “Frontier Gandhi: Reflections on Muslim Nationalism in India,” Social Scientist 33, no. 1/2 
(2005): 23. 
82 Kaviraj, “Modernity and Politics in India,” 144. 
83 Kaviraj, 149. 
24 
 
exist may have been deliberately constructed.84 In his Introduction to Hinduism, Gavin Flood 
writes that Hinduism is simultaneously polytheistic, with a vast pantheon of gods, and 
centred on a single transcendent God which the numerous deities are manifestations or 
aspects thereof.85 The hierarchy of deities, moreover, is difficult to establish in light of a lack 
of unified scripture across social classes and language cultures, as well as the existence of a 
myriad of religious narratives and the tendency for regional cultures to prioritise or worship 
particular gods who might barely be recognised in other parts of the country. 86 Geoffrey 
Oddie points out that the “…Indian religion does not fit easily with what became the 
dominant model among Protestant missionary commentators…where Indian religion is 
represented as being a brahman-constructed system…” and goes on to argue that the 
documented experiences and understandings of British missionaries failed to account for vast 
elements of religious practices and beliefs in the subcontinent during the nineteenth century.87 
This is not to say that there were not some common elements or belief or symbolism 
across the subcontinent. Nayanjot Lahiri, when talking about establishing an ‘archaeology of 
Hinduism’, holds that by the early-mid first millennium CE, Brahmanical texts and 
frameworks (particularly the Varna system) were visible across regions of India.88 He also 
draws attention to emblematic objects and the remains of shrines and temples containing 
                                                 
84 Pennington, “Constructing Colonial Dharma,” 579; Hatcher, “Bourgeois Vedānta,” 299; Richard King, 
“Orientalism and the Modern Myth of ‘Hinduism,’” Numen 46, no. 2 (1999): 148; Rupal Oza, The Making of 
Neoliberal India: Nationalism, Gender, and the Paradoxes of Globalization (New York: Taylor & Francis, 
2006), 63; Jyotirmaya Sharma, “Writing Vivekananda,” India International Centre Quarterly 40, no. 1 (2013): 
42; Robert Eric Frykenberg, “Constructions of Hinduism at the Nexus of History and Religion,” The Journal 
of Interdisciplinary History 23, no. 3 (1993): 524. 
85 Gavin D. Flood, An Introduction to Hinduism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 14. 
86 Harsh Verma, “Leadership and Dharma: The Indian Epics Ramayana and Mahabharata and Their 
Significance for Leadership Today,” in Fictional Leaders, by Jonathon Gosling and Peter Villiers (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2013), 183. 
87 Geoffrey A. Oddie, Imagined Hinduism: British Protestant Missionary Constructions of Hinduism, 1793-
1900 (London: Sage Publications, 2006), 62. 
88 Lahiri and Bacus, “Exploring the Archaeology of Hinduism,” 315. 
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icons still used in modern Hindu practice, spread through South and Southeast Asia.89  In 
light of this, he contests the notion that Hinduism as a cohesive religion was entirely a 
colonial invention, but in doing so, acknowledges that these common elements would have 
manifested themselves very differently across time and geography.90   
This was further consolidated when Hindu intellectuals were drawn into religious and 
doctrinal comparisons with Christian missionaries. This resulted in a necessary restructuring, 
at least on a superficial level, of Hinduism, particularly in regards to the caste system and 
practices which Hindu reformers found incompatible with their evolving model.91  A 
common follow-up to this among some academics, such as Julius Lipner, is that in 
modernising to respond to British constructs, Hinduism as it stands today is purely 
‘invented’.92 
 The prominent academic Klaus Klostermaier similarly acknowledges that a precise 
definition of Hinduism is impossible to determine. 93 He argues that despite this impossibility, 
the term has had, and may continue to have, useful applications particularly in reference to 
Vedic elements (including the Ramayana and Mahabharata).94 In addition, Klostermaier 
points to the difficulty of defining Hinduism as a key reason that the term Hindutva 
developed – where Hindutva was framed as an inclusive term encompassing the wide variety 
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of different ‘Hinduisms’ which would “…allow Hindus to transcend sectarian boundaries 
within India and at the same time distinguish them from the followers of other traditions”.95  
Ultimately, no academic would make the claim that India could be accurately 
identified generally as a Hindu state.96 Oommen refers to India as a multinational state on a 
linguistic, cultural, and religious front. He points out that “…India is the second largest 
Muslim country in the world; 80 per cent of the world’s Zoroastrians live in India; and the 
population of Indian Christians and Sikhs exceeds the total population of many nation-states 
in the world…”97 K.N. Panikkar similarly points to the diverse religions and cultural 
traditions which contributed to the historical development of Indian culture, “…which is 
vibrant and alive because of its continuous rejuvenation through the interaction of different 
cultural streams”.98 These varied strands of influence, however, were exactly what Hindu 
nationalists would seek to sublimate. 
 
2.4. Hindu nationalism 
Hindu nationalism is one of the key focuses of this thesis, particularly since it rose to 
mainstream prominence in India during the 1980s through evoking the Ramayana and its 
popular appeal. Despite the lack of a concrete definition or parameters for Hinduism, the 
general consensus that its construction has played a major role in shaping notions of 
nationalism – particularly in reaction to the imperial presence of Christianity (and, 
                                                 
95 Klostermaier, 32. 
96 Datta, “Hindu Nationalism or Pregmatic Party Politics?,” 574; George G. Thomas, “Solving India’s Diversity 
Dilemma: Culture, Constitution, & Nehru,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 6, no. 2 (2005): 22; 
Amartya Sen, “The Threats to Secular India,” Social Scientist 21, no. 3/4 (1993): 6, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/3517628; Paul R. Brass, The Politics of India Since Independence (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 14; Thomas Pantham, “Indian Secularism and Its Critics: Some 
Reflections,” The Review of Politics 59, no. 3 (1997): 539. 
97 Oommen, “Language and Nation,” 86. 
98 K.N. Panikkar, “Nationalism and Its Detractors,” Social Scientist 44, no. 9/10 (2016): 9. 
27 
 
particularly since Partition, the presence of Islam.)99 Though India’s Constitution was 
developed along secular lines, Michael Hanne remarks that the intersection of British 
colonisation and internal sectarian divisions was a major cause for the development of 
‘master narratives’ in Indian nation building, and that in a Hindu-majority state, it served as 
an easy tool for unification.100 The topic of Hindu nationalism received a significant spike in 
academic interest after the rapid rise of the BJP through the 1980s, and especially after the 
destruction of the Babri Masjid in 1992.101 Beyond closer examinations of these 
contemporary issues (which will be outlined later in this chapter), attention was also drawn to 
the historical conditions which precipitated the growth of Hindu nationalism particularly in 
the Indian independence movement.   
Underlying both of these areas of study, however, lay numerous attempts to unpack 
the political and social theory that frame Hindu nationalism, in consideration of the 
differences between Western societies and Indian society. Hindu nationalism is characterised 
as fundamentalist, due to its exclusionary and militant elements; however, it is also 
characterised as radical. Sankaran Krishna refers to the idea of “secular nationalism” when 
talking about Indian secularism (which will be expanded upon later in this chapter).102 While 
this term is debatable, it is useful from a purely semantic point of view in representing the 
institution against which Hindu nationalism was and is opposed. 
The emphasis that Hindu nationalists have long placed on finding a foundational 
narrative for India based in Hinduism means that Western academics and theorists on the 
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subject of community building through narratives are often called upon by writers on 
Hindutva and Hindu nationalism. In referring to Anderson’s ‘imagined community’, 
Sankaran Krishna highlights the existence of Pakistan as a primary reason that the 
exclusionary model of Hindu nationalists is able to function; Muslims, according to this 
model, have their own state and therefore can never be fully party to the shared narrative of 
Indian society.103 
Brian Hole postulates that a key aim of Hindu nationalism and supporters of Hindutva 
has been to “…create a large body of work that emphasizes the continuity of Hindu culture in 
India from the earliest times, and denigrates the contribution of other cultures…” in order to 
realign mainstream understandings of Indian history.104 The Ramayana, alongside the 
Mahabharata and the Vedas, having been established through the colonial construction of 
Hinduism, were therefore readily available to serve as this body of work.105The Ramayana in 
particular has been an important tool in establishing and reinforcing this communal narrative, 
as its limited array of principal characters, comparatively straightforward storyline, framing 
of Classical India as a ‘golden age’, and clear delineation of ideal morals and social 
behaviour make for a well-rounded guiding narrative.106 The use of texts like the Ramayana 
is part of a larger goal of establishing that the Indian ‘nation’ has a continuous lineage which 
may be traced back to the time of the Ramayana and the Vedas.107 
A key area of disagreement is whether Hindu nationalism and Indian nationalism are 
equivalent. John Zavos presents two models of Hindu nationalism; one where it is formed 
from the combination of Indian nationalism and communalism, and one where it operates as a 
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wholly separate entity.108 This operates in opposition to secular Indian nationalism. A.M. 
Rajasekhariah suggests that Indian nationalism – the kind espoused by Gandhi and Nehru – is 
more all-encompassing, aims to be compatible with secularism, and takes care to emphasise 
respect for the plurality of religions and cultures in India.109 Hindu nationalism, meanwhile, 
privileges a narrative where India is the homeland of Hinduism, and where Hindus are the 
‘original’ inhabitants of the subcontinent while Muslims and Christians are the product of 
outside invasion (or at best, incursion). 
The general consensus is that ideally, Indian nationalism would not have been able to 
fuel Hindu nationalism, based as it should have been on (imposed) secular principles.110 The 
desire of political figures in the years surrounding Indian independence and Partition to 
establish a secular state was fundamentally undercut by the necessity for establishing a clear 
master narrative, which allowed for the continued use of the Ramayana and the Mahabharata 
as nation-binding myths. Amalendu Misra, alongside others, therefore points out that despite 
constitutional secularism, India continues to be “…in the throes of religious nationalism”.111 
Sudipta Kaviraj remarks that, while Hinduism (and Islam) largely maintained their population 
in India, the former was undoubtedly reshaped both by imposed colonial ideologies and the 
need to bring ‘archaic’ practices in line with the ethics of an ideally secular state.112 This was 
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an apparent compromise which created space for the rise of the Hindu nationalist model 
rooted in the principles espoused by Hindutva.113  
 
2.5.  Indian secularism  
To understand the rise of Hindu nationalism, it is vital to consider the place and shape 
of secularism in the postcolonial Indian state. As with nationalism, secularism has been 
widely acknowledged as a newly imposed structure on postcolonial nations, and in India has 
only been present since the Indian Constitution was adopted in 1950.114 This transference of 
principles and political theory, Jakob de Roover points out, is not necessarily effective where 
these political constructs are based in historical, cultural, and metaphysical conceptions (as 
they tend to be).115 He therefore emphasises the importance of examining secularism in India 
in light of its foreign origins, and is considered to need its own analytical framework. For 
instance, Ashis Nandy suggests that a ‘hierarchy of secularism’ is a better approach to 
examining Indian secularism.116 His framework is based on the notion that Western 
secularism is strictly defined as the confinement of religion to the private sphere, while non-
Western secularism revolves around “equal respect for religions”, and does not necessarily 
involve a distinct separation of religion and state.117 Nandy argues that this means that while 
India’s secularism is modelled on that of the Western world, it is fundamentally rooted in 
religion. Indeed, the word “secularism” was not used in the Preamble of the Indian 
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Constitution until a 1976 amendment).118 The urban educated elites who formed the INC and 
spearheaded the independence movement were forced to balance the democratic British legal 
and political framework left to them with the religious undertones upon which significant 
elements of the Indian Independence movement rested.119  
De Roover describes the current focus of the Indian secularism debate as 
“...diagnosing the crisis that secularism is undergoing because of the rise of Hindu 
nationalism.”  This debate is centred on a) whether secularism has been at all successful in 
the postcolonial nation and b) the extent to which it is a feasible long-term model for India. A 
number of academics argue that despite the flaws in Indian secularism in practice, it has 
operated for the most part successfully.120 . The majority of the field of research in the area, 
therefore, appears to be split three ways. The first applies the Western model of secularism, 
albeit in a more abstract form, to the topic at hand. The second – as popularised by Ashis 
Nandy – completely rejects secularism as a functioning construct in Indian society, especially 
as it may be considered a colonial imposition.121 The third (criticised above) questions 
whether secularism is necessary, basing this scepticism on the confusing and paradoxical 
notion that Hinduism is inherently secular and universally-encompassing (so long as other 
religious groups are willing to accept this).122 
It is undoubtable that Indian society continues to be pluralistic. Sanjay Ruparella 
stresses that the postcolonial Indian state, despite Partition’s undeniable separation of 
inhabitants of British India on the basis of religion, has successfully managed to develop a 
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secularist model which recognises and protects the country’s multiple cultural identities.123 
Amalendu Misra further points out that despite the formation of Pakistan as a Muslim state in 
1947, the considerable presence of Muslims as a minority meant that constitutional 
safeguards were considered particularly important by the founding fathers of postcolonial 
India.124  
However, there are also numerous academics who disagree with this. Omar Khalidi, 
on for instance, argues that far from being a secular state, India essentially practices 
assimilation, particularly through the conflation of ‘Hindu’ and ‘Indian’, resulting in the 
erasure of, in particular, Muslims and Christians.125 Priam Singh extends this to the Indian 
Constitution itself, claiming that while the text does not contain explicitly Hindu elements, 
some of the language used – such as the word ‘Bharat’, which is presented as synonymous 
with ‘India’  is drawn from Hindu literature – was deliberately chosen to appeal to religious 
communities.126 Peter Morey expresses agreement with this idea that the Congress party were 
more focused on absorbing religious communities than demanding uniform secularism, and 
cites historian Mukul Kesavan in contending that secular politics was only adopted by the 
Indian elite in order to facilitate this absorption.127  
Another issue that emerges on the academic front is the perception, particularly 
among Indian academics, that unlike historically Christian states, a separation between 
religion and state is not needed in India as Hinduism is “…pluralistic and flexible and can 
therefore be a better source of toleration…”128 Mani Shankar Aiyar, among others, is a 
fervent proponent of this notion, going so far as to say that India’s spiritual history proves 
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that to be truly religious, one must be secular.129 Sanghamitra Padhy suggests that the 
perception of Hinduism as inherently inclusive was the very reason that the term secularism 
was not written into the Constitution until 1976, as it was not considered necessary.130 Padhy 
goes on to criticise this view as inconsistent with minority interests, stating that “…the 
problem with such notions is that they seek to create uniformity based on oneness rather than 
allowing a space for diversity.”131  
In all, the nature of India’s secularism is a contentious issue in both the academic 
sphere and the nation’s political structures. The ambiguity of secularism and the secular 
nationalist narrative is part of the reason why Hindu nationalists have been able to establish 
their own national narrative through the use of Hindu religious texts like the Ramayana. 
 
 
2.6. The Ramayana 
The Ramayana is the core of this thesis, and its narrative has been significant to the 
construction of Indian nationality, the reinforcement and perpetuation of existing gender 
paradigms, and the consolidation of Hindu nationalism. Unfortunately, literature specifically 
focused on the Ramayana is limited, and contradictions and controversies emerge from its 
very composition date. In her work The Hindus, Wendy Doniger dates the story of Rama to 
anywhere from 200BCE-200CE; however, this range refers specifically to the composition of 
the Valmiki Ramayana.132  There are a number of notable interpretations of the text, which 
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are often more popular than the much longer and complex ‘original’ of Valmiki.133 The 
multiplicity of narratives complicates the ability to fully encompass the nuances of the text 
from a literary perspective, while its background in the oral form means contextualising the 
text within a purely historical framework is also quite difficult. A cultural approach to the 
study of the Ramayana is perhaps the most straightforward, but once again the obscurity of 
its origins and its diverse manifestations means that there is no easy way to offer a concise 
overview of the text as a cultural product.134 
Textual analysis on the Ramayana, particularly in English, is difficult to find in 
significant quantities. Rajagopal insists that the text has gained an extraordinary amount of 
power over the centuries, claiming that in light of the myriad of regional interpretations and 
forms the narrative has taken, “…to know the Ramayana is to know India, it is said.”135 The 
academic publications available, however, are not particularly rich in detail or scope 
(Rajagopal himself only provides a brief critique of the lack of concentration paid to the text 
as a potent entity, rather than undertaking his own analysis), in spite of the fact that their 
authors are mostly in agreement that “…the story of Rama…became the major and most 
widely accessible repository of religious and social ideas for mass audiences in eastern 
India.”136 Of the few in-depth academic works focussed on the Ramayana, some approach it 
from a comparative angle, particularly to the Mahabharata, while others focus strictly on 
literary techniques and thematic elements within the text (with little, if any, reference to its 
impact on or reflection upon Indian society, whether past or present). 
Another key difficulty with the study of the Ramayana is that, while Valmiki’s text 
does exist in written form, oral tradition features significantly in the dissemination of Indian 
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narrative.137 Velcheru Narayana Rao posits that in the oral retelling of stories and themes 
from well-known stories such as the Ramayana over centuries, characters cease to be bound 
to the confines of their authors’ ideas and intentions, and become “…as familiar as your next-
door neighbours”.138 This complicates efforts to definitively offer interpretations of the 
narrative without referring to a particular edition or variant, particularly as oral traditions are 
constantly evolving and are difficult to trace without written records. A.K. Ramanujan’s 
essay “Three Hundred Ramayanas: Five Examples and Three Thoughts on Translation” is a 
rare and significant example of academic study aimed to delve into the complexities of the 
Ramayana tradition; Ramanujan highlights examples of major different “tellings” of the 
Ramayana across language and geography, while avoiding narrowing focus on any one 
particular version at the expense of a holistic view.139 
Another relevant area of Ramayana study focuses on the Ramayana as a text intended 
not merely to provide a mythic history, but also to offer models for social structure and 
action. On a different note, Swarna Rajagopalan considers the role played by the Ramayana 
and Mahabharata as instructional manuals for strategy and politics in consideration of the 
fact that both texts would have been written for and targeted at Brahmins and Kshatriyas.140 
While she makes the dubious claim that these texts are equally as relevant in the modern 
world “…although prevailing moral standards are arguably lower in today’s world…” 
Rajagopalan’s focus is specifically on the way the texts reflect Indian political ideas (and 
military) ideas.141 On a similar line, Harsh Verma’s “Leadership and Dharma: The Indian 
Epics Ramayana and Mahabharata and Their Significance for Leadership Today” provides 
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an interesting approach to the text in regards to its potential influence on modern politics and 
political leadership.142 Verma’s analysis focuses on key leadership practices and hierarchies 
driven by understandings of dharma which are depicted in the text: hereditary leadership; 
leadership by tradition; and dharma as moral guidance. While Verma does not apply these 
models to real-world examples of leadership models, his interpretation illustrates the 
approach towards the text used by political leaders of both secularism and Hindutva in 
India.143   
In light of Verma, a more recent focus of academic attention is the relationship 
between Sagar’s 1980s televised serial, Ramayan, and its role in enhancing and amplifying 
the Hindu nationalist movement during the early rise of the BJP. A popular school of thought 
was that the release of the Ramayan contributed to planting the seeds of Hindu nationalism in 
the wider Indian population.144 While this is disputable considering that the swell of support 
for the BJP began in the early-mid 1980s, it is undoubtable that the Ramayana significantly 
boosted the speed with which the BJP and other Hindu nationalist groups gained political and 
social power.145 Shanti Kumar highlights this as indicative of the significant role played by 
electronic capitalism in shaping the parameters of national identity and community. In a 
country where barriers of language, culture, and vastly differing state governments have been 
a major obstacle in establishing a cohesive sense of national identity, the emergence of 
transnational television and media in the 1980s has had the ability to transcend boundaries.146 
Kumar’s work also highlights the role of Doodarshan, the state-run television channel 
introduced in 1959 which aired Sagar’s Ramayan as part of what she argues was a larger 
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nationalist agenda.147 Kumar emphasises the fact that Doodarshan was key to establishing 
hegemonic representations of nationalism and national identity, and also served as a vehicle 
to combat the influences of foreign television and commercial cinema; as a government 
enterprise the station was able to carefully tailor their content to reinforce these messages, 
even in content not based in religion.148 Badri Narayan considers the role of Sagar’s Ramayan 
in the Dalit ‘caste’, and the BJP’s exploitation of the fact that some Dalit communities claim 
a lineage going back to Valmiki. In doing so, Narayan suggests that the popularity of the 
television serial allowed the BJP to more efficiently draw on the classical Ramayana 
tradition.149  
Purnima Mankekar offers an insightful exploration of the intersection of female 
identity in India as intrinsically bound in with the nationalist movement and cultivated by the 
television boom in the 1970s and 1980s. Mankekar’s work employs autobiographical, 
ethnographic, gender, and political analysis, with a focus on the presence and voices of 
women in relation to Hindu nationalism. In doing so, Mankekar examines key themes of the 
Ramayan, their reflection on traditional gender assumptions in India, and the influence this 
depiction has had on the self-perception of Indian Womanhood through an ethnographic 
model.150  
 
2.7. Gender in India  
While the Ramayana is the core of the thesis, its main focus is on gender in India, and 
how the history and lives of women in India have been constrained by the text as a 
representation of modern Hinduism. The role of gender is a significant theme in the 
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Ramayana, and this is noted by a number of writers on the topic; particularly by female 
Indian writers after the establishment of the Indian Association of Women’s Studies in 1982 
and a consequent swell in the output of Women’s Studies in India.151 Gendered narrative and 
sub-narrative is rife in the Ramayana – something which is, according to Sutherland 
Goldman, essential to the structural integrity of the actual verse (kanda.)152  
Velcheru Narayana Rao points out that the binary gender construct which emerged 
through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and cast men as protectors while tying women 
to passive roles, was a narrative form that reflected the cultural ideologies of some, but by no 
means all, Indian communities.153 In a similar light, Usha Zacharias reinterprets Anderson’s 
‘imagined community’ to frame women as “…a metaphor for the erasure of her citizenship, 
even as her sexuality forms the narrative hinge for…the imagined community.”154 This is 
exemplified by the term ‘subaltern’, a Marxist term developed by the Italian Marxist writer 
Antonio Gramsci in the early 1900s.155 The subaltern has become a paradigm used in 
particular South Asian scholars in postcolonial studies to explore the roles of the socially 
marginalised in colonial and postcolonial India, and the Subaltern Studies Collective 
developed by the historian Ranajit Guha has played a significant role in the study of 
postcolonial South Asia.156  Gayatri Spivak, in “Can the Subaltern Speak?” applies this 
paradigm to women and the fact that while women do have voices in postcolonial India, these 
voices are limited and shaped by prevailing expectations. Thus, the space that they occupy in 
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discourse is to a certain extent predetermined and renders anything outside of their allocated 
dialogue unheard.157  
Another significant focus of study is women’s rights and quality of life in postcolonial 
India, and the way that prevailing traditional and patriarchal views (particularly those 
espoused by Hindu nationalists and framed by the Ramayana) continue to shape the 
experiences of women.158 Many academics agree that, particularly in the decades 
immediately following independence, women’s rights stalled or even regressed.159 Part of this 
is because female independence and sexuality in India is commonly seen as the result of 
Western influence – and therefore, un-Indian, as opposed to an adherence to ‘traditional’ 
values of binary gender roles.160 Moreover, the continued influence of traditional 
understandings of gender mean that women are seen as less valuable to potential parents. 
This has manifested itself in the key areas of female foeticide and infanticide, the 
continuation of chauvinistic practices such as dowry, denial of education to women, and 
barriers to women who either wish to enter politics, or who wish to take on more ‘serious’ 
political roles.161 A number of academics highlight the Hindu Code Bill (adopted by the 
Indian government between 1955 and 1956) as a telling example of key women’s issues in 
the postcolonial period, and the prevailing attitudes at the time which diminished the potential 
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effectiveness of the Bill. Chitra Sinha outlines the discourse around motherhood which 
occurred in parliamentary debates about the Bill, exploring the areas of child guardianship 
and custody, divorce, and adoption before and after the Bill’s enactment.162 These debates, 
according to Sinha, demonstrate that the Bill was certainly representative of the gradual 
emergence of women as liberated individuals; but that there nevertheless remained a number 
of significant barriers to female emancipation from the private sphere.163 
There has been a growing focus on the increasing deficit in female children as a result 
of female foeticide and infanticide.164 This has been widely acknowledged as a significant 
result of the intersection between class, socio-cultural tradition, and religion; all of which 
contribute to a setting where female children are, in essence, not valued; particularly for those 
of lower castes and socio-economic status.  Tulsi Patel links this, as well as the continued 
practice of dowry, to girls often being pulled out of school after primary or junior high school 
in order to care for male siblings or aid their mothers.165  This establishes an internalised 
understanding of school education, beyond basic literacy, as subordinate to learning to be 
good housewives. A lack of education therefore obviously minimises already reduced 
employment chances. Mukesh Eswaran also raises an interesting potential link between the 
male concern regarding paternity of their children and the need to ensure social restrictions 
on the mobility of women; greater work opportunities may well represent a threat to women 
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who work outside their homes, meaning that “…nonparticipation in market work has become 
a signal of greater responsibility.”166  
Women might attempt to enter the workforce at a later age when they have fulfilled 
familial responsibilities; however, this minimises their potential for career advancement when 
they are forced to compete with men.167 Indira Mahendravada points out that there has 
certainly been a rise in gender parity in education; but that the unequal structures that have 
been the focus of study since Independence continue to persist.168 This also extends to female 
representation in government; where, while local politics and councils have experienced a 
significant rise in female participation, state and national legislatures remain bereft of a 
significant female proportion.169 This is a fact which has been acknowledged by Indian 
academics since the 1990s.170 It continues to be a major issue, where even a proposal for 
women in parliament (supported by both Congress and the BJP) does not stop women from 
being marginalised from the actual decision-making processes within their own political 
organisations.171 Similarly, Zoya Hasan draws attention to the fact that the Hindu right has, 
for example, successfully mobilised its female base, this “…was not progressive or 
emancipatory politics”, instead using women as a tool for achieving the Hindu nationalist 
goals of the Sangh Parivar.172 Sudha Pai points out that a major part of this is the imbalance 
in education and independent finances; while women have succeeded in Indian politics since 
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independence, much of this has come down to the role of political dynasties in allowing entry 
and efficient function within the democratic system.173  
A number of academic and feminist writers have pointed out the role of education (or 
lack of education) available to Indian women. Nandini Manjrekar points out that this had 
been a troublingly peripheral concern for the women’s movement in the post-colonial 
period.174  She acknowledges that, particularly since the 1980s, the women’s studies 
movement has begun to contribute in larger numbers to drawing attention to the importance 
of women’s education as a tool for promoting equality. This has also been acknowledged 
(including by Manjrekar) as partially due to the fault of the Indian education system itself, 
where sexist values and structures have dominated throughout the 20th and 21st century.  
Narendra Nath Kalia, in a similar vein, highlights the gendering of characters in 
lessons. Men play dominant roles in textbooks, and women are often characterised as passive 
and domestically-oriented.175 This is further cemented by the mandatory study of mytho-
religious texts such as the Ramayana from a young age.176 There is also research related to 
the intersection between class and gender oppression; where class-specific gender roles are 
yet another imposition placed upon a population already burdened by gender 
discrimination.177 Traude Pillai-Vetschera, for instance, stresses that the intersection of class 
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and gender is particularly damaging to, Dalit women as an oppressed group within an already 
oppressed minority.178  
Unfortunately, while the majority of the above-referenced researchers indicate a link 
between gender representation and roles in mythology and religion, few make any specific 
references, either to particular plot/character moments, or to key themes. Many also reference 
a common Indian narrative of Vedic history, where women were said to have held 
considerable freedom and power;179 despite the lack of evidence for this, particularly when 
considering the Ramayana and other mythic texts composed during that period.180 Mallarika 
Sinha Roy also points out that in the aftermath of the first Indian national conference on 
Women’s Studies in 1981 that: 
…a critical engagement with feminist theories and politics…which almost 
inevitably would have produced multiple positions regarding political practice, 
was considered best avoided because women’s groups and organisations 
feared that a recognition of differences within their ranks ‘would allow anti-
feminists to declare that they knew women were incapable of working 
together’.181 
Another key problem with academia relating to women in education and employment, 
which is not the fault of academics, is the difficulty of access to current and accurate data. As 
of 2018, census data from 2011 has still not been formally tabulated or summarised by the 
Indian Census Board, and raw figures are available only in the form of unformatted Excel 
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tables.182 The most contemporary summary of census results on the website is from the 2001 
census. The accuracy of this data is also difficult to ascertain; aside from the immense 
population, a large percentage of Indian citizens live in rural areas, have no permanent 
address, are illiterate, and/or have no formal identification.183 Michelle Hackett notes that, as 
with other developing nations, another significant problem is that accurate and up-to-date 
crime statistics (particularly those relating to violence against women) are difficult to obtain, 
complicating efforts to produce data-driven examinations of issues such as domestic violence 
on a national scale.184 
 
2.8. Hindu nationalism, the BJP and the Ramayana from the 1980s 
The emergence of Hindu nationalism and the theoretical framework for examining it 
is a key theme in this thesis, as outlined above. In terms of historical focus, the period from 
the 1980s to the present day is the most illustrative and relevant area of study when exploring 
the use of the Ramayana and its perpetuation of gender frameworks in constructing a Hindu 
nationalist narrative. 
The wave of support for Hindu nationalism and the rise of the BJP in the 1980s was, 
according to Amrita Basu, unexpected and considered by most academics and observers to be 
a temporary phenomenon.185 When it was obvious that this was not the case, however, two 
key causes were identified. Basu links this rise in the popularity of far-right wing groups to 
the growing view among the lower and middle class of the INC as spineless, inefficient, and 
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unnecessarily bureaucratic.186 B.C Upreti agrees, arguing that the failure of the INC to 
establish a non-religious narrative for the postcolonial Indian state undermined the liberal 
secular nationalism upon which these core institutions are based. This therefore left both the 
INC and the core value of India as a non-religious, secular nation, more vulnerable to 
challenges from ethno-regional movements and fundamentalism based upon notions of 
Hinduness as the core of Indian identity.187  Similarly, Himani Bannerji points to the fact that 
the liberal and secular Indian state which the INC represented “...held an ambiguity at 
heart.”188 In contrast, the general consensus is that the BJP has rarely denied its association 
with Hinduism; in 1989, the then BJP president L. K. Advani told the BBC that “it would not 
be wrong to call the BJP a Hindu party”.189 
Another reason that is occasionally cited as a catalyst for the rise of conservatism and 
cultural/religious national identity is the rapid rate at which India is becoming globalised – 
and also, the discord this results in a largely cash-based economy and a nation still largely 
inhabiting rural areas. The resulting need for some sense of national cohesion and identity 
has, according to Rupal Oza, resulted in fortifying gender and sexual identities, and stricter 
and more homogenous views of India’s cultural and religious narratives – also involving the 
prioritisation of certain narratives such as the Ramayana.190 This is an argument which has 
been increasingly made since the serialisation of the Valmiki Ramayana by Sagar in the 
1980s.191 Arvind Rajagopal, in Politics After Television: Hindu Nationalism and the 
Reshaping of the Public in India, explores the close relationship between televised media and 
the rise of Hindu nationalism in the late 1900s. In discussing the release of Sagar’s Ramayan 
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and its politicisation, Rajagopal contends that the series, whose release coincided with a swell 
in the Ram Janmabhumi movement aimed at demolishing the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya, was 
capitalised upon by the BJP to expand the popularity of the party and the movement.192   
In a similar vein, Purnima Mankekar describes the role of state-run television, where 
Sagar’s Ramayan aired, as a significant part of the rapid developments in cultural shifts 
during the 1980s, particularly those linked to Hindu nationalism.193 Beyond television, 
particularly moving into the twenty-first century, Achin Vainak indicates that rapid 
developments in information and communications technology has facilitated in the knock-on 
effects of protests and ideologies; something which has played a significant part in the ability 
for the BJP and other Hindu nationalist organisations to mobilise and galvanise its base.194 
Part of the consolidation of these kinds of narratives has been, as with gender, the 
manipulation of education. In early 2004, Nandini Sundar pointed to the fact that RSS 
schools (managed by the organisation Vidya Bharati) frame Christianity as a key instrument 
of colonialism, and Islam as representative of the invasion and establishment of the Mughal 
Empire.195 This then easily leads to claims in the textbooks brought out by Vidya Bharati that 
equate ‘holy land’ with ‘motherland’ and argue that Christianity and Islam have their own. 
According to the RSS, therefore, only Hindus can be truly loyal Indian citizens as it is the 
birthplace and holy land of Hinduism.196 
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2.9. Conclusion 
As this chapter has demonstrated, there is certainly a significant amount of literature 
focused upon the subcontinent; however, these fields operate for the most part independently. 
The space where the study of religion, gender, and politics in India intersect remains 
relatively sparsely covered, particularly regarding the relationship between specific religious 
texts and the politics of exclusion in establishing the postcolonial Indian state.  
This chapter outlined some of the key issues relating to this thesis, and the current 
field of research surrounding them.  The first of these was the role of narrative in nation-
building, and the complications that arise when attempting to establish one unifying narrative 
in a multilingual, multicultural state. The second surrounded the place and shape of Hinduism 
in the subcontinent, and its effect on the development of Hindu nationalism and secularism. 
Here, it was established that secularism in India is difficult to define, with most models 
failing to capture the complexities of a Western mode of political theory forced upon a non-
Western region. The Ramayana, as the third area of research, has been acknowledged widely 
to be significant to the cultural, historical, and political makeup of the subcontinent; however, 
there is limited work which demonstrates these links in a cohesive way, while simultaneously 
recognising the amorphous nature of this narrative tradition.197 
The field of gender studies theory, while large, was found to be largely applicable to 
Western cultures and narrative. The virgin/whore complex (which will be explored in the 
next chapter), for instance, while rich with potential application to literature studies and 
gender studies in India, has been rarely utilised (with the notable exception of Vijaisri’s 
work).198 The study of the subaltern broke this mould; while it is a theory applicable to all 
minorities and oppressed groups rather than specifically focused on gender, Spivak and other 
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South Asian writers have successfully taken it from its original Italian Marxist context and 
situated it in the postcolonial Indian state. In gender studies through the lenses of 
anthropology, politics, history, and cultural studies, there exists a significant body of work. 
However, a common weakness was in expanding cursory mentions of the importance of 
culture and religion into cohesive intersectional examinations. 
This is made particularly difficult by the fact that the majority of the academics 
dominating the field of subcontinental studies come from a Western, white academic 
background (including Flood and Klostermaier). Part of this seems to stem from the notion of 
the insider/outsider approach to academia, and the propensity for Western academics to look 
down upon or dismiss work coming from non-Western scholars; in 2015, Wendy Doniger 
told an Indian newspaper that: 
Certainly as someone raised outside, I was struck by aspects of that tradition 
that an insider would have noticed or, perhaps, appreciated in the way that I 
did. By not belonging to any particular Indian community, I was free to learn 
as much as I could…199 
Doniger’s statement skims over the fact that, following this logic, all Western 
academia pertaining to the West should be regarded in the same light. Moreover, she does not 
acknowledge the fact that her process of learning is filtered through Western concepts and 
ideas, which “…need to be adjusted to the specific character of the Indian social, political and 
economic contexts”.200  Mangala Subramaniam similarly criticises Western academics for 
overlooking or marginalising Indian literature on women’s studies and women’s activism, 
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attributing this to a subconsciously imperialist tendency to regard Indian women as victims, 
not agents of change.201 
However, this is not necessarily a shared view among Western academics. Gavin 
Flood, for instance, has called for increased tolerance and acceptance of insider standpoints 
and analysis.202 With this in mind, this thesis addresses the gaps in the analytical literature by 
drawing upon what is available to make connections between these disparate areas of 
research, in order to highlight the unique place of the Ramayana as a powerful literary, 
mythological and cultural force. In doing so, it  demonstrates how the embeddedness of the 
Ramayana in Indian culture and history has been exploited as a tool for Hindu nationalist 
goals. 
Considering the literature outlined above, the next chapter highlights the specific 
academic and methodological approaches that this thesis employs to provide a foundation 
that is convenient for examining the intersecting forces of religious narrative and national 
identity, secularism and nationalism, discourse and literature analysis, and gender. 
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3. Methodological approach 
The ksatriyas accepted the brahmans as their superiors 
and the vaiśyas were subservient to the ksatriyas. 
The sudras, devoted to their proper duty 
served the other three classes. 
(The Ramayana, Bālakāṇḍa, 5:17.)203 
3.1. Summary of relevant methodological areas 
The previous chapter outlined the areas of relevant literature to this thesis. This 
chapter will describe a similarly diverse methodological approach. The varied subject matter 
of this thesis means that there are four key methodological lenses being applied to address 
different aspects of its argument. The first focuses on the approach to reading narrative and 
narrative ecology as a basis for the construction of community and nation. The second 
provides a standing definition for the shape and limits of Indian secularism, as distinct from 
the normative use of the word when talking about Western society. It also situates Indian 
secularism within the context of Hindu nationalism, and establishes the parameters of both in 
opposition to one another. The third outlines the method of analysis and interpretation of the 
Ramayana that this thesis employs, in consideration of the tensions between oral and written 
textual traditions. The fourth lens is two-fold and focuses on gender theory; firstly, in relation 
to literary interpretation, and secondly regarding historical and cultural analysis. 
 
3.2. Narrative and community-building 
This thesis demonstrates that narrative is fundamental to the construction of national 
identity. In the case of many nation-states and communities, this is based in ways of 
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recording history and historical narratives. The methodological approach I am employing 
highlights narratives like the Ramayana as structures that make collective meaning, in this 
case for the Indian nation.204 These mythic narratives have the power to support prevailing 
hierarchies and threaten the birth of new models of what India could become. Mythic 
narratives have particular force because they are tied in with the divine, sometimes 
contributing to very rigid, seemingly unquestionable, power structures that gain a life of their 
own beyond the narrative. 
The key features of effective narratives for creating communities are the selective use 
of past events, key characters, and an overarching structure linking events and characters 
together in a temporally linear way. In doing so, narratives become filters for reality and in 
turn create their own realities, which evolve into a collective, or community, memory.205 This 
means that facts themselves become subordinate to the narrative constructions. In this way, 
narrative becomes a backbone for the development of religion and state as unifying and 
communal forces. 
Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism makes a vital point in linking this kind of community narrative to nationalism. 
Anderson posits that the construction of an imagined community in large-scale society is 
necessary because “…the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their 
fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of 
their communion.”206 Thus, regional differences and deep-rooted issues of social inequality 
and class exploitation are put aside in favour of a common understanding of identity. 
Applying Anderson’s model of the ‘imagined community’ to India and nation-building, is not 
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a simple matter, as Western constructs are rooted in contextual history and therefore do not 
necessarily mesh with Indian identity. Stephan Schlensog posits that understanding India and 
its political tensions requires an understanding of Hinduism.207 Shortly after, he states that 
“…Hinduism has no founder to whom it traces its institution as a religion and as a culture 
with a religious message; it knows no binding dogmas and recognizes no binding teaching 
office.”208 This presents a clear problem: Independence leaders relied upon the rhetoric of 
Hinduism as an all-encompassing religious tradition rooted in India, but accepting of other 
faiths. However, the lack of a defined canon of authoritative texts means that there is no 
singular pillar of belief to support these claims as part of one cohesive Hindu narrative. There 
was, therefore, a lack of a strong centre point for establishing a unifying story of India around 
which a community could be imagined.  
Anderson points to the “old-fashioned novel” as a key device for imagining a nation, 
where millions of people may be connected by print and story, so that individuals “…can 
even be described as passing each other on the street, without ever becoming acquainted, and 
still be connected.”209 While the Ramayana as a tradition is widespread and varied, the 
Valmiki Ramayana is a rich written text in its own right. Therefore, it became a useful tool 
for establishing an imagined community, even though the majority of Indians in the early 
1900s were illiterate and would likely have interacted with Valmiki’s Ramayana through 
truncated oral, dance, or musical interpretations. The mythic origins of Valmiki himself, 
however – he writes himself into the narrative, claiming that he narrated it to Rama’s sons 
after Sita is abandoned by Rama in his care – mean that the Valmiki Ramayana is reinforced 
as a grand narrative not only by the existence of the text, but also by the very existence of its 
author. 
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The strength of the traditionalist Hindu narrative, espoused and encouraged by the 
BJP, means it can easily step into the power vacuum left by the ambiguity of postcolonial 
secular India. The BJP have thus been able to rely on elements of this traditionalist narrative 
to maintain popular support and in the same breath attack political opponents. Part of this 
involves reframing the standard approach to secularism, which is built largely upon western 
patterns of the development of secular society and ideology. In considering Anderson’s work, 
this thesis focuses on the BJP’s construction of a narrative based on the Ramayana as an oral 
text, which is validated by the Valmiki Ramayana’s place in the Hindu scriptural canon. The 
‘authenticity’ of this text is further underscored by the fact that it is written in Sanskrit, which 
is associated with the Hindu philosophical and scriptural canon, and with purely ritual and 
literary practice.210  
Anderson uses the term ‘narrative’ to refer to several different classes of narrative, 
such as the public, the institutional, and the mythic/religious. The Ramayana most closely fits 
the mould of the mythic narrative, defined by Steven Walker as institutional narratives mostly 
found in religious contexts. These myths almost always incorporate some element of the 
supernatural, and are powerful vehicles for embodied meaning. Additionally, they evoke 
strong emotion through character and story, which is cemented through repetition, thereby 
engaging the audience in discourse to which they might not otherwise be exposed.211 
Charlotte Linde employs the term ‘tacit knowledge’, which refers to knowledge which is non-
quantifiable, particularly to those who hold it.212 According to Linde: 
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Stories provide a bridge between the tacit and the explicit, allowing tacit social 
knowledge to be demonstrated and learned, without the need to 
propositionalize ethics, specify in detail appropriate behaviour, or demonstrate 
why particular heroes of the past are relevant today. The reason for this is that 
stories do not only recount past events. They also convey the speaker’s moral 
attitude towards these events: the protagonist of the story acted well, acted 
badly, is to be praised or blamed, can be taken as a model for the hearer’s own 
behaviour.213 
In the context of nation-building and the imagined community, mythic narratives 
provide a model of moral behaviour through the positive portrayal or deification of certain 
characters. Positive and negative behaviour is cemented through compelling storylines, thus 
internalising ethics and social structures, and characters may become archetypes for the 
‘ideal’ mother, son, ruler, or community member. Linde states that these narratives are 
reinforced by events (festivals or holy days), places (ritual sites or temples), and artefacts 
(religious objects, iconography in the form of art or jewellery, or personal shrines).214 The 
Ramayana is deeply embedded in classical Indian music and dance traditions, there are 
numerous temples and shrines to the gods it depicts, and festivals such as Navaratri celebrate 
Rama’s victory over the demon king Ravana.215 These features all mean that the Ramayana is 
a powerful mythic narrative and vehicle for the conveyance of tacit social knowledge.  
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3.3. Framing Indian secularism in opposition to Hindu nationalism 
Western secularism is most often referred to by the pithy “separation of church and 
state”, meaning that religion and state must be confined to their own spheres.216 The 
postcolonial Indian method of nation-building atop a secular foundation attempted to draw 
upon this principle when constructing the boundaries of a postcolonial government. This 
involved transferring a system operating in nation-states that had developed over centuries in 
the particular socio-political milieu of Western Europe to the subcontinent, which had no 
such background. European state identities and governments, on the other hand, had 
gradually accumulated legitimacy among populations in Europe and could thus stand against 
religious authority, which was not the case in India.217 Lokmanya Tilak, an early leader of the 
Indian Independence movement, was a strong critic of the notion of forcing Western forms of 
secular nationalism upon India, as he believed that social change in India had to be based 
upon ‘Indian’ civilisation’s intrinsic socio-religious beliefs and a healthy respect for past 
traditions.218 
In his book The Legacy of the Lokmanya, he claims that there are three major 
philosophies of nation and society: the western liberal; the Marxist; and the Indian.219 As 
previously stated, through the Independence movement Hinduism was frequently represented 
as a binding force that transcended religious boundaries. The idea that Hinduism is a way of 
life, more than it is a religion, was a key aspect of community building often used even by 
liberal secularists like Nehru and Gandhi.  The long presence of religious diversity in the 
subcontinent, moreover, has meant that the relationship between state and religion has had to 
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be one of tolerance and acceptance, rather than rejection of religious principles in legal and 
bureaucratic structures.220 This thesis therefore uses the term ‘secular’ to refer to the groups 
of political systems in India which are intended to support and advocate for equal 
representation and respect for the diversity of religious traditions.  
Ashis Nandy’s ‘hierarchy of secularism’, mentioned in the previous chapter, offers a 
multilayered approach to viewing different Indian secular models.221 Nandy lays out four 
different layers of secularism, particularly in the subcontinent in the postcolonial period. At 
the top of the hierarchy are, ostensibly, political actors who are not publicly or privately 
religious believers; Jawaharlal Nehru serves a perfect example of this – indeed, he was 
occasionally critical of Hinduism and stipulated in his will that he did not want any form of 
religious funeral.222 Second in this hierarchy are those who are believers in private, but not in 
public – such as Indira Gandhi. The third rung covers people who are believers in public but 
not in private. Finally, in Nandy’s scaffold, lie those who are religious in both private and 
public domains – most notably, Gandhi.223 Nandy argues that Gandhi’s religious tolerance, 
while manifesting on a legislative level in a similar manner to secularism, was rooted in 
religious values, and therefore that the Indian construct of secularism is at least partially 
founded on and based upon acceptance of religious diversity, rather than a separation of 
religion and state.224 Simultaneously, however, Gandhian and Nehruvian secularism as an 
imposed construct relies on members of religious communities diluting their faith, leaving the 
potential for religious groups to exploit feelings of resentment. John Zavos suggests a 
separation of Hindu nationalism and Indian nationalism; the former being an ideology based 
on religious and ethnic communalism, while the latter is the universalism of Gandhi and 
                                                 
220 Pantham, “Indian Secularism and Its Critics,” 526. 
221 Nandy, “The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of Religious Tolerance,” 181. 
222 Klostermaier, A Survey of Hinduism, 43. 
223 Nandy, “The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of Religious Tolerance,” 183. 
224 Nandy, 186. 
57 
 
Nehru (albeit rooted in the idea that Hinduism as a religion is all-encompassing).225 This, in 
fact, serves as a secondary mythic narrative in Indian independence; that Hinduism is able to 
transcend itself to consider the beliefs of other religions valid paths to enlightenment, and is 
thus implicitly superior to other religions which are restricted to one narrative.226  
Applauding Hinduism as a rallying point for all Indians provides many opportunities 
for Hindu religious groups, particularly those of a more conservative bent. In reframing 
secularism as an imposed Western ideology promoting tolerance of diverse faiths at the 
expense of the supposed Hindu foundation of India, radical Hindu nationalism has been able 
to develop in its own right despite the continued presence of religious influence in Indian 
secularism. The BJP has claimed that both the term and the construct of secularism in India 
has been used to “…denigrate the Hindu categories and symbols of the majority community 
and justify the pampering of the minority communities.”227 “According to Nandy, the 
ideology of Hindu nationalist revivalism or fundamentalism borrows from the models of 
Semitic religions and of the modern Western nation-state, and is therefore “another form of 
Westernisation”.”228 Nandy’s model of Indian nationalism as conceptualised by Gandhi and 
Nehru was the basis of the Indian National Congress (INC)’s vision for national identity. 
Based on unity of Indians regardless of caste, religion, or creed under a sense of national 
identity, ‘Indian secularism’ therefore stands as an inclusive model in opposition to the 
Hindutva focus on Hinduism as the fundamental core of India’s history, culture, and future. 
The self-inflicted weakness of the INC model of secularism has given Hindutva supporters 
the chance to make their own space in the crafting of postcolonial Indian identity, based on 
the exclusion of those opposed to a strict interpretation of Indian identity and history as 
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inextricably wound up with Hinduism.229 This thesis focuses on this process of exclusion as 
used by Hindu nationalists and Hindu nationalist organisations such as the BJP, in order to 
establish political mechanisms in the Indian nation-state which ensure that minorities and the 
disempowered are forced to either abide by a strict vision of ‘the nation’, or otherwise to be 
invalidated and subjugated.  
 
3.4. Reading the Ramayana 
There are two main approaches to reading the Ramayana. The first approach, is that 
Valmiki’s Ramayana, is the original and authoritative narrative, with later tellings being 
interpretations and adaptations rather than authoritative in their own right.230 Sheldon 
Pollock, for instance, claims that Valmiki’s poem is the core text at the heart of the 
Ramayana tradition, and that other tellings are “…always retellings of a text everyone 
knows.”231 The second approach is to grant at least some weight to versions of the Ramayana 
in other religions, languages, and geographic regions; and to refer to the collective of 
presentations of the story of Rama as the ‘Ramayana tradition’.232 This is a model which is 
less binary and elitist, and takes into account the fact that while the modern understanding of 
the Ramayana is that it was written by Valmiki, the reason that it is embedded in Indian 
history and culture is due to the variety of Ramayanas – particularly in oral, music, and dance 
form – which spread across the subcontinent.233  
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Both models acknowledge Valmiki’s work as the origin of the Ramayana tradition, 
however, the first elevates it while sidelining the significance of others.234 The second 
focuses on the idea of the ‘Ramayana tradition’ – a term encapsulating all of the varied and 
diverse tellings and interpretations of the Ramayana, including elements that may have been 
excluded from or only briefly mentioned in Valmiki's version. This also refers to the 
performative and oral traditions which would have preceded Valmiki’s text (indeed, in the 
poem’s opening, Valmiki is gifted the narrative in oral form by a wandering sage and poet for 
the gods.) Acknowledging the deeply embedded role of oral narrative in Indian culture is 
extremely important, especially considering that Sanskrit, as a scholarly and liturgical 
language, has been and continues to be a largely inaccessible medium particularly for a 
population governed by a Constitution that recognises twenty-two official languages.235 In 
1945, only two years before independence, less than a tenth of India’s population of three 
hundred million were literate.236 This further emphasises that while the Valmiki Ramayana’s 
central written narrative was relatable enough for Nehru and Gandhi's rhetoric to resonate 
with the general populace, the true reason for its success as a tool of national identity creation 
has been its rich oral narrative ecology.237 
While acknowledging this vast tradition, this thesis deliberately employs the BJP’s 
interpretive approach to the Ramayana – as a concrete narrative canonised by Valmiki, albeit 
with some cultural variations. As a text for the political and academic elite, it has served to 
shape not only cultural narratives and the arts, but also the socio-political fabric of the region. 
This thesis analyses two key aspects of Valmiki’s Ramayana considering the above. The first 
is on the use of character to create an archetype of the ideal woman as inherently passive and 
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defined only in relation to the men around them. The second examines the wider idealised 
representation of classical Indian society in the text and its gendered nature.238  
Therefore, the analytical lens that I am applying to the Ramayana is shaped by and 
centred on the way in which dharma and gender rhetoric combine to create an overarching 
theme and mould within which women are shunted into passive roles, and the masculine is 
deemed more ‘useful’ to greater society. Through focusing on the framing of character – in 
particular Rama and Sita – I will aim to draw greater conclusions about the social structures 
and gender assumptions made in the text.  
 
3.5. Gender 
This thesis employs two distinct forms of gender analysis methodology. The first 
follows on from the above intended approach to the Ramayana, and employs the goddess 
(virgin)/whore dichotomy. This theme, which is a common feature of gender analysis, refers 
to the almost impossible demands of perfection that woman in many religious and historical 
texts are forced to face, and the disgrace they experience should they fall short of this 
standard. This is intertwined with the second approach to gender that this thesis employs; the 
othering of women, where women are defined by their passivity and silence. This is best 
exemplified by the notion of the subaltern as outlined in the literature review of the last 
chapter, and framed by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak in the essay “Can the Subaltern 
Speak?”239   
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This virgin/whore dichotomy is a Western feminist concept originating in the theories 
and work of the late nineteenth/early twentieth century psychologist Sigmund Freud.240 It 
describes a construct which emerges in several narrative traditions in varied forms and under 
different names; each of which describes the polarisation of women between two rigid 
models. According to the virgin/whore dichotomy, ‘good’ women are those who either do not 
express themselves as sexual beings, or who only do so within the bounds of marriage. 
Women who do not reach this ideal, meanwhile, are immediately classified as ‘whores’.241 
Wendy Doniger points to the theme of the mother as an “ancient and persistent Hindu 
mythology”, who is characterised as virtuous and wholly devoted to sons.242 While a mother 
is not chaste in a sexual sense, her unwavering loyalty to her husband and sons places her in 
the category of the positive and virtuous female archetype. The other key character in this 
archetype is the chaste virgin. Like the mother figure, the girl is obedient to the men in her 
life. Contrasted against this, Doniger continues, is the female villain; often a demon in 
Sanskrit texts, who attempts to use her sexuality to manipulate men and undermine pure 
women. This dichotomy associates positive womanhood strongly and irrevocably with the 
non-sexual, and in some cases, elevates this to goddesshood. Any deviation from the ‘good 
woman’ mould irrevocably categorises women as a “bad mother/whore”.243 
Priyadarshini Vijaisri, a fellow at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies in 
Delhi applies this construct specifically to Indian feminism and feminist movements. While 
Vijaisri is specifically concerned with the alienation of outcaste (Dalit) women in opposition 
to caste women, the same construct is transferable to the relationship between the ideal of the 
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female deity or the virtuous woman in Hindu texts, and Hindu women in India. The 
adaptation of Vijaisri’s construct serves as a bridge between the ‘Madonna/whore’ complex 
as applicable to Indian culture, and the model of the subaltern. The ‘subaltern’, which as 
stated in the previous chapter was drawn from the work of Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, 
has become popular in South Asian Studies. The term “…was used to signify the centrality of 
dominant/dominated relationships in history”, where the ‘subaltern’ is the subjugated or 
subordinate group.244 Subaltern studies therefore aims to focus on the experiences and actions 
of subaltern groups, from the perspective of the subaltern rather than that of the oppressor. In 
reference to gender, this model is best expounded upon by Gayatri Spivak, a prominent 
Indian literary and gender theorist.  
In the essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?” Spivak examines the role of women 
particularly in colonial Indian society as silent actors. She argues that there is a key 
distinction between the terms ‘speak’ and ‘talk’. Women may physically talk and be vocally 
expressive but, but according they cannot be heard as active social voices with independent 
agency. Additionally, women’s history and female narratives are viewed from external, 
dominant perspectives as objects of examination rather than individual beings. Furthermore, 
whether women were living under colonial rule or participating in anticolonial insurgencies, 
the same gender constructs applied to keep males in the dominant position. Spivak goes on to 
state that “…the protection of woman…becomes a signifier for the establishment of a good 
society…”245 In both situations, women are judged by their ability to act according to a script 
which furthers the aims of men.  
By applying this lens to the Ramayana and to women in colonial and postcolonial 
India, it is evident that women have been primarily represented as actors in predetermined 
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roles, with limited autonomous action and thought available to them. Moreover, attempting to 
subvert or break this imposed archetype leads to negative consequences for those individuals, 
as acting out against the dominant discourse is a violation not against specific persons, but 
rather against the social fabric.  This thesis considers Spivak’s theory of the subaltern and its 
distinction between the Indian woman’s ability to talk versus their ability to speak, in relation 
to the female voice in Indian history, culture, and politics, and the role of Hinduism as 
defined by Hindutva in shaping the limits of how women are heard in modern India.  
 
3.6. Conclusion 
By combining these related frameworks and understandings, this thesis’s analysis 
builds on the methodological framework of Benedict Anderson’s ‘imagined community’ and 
Charlotte Linde’s ‘tacit knowledge’ in the role of narrative as a unifying force. These terms 
operate as a joined lens to examine how the Ramayana has been used in establishing a 
foundational narrative for Hindu nationalists. The reading of the text and text analysis is 
focused on the Valmiki Ramayana as the basis for the modern popular understanding of 
Hinduism and the extremely popular television serial, while acknowledging that there is also 
a rich and vast Ramayana culture. 
The model of secularism that this thesis refers to is distinct to that of Western 
secularism, and the extent to which the Indian state and legislature may be called secular is 
debatable.246 According to the nation’s Constitution it is a secular state. Legally members of 
all religions are considered equal citizens in the eyes of the government, and this is what 
Hindu nationalists seek to question.. Considering the framework provided by Ashis Nandy, 
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‘secularism’ is the most appropriate term for the system of government and society proposed 
by Independence activists and currently in place in modern India. 
The next chapter applies the literary interpretive methodological approach outlined 
above to the Ramayana, to extract readings in light of the virgin/whore literary paradigm 
against the backdrop of Spivak’s construction of women as part of the subaltern. It also 
considers the 1987 television serial Ramayan (Ramanand Sagar) as a tool for reviving the 
imagined community of consumers of the Ramayana in all its forms, as well as for adding to 
the swell in traditionalist Hindu nationalism through the 1980s. 
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4. A background and analysis of the Ramayana tradition 
His shoulders are broad and his arms are massive. 
His neck is like a conch shell and his face is beautiful. 
His collarbone is set deep in muscle 
his eyes pleasantly reddish. 
Everyone has heard of Rama, my lady. 
(The Ramayana, Sundarakāṇḍa, 33:15.)247 
4.1. Introduction  
The Ramayana (literally Story of Rama) is a key religious narrative in Hinduism that 
has become a recent site of political and cultural contention. It a text that is difficult to date 
precisely, due to its origins out of a long oral tradition.248  Its influence is nevertheless 
demonstrably significant, both in and of itself and in the way in which it has shaped other 
texts and social narratives. The text’s significance is not limited to India; it has a profound 
cultural influence in Nepal, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, and in the Hindu Indonesian region of Bali. 
Despite this widespread presence, the Ramayana has nevertheless come to play a vital role in 
the forging of national identity in the postcolonial Indian nation. This chapter examines key 
themes of politics, patriarchy, and the archetypes of ideal manhood and womanhood that are 
represented in the text. It highlights the strong presence of the virgin/whore dichotomy in the 
text, and the way in which these are used to silence women or shunt them into passive roles. 
Finally, this chapter explores the release and reception of the 1987 television serial Ramayan 
by Ramanand Sagar, its impact on and relation to women, and its context in the rise of Hindu 
nationalist politics. 
                                                 
247 Vālmīki, Goldman, and Pollock, The Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmīki, 1996, 202. 
248 Sakalani, “Questioning the Questioning of Ramayanas,” 52. 
66 
 
As earlier stated, The Ramayana is one of two significant mythological epics that are 
considered particularly important in ‘normative Hinduism’; the other is the Mahabharata, a 
substantially longer text that includes the well-known Bhagavad Gita.249 The Sanskrit-
language poem was composed by Valmiki, a semi-mythic Hindu sage and poet who attributes 
authorship to himself and writes himself into the text.250 Dating the work is difficult but it is 
situated between approximately 500 BCE and 100 BCE , though narrative elements linking 
Rama directly to the god Vishnu are more likely to have been added during the second 
century BCE, and the character of Rama most likely precedes the Ramayana in regional oral 
myth and narrative.251 According to Romesh Chunder Dutt, a notable nineteenth century 
translator of the Ramayana, the text we have today is the product of centuries of revision and 
refinement, though the main narrative was probably conceived by a single author.252 The 
Ramayana comprises of 24000 verses, 500 chapters (sargas) and seven books (kandas). It is 
approximately 480 000 words, making it about four times the length of the Iliad and one of 
the longest ancient world classics. Popular reinterpretations in other Indian languages include 
the Hindi Ramcharitmanas (Goswami Tulsidas, sixteenth century), the Tamil 
Kambaramayanam (Kamban, twelfth century).  
Just as there are many manifestations and variants of Hinduism, there have been 
numerous different oral and written versions of the Ramayana. Valmiki’s Ramayana is 
widely considered to be the original – and therefore most authoritative – version of the 
narrative.253 Despite the myriad of different versions of the Ramayana that are quite popular, 
the BJP refer almost always to the Valmiki text as the ‘most authoritative’ version, thereby 
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highlighting it as a central ‘canon’ tradition on which to base its own ideological reading.254 
While the text is situated in the specific historical and cultural period of classical India, is 
also framed as a partly instructional work, and as a guideline for correct – dharmic – conduct 
regardless of time period or location. Alongside the Mahabharata the Ramayana effectively 
forms part of India’s historical inheritance and cultural DNA.255 Additionally, the work is 
respected and venerated for the wide range of themes it explores, particularly pertaining to 
gender and gender relations/roles in classical Indian culture, and its society and characters are 
frequently touted as a model for an ‘ideal’ Indian society. While the Ramayana demonstrates 
very little evidence of historical accuracy or historicity, it is read by a number of Hindus (and 
portrayed as such) as being representative of historical fact rather than mythological.256 A 
significant reason for this is the use of the text by Hindu nationalists in establishing a shared 
national origin myth, where the Ramayana’s events are represented as part of India’s history 
and heritage. 
 
4.2. The Ramayana: History and narrative 
While the Ramayana is situated within the text as being from an era long passed, the 
geography and society it represents is similar to that of the context of its conception. The 
subcontinent between 500BCE and 100BCE (the probable timeframe within which the text 
evolved) was characterised by a number of dynasties and empires occupying various regions 
in nation-states and independent kingdoms. The social structure was largely caste-based, 
though the system was likely not quite so distinct or rigidly enforced as it would come to be 
in later centuries. This was the culmination of the Vedic period (1500BCE-500BCE 
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approximately), during which the liturgical Vedas were composed and the principles of the 
caste system were implemented. The key kingdoms mentioned in the text are known 
historical, geographical, and cultural regions. The kingdom of Kosala and its capital 
Ayodhya, of which the titular character Rama is prince, was situated in what is modern Uttar 
Pradesh in central northern India.257 Mithila, where Rama’s wife Sita is from, is believed to 
be a geographical region in the north-eastern state Bihar.  
The Ramayana is simultaneously simple and difficult to summarise. In its most 
reduced form, it is a narrative based around the archetypal hero (Rama) who faces hardship 
with equanimity until he is faced with the abduction of his feminine counterpart and wife 
(Sita). After a lengthy struggle, he defeats the evil king who took her (Ravana) and they 
return home. However – as with many other works of epic literature, the core narrative is not 
necessarily the most important part. Indeed, the framing language and secondary narratives 
play as significant – if not more significant – role in shaping the reader’s understanding of the 
greater context and situating of the primary story.  
The following is a brief summary of the Ramayana, provided to facilitate an easier 
understanding of the central text and proceeding analysis: 
 
Book Summary 
I. Bālakāṇḍa The ascetic Valmiki asks the famous sage Narada (a figure 
who also appears in the Mahabharata and other myths) if there has 
ever been a truly virtuous man. Narada tells Valmiki about Rama, the 
prince and King of Ayodhya.  
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Inspired, Valmiki writes the Ramayana and teaches it to his 
disciples and Rama’s twin sons, Lava and Kusha (though their 
parentage isn’t revealed till the last book.) 
The full story begins here, where Rama is described as the 
incarnation of the god Vishnu, who is responding to the complaints 
from other deities about the rakshasa (demon) King Ravana. He is 
born to Kaushalya, the first wife of Dasharatha, king of Ayodhya. The 
book goes on to describe Rama and his youngest brother Lakshmana’s 
upbringing, Rama’s heroic slayings of powerful demons, and his 
wedding to Princess Sita of Mithila. 
II. Ayodhyākāṇḍa Twelve years after Rama and Sita’s marriage, King Dasharatha 
decides to hand kingship over to Rama. However, the night before the 
coronation, Dasharatha’s second wife Kaikeyi is goaded by her 
maidservant into calling upon two boons that her husband had granted 
her years ago after she saved his life. She demands that Dasharatha 
give the throne to her son, Bharata, and that he exile Rama to the 
wilderness for fourteen years to ensure a peaceful transition.  
Heartbroken but duty-bound, Dasharatha agrees. Rama accepts 
with equanimity, despite the anger and sorrow of those around him. 
His loyal brother Lakshmana demands to go with Rama, as does Sita. 
When the three leave, Dasharatha dies of grief. Bharata, who was 
away during this episode, returns to discover his mother’s doings. He 
follows Rama to bring him back to Ayodhya, but Rama is determined 
to fulfil his father’s vow. Bharata returns to rule as Rama’s regent.  
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III. Araṇyakāṇḍa Thirteen years pass with relative peace as Rama, Lakshmana, 
and Sita travel the forests. Rama and Lakshmana defeat many demons 
and further develop their reputations as fearless warriors, while living 
off the land. In the last year of exile, Rama is approached by 
Surpanakha, the sister of King Ravana of Lanka. Smitten by Rama, 
she attempts to seduce first him then Lakshmana, till Rama spurns 
her. Angered, she attempts to kill Sita but is stopped and mutilated by 
Lakshmana.  
When news of this reaches Ravana, he determines to capture 
Sita in revenge by sending a demon in the shape of a golden deer to 
entrance her, and to draw Rama and Lakshmana away. By taking the 
form of an elderly beggar, Ravana coaxes Sita out of the protection 
spell Lakshmana cast around their cottage, and abducts her. Entranced 
by her beauty, he demands she marry him, but she refuses. Rama and 
Lakshmana discover Sita’s abduction and immediately set out to 
rescue her. 
IV. Kiṣkindhākāṇḍa Rama and Lakshmana meet Sugriva, the former king of the 
monkey kingdom Kiṣkindhā and current exile. Rama helps the 
monkey Sugriva to regain his throne from his elder brother Vali, in an 
arguable breach of his strict moral and ethical code (Rama shoots Vali 
in the back, thus not only interceding in a personal battle but also 
contravening principles of correct conduct). After restoring King 
Sugriva to the throne, Rama is promised aid and the monkey King 
Sugriva sends out search parties. The southern search party, which 
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includes Rama’s greatest devotee, the monkey god Hanuman, 
discovers that Sita was taken to Lanka. 
V. Sundarakāṇḍa After Hanuman discovers his divine heritage, he leaps across 
the ocean to the island of Lanka. He finds Sita, who is losing faith in 
Rama rescuing her, and gives her Rama’s signet ring as a sign of his 
authenticity and Rama’s fidelity. She thanks him but refuses to return 
with him, saying that she will wait till Rama comes to avenge her 
abduction. Hanuman is captured but tells Ravana to release Sita, then 
escapes while setting fire to Ravana’s citadel before returning to 
Kiṣkindhā. 
VI. Yuddhakāṇḍa Rama, Lakshmana, and their allies move to attack Lanka. 
After a lengthy battle, during which Lakshmana is almost killed, 
Rama kills Ravana and installs Ravana’s brother on the throne. Sita is 
joyful at being reunited with Rama, but he refuses to take her back on 
the grounds that, after having lived with another man for over a year, 
her virtue might be compromised. Devastated, Sita walks into a 
sacrificial fire but is unharmed and led out of the fire by the god of 
Fire, Agni, who attests to her purity. Rama reveals that he knew that 
she was innocent but had to prove it to the public. Rama, Lakshmana, 
and Sita return to Ayodhya triumphantly.  
VII. Uttarakāṇḍa258 Rama and Sita have ruled peacefully for some time, when Sita 
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falls pregnant. However, their joy is undermined when Rama begins 
to hear rumours that his citizens are beginning to think him cuckolded 
by Sita. Determined to save his reputation as King, Rama orders 
Lakshmana to leave Sita in the forest. The devastated Queen is found 
by the sage Valmiki and taken into his care. Sita gives birth to twins, 
who grow up to be his disciples. He teaches them the story of Rama 
(thus completing the return to the time of the first book.) Rama 
discovers that Sita and his children are living in the forest and 
attempts to bring her back. After suggesting that she endure one more 
ordeal by fire, Sita rejects him and calls upon her mother (Earth) to 
receive her. The earth opens and swallows Sita, leaving Rama 
devastated and alone. 
 
4.3. Power, Politics, and Patriarchy 
According to Paula Richman, a standard reading of the Ramayana offers the 
following three themes: elevation of the notion of the king; Rama’s personality and conduct 
as an example for people; and a utopian ideal of the perfect society as depicted by the end of 
the story.259 Each of these centres around the construction and maintenance of a particular 
political and social  systems, which allows for the existence of a state which is itself 
represented as gendered. In approaching the text through the lens of gender analysis, three 
key points emerge: that the language of the Ramayana is inherently gendered; even in 
representations of non-living entities and concepts such as that of the kingdom; that this 
language allows for the imposition of patriarchal gender norms, where men are framed as the 
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key agents of development and action; and finally, that the inevitable consequence of this is 
the silencing and/or pacification of women.260  
While the narrative of the Ramayana has developed into a popular myth, it is 
important to recognise that Valmiki’s is a text directed very much at the elite and the ruling 
class.261 There are almost no working-class characters in the text, an important thing to 
consider in terms of its impact and interpretations particularly in light of the way in which 
female representation in the text reflects on its impact in society.262 Moreover, leading into 
the approaches of individual characters to gender, it is interesting to note the language 
Valmiki uses when talking about the role of the king in the state. The vast majority of the 
language used to frame nations casts the state in the role of the feminine, in need of 
guardianship and management by the masculine strength and male-dominated hierarchy, 
particularly within the elite Kshatriya and Brahmin castes; Valmiki describes the city of 
Ayodhya in the aftermath of King Dasharatha’s death as being “…like a woman bereft of her 
husband.” (II.60.61)263 The concept of dharma strongly frames this on both fronts; 
individuals are bound by the restrictions and expectations of their caste and gender.264  This 
blend of caste and gender is reflected in the constant rhetoric regarding the role of the king – 
both in the abstract, and in reference to Rama’s father Dasharatha, Ravana of Lanka, and 
Rama himself. The king is framed as “…the guardian of the four classes of society. He is the 
guardian of his own conduct and of righteousness.” (V:33:11)265 Therefore, masculine 
domination encompasses not only the political but also social, cultural, and moral spheres. 
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Women, meanwhile, are relegated to motherly roles, even in the social abstract; "...like a 
woman bereft of her husband, the city of Ayodhya with its great king was cast into gloom." 
(II:60:16)266 Where male social roles differ greatly depending on caste, marriage and 
motherhood transcend social barriers to be the ultimate aim and responsibility for women. In 
referring to a woman’s dharma as being to “…show her husband and earnestly strive to 
please and benefit him…” Valmiki even claims that this is a heavenly edict, declaring that 
they were “…revealed in the Veda and handed down in the world…” (II:21:20)267 This view, 
incidentally, was mirrored to some extent  in the 1990s by KR Malkani, the then-Vice 
President of the BJP.268 
One prevalent element of the Ramayana is the relationship between men and women, and the 
social constructs underpinning this dynamic.  This is particularly evident when considering 
the way in which men and male beauty are central to the Ramayana – and no more so than on 
Rama. Descriptions of his appearance are frequent, and mostly focus on his size and 
musculature. 
Rama was…renowned throughout the world for his manliness as well. His 
arms were long, his strength immense, and he carried himself like a bull 
elephant in rut. (II.3.11.)269 
He is wise and grounded in proper conduct. Eloquent and majestic, he 
annihilates his enemies. (I:1:9)270  
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His shoulders are broad and his arms are massive. His neck is like a conch 
shell and his face is beautiful. His collarbone is set deep in muscle 
his eyes pleasantly reddish. (V:33:15.)271 
 
All of these descriptors are focussed on typically ‘positive’ masculine traits; physical 
strength, virility, excellence in battle, and righteous leadership. The comparison to a “bull 
elephant in rut” ties his reproductive capabilities not only to his sex but to his physical and 
mental strength.272 This link between the physical and mental is reflected in descriptions of 
other righteous male characters (Dasharatha is described as a “glorious bull” (II.59.14) but 
also a righteous and powerful king.)273 Rama is also endowed with what may be considered 
softer and more feminine traits, such as obedience, forgiveness, and reconciliation; he often 
serves as a calming and moderating force particularly to his brother Lakshmana.274 Physical 
descriptions which focus on his aesthetics and are framed in a less typically ‘male’ way are 
also common: “Rama was handsome…he was shapely and slim of waist…his hair was jet 
black.” (III:16.8-10)275 However, these traits of Rama’s are generally overshadowed or 
represented only as a sidenote.276 
Moreover, in keeping with the notion of men as protectors of society, the health and 
virtue of its rulers and men in general are centred as deeply intertwined with the welfare of 
the state. Ironically, this is fairly fragile – as is evident in the fact that part of Rama’s 
reasoning for regaining Sita is the dependence of his honour (and therefore that of Ayodhya) 
on protecting his wife and his virtue. In being held by Ravana by more than a year, therefore, 
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Rama’s honour is predicated on Sita’s extreme act of attempted self-immolation. This means, 
moreover, that till she undertakes this act he treats her coldly and cruelly in front of his army 
and the citizens of Lanka. Her feelings and love for him are irrelevant in the face of his 
achievement of winning her back and rectifying the insult that Ravana (and by extension, 
she) inflicted upon him.277  
In considering the extreme actions Sita is forced to resort to in order to compensate 
for her perceived mistake – coveting the deer – it is interesting and striking to note the way in 
which male characters are ‘punished’ for their own errors. Rama, for instance, wrongly 
accuses Sita of infidelity – not only at the end of his war against Ravana, but again while she 
is pregnant. In justifying his actions as essential in order to protect his and her honour, he is 
able to not only obfuscate responsibility but frame himself as having taken the noble and 
dharmic path, through asserting his patriarchal power over her.278  
Indeed, the victimisation of women, while a repeated occurrence in the narrative, is 
addressed only superficially by the story’s characters. Ravana inflicts significant emotional 
pain on Sita by kidnapping and keeping her isolated in captivity to coerce her into marrying 
him. However, that is not the action that he is most reproached for by the narrator and his 
advisors. Before Rama attacks Lanka, Ravana’s brother Vibhishana attempts to persuade the 
king to return Sita with the following advice: “There are three faults that lead one to ruin: 
theft of another’s property, raping another man’s wife, and excessive distrust of one’s 
friends.”(VI:74:20)279 The emphasis here is not on the wrongness of rape; rather, in keeping 
with the other two faults that Vibhishana lists, it is on the damage this inflicts on the man. 
The woman in this situation – Sita, who is counted as both wife and property in the 
perception of Valmiki’s male characters – is stripped of autonomy, and the suffering inflicted 
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upon her sidelined in favour of how it affects Rama. The decentring of women in their own 
lives and issues is a common theme throughout the Ramayana, and one which will reappear 
in following chapters. 
 
4.4. Talking women and speaking men: silencing the active female voice 
In contrast to the above depictions of Rama, female characters are very rarely 
described by name; rather, most often, by descriptors. This is reflective, of the general 
framing of women in the Ramayana; as passive objects, whose emotions are inconsequential 
unless they have a direct effect either on the male narrative or on male characters. While 
there are some female characters who have some agency in their narrative, it is most often 
minimised unless it has a direct effect on the story’s men.  
Both of these elements are seen most clearly in Sita, as the main female character in 
the Ramayana, and in many ways the core plot device of the over-arching narrative. Sita is, in 
and of herself, a fairly robust and fleshed-out character, who is (or should be) prestigious in 
her own right. The adopted daughter of the King of Mithila, Sita was found in a plough 
furrow – symbolising her position as the daughter of the Earth – meaning that she is 
introduced as not only an earthly princess, but also a deity (or at least the incarnation of a 
deity.) Though Sita is a primary character, she is almost always framed passively, with any 
active, assertive, or aggressive behaviour is nearly always represented in a negative light.280 
A key example of this is when she lashes out at Lakshmana after hearing Rama call for help 
while in the forest; Lakshmana responds by saying “…I dare not answer, Maithili, for you are 
a deity in my eyes. And yet inappropriate words from a woman come as nothing new…” 
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(III:43:178).281 Despite his apparent devotion  to and respect for Sita, in the space of one 
sentence Lakshmana turns on her for breaking the soft-spoken and subservient ideal she is 
supposed to embody. 
The message of Sita’s submissiveness to the men around her is constant throughout 
Valmiki’s Ramayana. The a number of occasions where Sita’s name is not even used, instead 
being replaced with the titles ‘wife’ or ‘daughter’; she is a role, rather than an individual. For 
example, Valmiki describes the abduction of Sita as: “Then, having slain the vulture Jatayu, 
he carried off Rama’s wife.” (I.1.36)282 In using this phrasing, Rama is framed as the 
wronged party, while Sita is framed as a stolen possession of his.283 Just as she is defined by 
her relationship to Rama or her father, Sita’s worth is placed constantly in her virtue and in 
her devotion and obedience to Rama. Indeed, even the key display of her more-than-human 
nature, when she walks through fire and emerges unharmed, is explained both before and 
during the event as the product of her fidelity: 
Because of her asceticism, her truthfulness, and her complete devotion to 
her husband alone, she might burn fire, but fire could never burn her. 
(V:53:23)284 
Moreover, this act and its implications of divinity are not enough to save her from the 
scrutiny of the public or to ‘redeem’ her for having been abducted and potentially 
compromising her honour. 
Much of the representation of women in the text is framed in this manner. Positively 
viewed female characters are indicated by their passivity, and ‘evil’ women are framed 
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through their initiative, assertiveness, and aggression. The representation of women in the 
Ramayana is lacking, not necessarily in the number of female characters, but in their 
significance to either minor or major narratives, as well as in their descriptions. Even in the 
case of women who have a noticeable presence in the text, their contributions are largely 
passive, and this passivity is encouraged by the men around them as well as by the women 
they interact with. In this manner, notions of female identity and social roles are reinforced, 
further cementing within the text’s social structure the role of women as obedient mothers 
and wives, defined before marriage by their purity, and by virtue and fidelity after marriage. 
This message continues to resonate in the minds of modern Indian women; Sita is intended to 
reflect the dharma of all women, regardless of class or caste.285 Even more than this – even in 
the face of maltreatment by spouses, the text repeatedly adjures female characters who desire 
to remain virtuous to “…hold her husband, whether he is virtuous or not, to be a deity 
incarnate." (II:56:5)286 Moreover, the relationship between husband and wife is repeatedly 
portrayed as more distinct than that of a subordinate and their superior. Indeed, the text is 
adamant that “…A husband is a woman's deity…” (II:32:27)287 Valmiki never suggests that 
in turn, a husband should strive to fulfil his duties to his wife; rather, that he should abide by 
the dharma of his caste. Where men are represented as individuals with personal and social 
dharma, the Ramayana clearly indicates that women may well be interchangeable, so long as 
they worship and serve the men in their lives. 
In the Ramayana, women are clearly framed in relation to two key categories. The 
first is the ‘virgin’ – a virtuous, obedient woman who fulfils her social obligations of fidelity, 
demureness, and gentleness, to the extent that she may be endowed with goddess-like powers. 
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The second placed in opposition to the ideal woman, is the notion of the ‘whore’ – a category 
into which is placed any woman who fails to meet the standards of the virgin ideal.  
Each of these primary female characters therefore attach or are encouraged to attach 
their sense of self-worth – and even the very notion of their existence – to their husbands and 
sons and their fidelity to the male figures in their lives. This is a message that is repeated and 
consolidated throughout the text. The following are examples of this discourse; indeed, the 
reader is told that “…a woman whose husband has left her cannot go on living”. (II:26:5)288 
Ultimately, female fidelity is the core of her identity; while male fidelity is almost irrelevant, 
as women are directed to worship their husbands regardless of their virtue. Where Valmiki’s 
virtuous women are virtually interchangeable, his male characters have unique identities, and 
are as such judged on those.289 Rama, when he believes Lakshmana is dead, bemoans the fact 
that “…Were I to search the world, I could find another woman like Sita, but never a brother, 
a companion, or a warrior to equal Lakshmana”. (VI:39:6)290 Indeed, this is reinforced by 
Sita, who refers specifically to the Vedas when extolling the righteousness of a woman who 
shows obedience and “…earnestly strive[s] to please and benefit [her husband]…” 
(II:21:21.)291 
This also means that any blame that could possibly be ascribed to male characters is 
often instead deflected onto women. Legitimate concerns and disagreements with Rama 
which are held by female characters (particularly Kaikeyi, Sita, and Surpanakha) are 
indicative not of his own flaws but of theirs. This is an implication which is extended to the 
notion that these women are therefore responsible not only for their misfortunes but also for 
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his.292 Consequently, this means that female characters almost always have their misfortunes 
blamed upon a perceived lack of virtuosity. Repeatedly, the message is that “…it is not 
houses…or such royal treatment as this that shields a woman; it is her virtuous conduct 
alone.” (VI:102:26)293 The clear implication here is that all misfortune and mistreatment Sita 
faces at the hands of Rama and Ravana must be the result of her transgressing the boundaries 
of the ‘virgin’, rather than the wrongdoing of the men.   
Beyond the framing of women embedded in the language Valmiki uses, is the way in 
which characters themselves represent and refer to women. The message of female 
submission and obedience is strongly echoed in the way in which male characters speak to 
their female counterparts. Rama, after the long battle to reclaim Sita, tells her the following 
before a shocked audience: “Since, however, your virtue is in doubt, your presence has 
become as profoundly disagreeable to me as is a bright lamp to a man afflicted with a disease 
of the eye…” (VI:103:17)294 
This involves male characters drawing upon the prevalent gender paradigms of 
classical India, and both verbally and physically enforcing them in their interactions with 
women. As previously mentioned, a key part of this is the assumption that women are to be 
subservient to men, regardless of the quality of the man. Valmiki informs us that a woman 
should hold her husband in the highest esteem regardless of the quality of his character.  
Moreover, no matter the quality of the woman in question, she “…will come to a bad end if 
she does not respect her husband's wishes" (II:21:20).295 Consequently, male characters are 
able to disregard and abuse their wives, and then to blame those women for the harm they 
suffer. It is telling that Rama is kind and compassionate to almost every other character, even 
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forgiving Kaikeyi after she orders that he be banished to the forest. Sita, on the other hand, 
faces public humiliation for being abducted. The assumption portrayed by Valmiki that 
women should tolerate negative behaviour from their husbands due to marital duty is still 
reflected in Indian law, where (as of a Supreme Court judgement in late 2017) marital rape is 
still not considered a crime.296  
A natural progression from this is that when female characters disobey or contradict 
men, they may instantly be treated as having broken the ‘virgin’ mould, regardless of who is 
at fault. One key example of this is an exchange between Ravana and Sita. Initially, Ravana 
addresses Sita with respect and reverence in the expectation that she will marry him, despite 
having forcefully abducted her. When she tells him that she is already married and devoted to 
Rama, his language to become insulting and demeaning: 
...I shall be a lover to win your praise, and never, my beauty, will do anything 
to displease you...you think you are so smart, but what a fool you really are. 
(III:47:12-13)297  
A similar contradiction comes from Lakshmana – who is, otherwise, completely 
devoted to Sita – when she orders him to seek out Rama in the forest after they hear a cry for 
help: "I dare not answer Maithili, for you are a deity in my eyes. And yet inappropriate words 
from a woman come as nothing new" (III:43:26).298 As with other characters, Sita faces the 
troubling and inescapable pattern of treatment by men; the slightest flaw undermines her 
virtue, where it might enrich a male character. 
It is not only male characters that echo the assumptions of the narrative’s general 
language and depictions of women. Indeed, female characters play a significant – even equal 
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– role in perpetuating and enforcing the archetypes and oppressive structures on their fellow 
women. This internalised misogyny is an issue that appears not only in the Ramayana and its 
readings, but also throughout conservative Hindu female understandings of gender (both 
explicitly in the words of female conservative politicians, and implicitly in the support that 
conservative parties like the BJP receive from women).299 Sita blames herself for her 
suffering when Hanuman arrives to rescue her; claiming that “…it is as a consequence of my 
evil destiny and my own misdeeds in the past that I have suffered all of this…” 
(VI:101:31)300 This is reflective of a recurring undercurrent to the Ramayana – that of women 
blaming the actions of themselves and other women for events that are objectively far from 
their control. The women of Lanka blame Ravana’s sister Surpanakha for the war between 
Ravana and Lanka and the ultimate destruction of the city – ignoring that Ravana was 
responsible for the capture of Sita, and failed to return her against the advice of his advisors 
and family. 301   
Even Sita, who has criticised Lakshmana and Rama in the past, is not immune from 
this: “I hope you are satisfied now, Kaikeyi! The delight of our family has been slain. You 
malicious creature! You have destroyed our family” (VI:23:4)302 Sita’s denouncement of 
Kaikeyi (Rama’s stepmother) towards the end of the battle when Ravana kills an illusory 
Rama, is particularly indicative of the way in which Valmiki’s women are willing to go to 
extraordinary lengths to spare male characters the blame for their own actions.  
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4.5. Bringing Sita and Rama to Television  
As previously mentioned, one of the most significant modern cultural impacts of the 
Ramayana was Sagar’s serialisation of the text in the late 1980s, which technically consists 
of two series. The first finishes at the end of the Yuddhakāṇḍa, when Rama and Sita return to 
Ayodhya to be crowned. Its sequel Uttar Ramayan covers the seventh and final book, 
Uttarakāṇḍa, where Sita is exiled from Ayodhya and gives birth to Rama’s and her sons Luva 
and Kusha.303 While it was commissioned by an Indian National Congress (INC) 
government, it contributed significantly to the surge in popularity of Hindu nationalist 
narratives, particular that of the BJP, which situated the contents of the Ramayan within an 
imagined glorious past, as depicted by Valmiki’s original text. Its immense influence also 
served to reinforce and idealise traditional gender roles and identities, particularly among 
women at home.304 The serial also preceded and arguably precipitated the events of the 
destruction of the Babri Masjid in 1992, as will be explored in later chapters. 
The Ramayan was one of a number of televised serials and films released in the 1980s on the 
state-run station Doodarshan that were themed around nationalist, religious narratives.305 One 
of the reasons for the emphasis on serialising this particular genre of narrative was that there 
had long been a background in India’s history of film of religious narratives – tinged by an 
emphasis on state-building being successfully transferred to screen.306 Against this backdrop, 
it was easy for a series about a narrative that was already well-known and revered to be 
successful. However, Sagar’s Ramayan’s popularity and influence far exceeded the level that 
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the term ‘success’ might imply, and reflected far more than the appeal of the television serial 
itself. Mukti Lakhi Mangharam claims that: 
…Its [the Ramayana’s] appeal became especially evident between 1987 and 
1989 when, at 9:30 a.m., the Indian nation would come to a standstill as 
people everywhere gathered to watch Ramanand Sagar’s state-sponsored 
television serial…regarding the viewing as an act of worship.307 
The timing of its release also coincided perfectly with the consumerist boom among 
the middle class through the 1970s and 1980s, meaning that a significant sector of the 
population now had the opportunity to engage with the series where merely a decade ago that 
would not have been an option.308 The combination of these two factors meant that despite a 
general critical consensus that the serial was a flawed melodrama, by the last episode, the 
Ramayan was the most popular program ever televised in India.309 The veneration received 
by the serial was not necessarily unprecedented or unexpected, either. According to Philip 
Lutgendorf, when the 1917 film Lanka Dahan (The Burning of Lanka) was released, 
audiences prostrated themselves whenever Rama appeared on the screen.310 
Importantly, this success privileged the notion that the single strand of cultural history 
that the Ramayana represented was the “authentic” cultural heritage of the nation; and its 
values attributed specifically and solely to Hinduism and Hindu Indians.311 This also served 
to homogenise understandings and interpretations of the Ramayana across Indian households, 
despite a long-standing history of regional diversity in retellings and key narrative points of 
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the story.312 In doing so, it blurred the lines between high and popular culture, validating the 
Hindu nationalist sentiments of the middle class while preying upon the growing fear that 
modernity was stripping away traditional culture.313 The series amplified the construction 
during the Independence movement and the early postcolonial period of a national identity 
fundamentally based upon Hindu mythology and a shared cultural history of an ideal past. 
This narrative was implied to be a potential solution to the problem of social and political 
divisions in contemporary Indian life and guard against the threat of Western cultural 
influence. 314  
It is also important to note the impact of the cultural narrative on women, who for the 
first time were able to consume en masse the Valmiki Ramayana despite continued 
significant divides in education and literacy levels and opportunities. This impact was so 
profound that Deepika Chikhalia, the actress playing Sita, was elected to the federal 
parliament in 1991 as a BJP candidate in the constituency of Vadodara; a direct, tangible 
marker of the political capital the BJP were able to gain from the Ramayan.315   
The Ramayan, alongside other programs by Doodarshan, played a key role in 
providing representations of not simply womanhood, but Indian womanhood, where domestic 
and wider social inequality could be swept aside or dismissed in favour of a desire to conform 
to the ideal female place in the ‘imagined community’ of modern (Hindu) India.316 
In light of the above, it is clear that the television serial owed its popularity to not only 
the long history of Valmiki’s original text, but also to its contemporary context. That context, 
which I discuss in the next chapter, signified that rather than simply acting as a retelling of a 
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popular text, albeit one with outdated gender values and norms, the televised Ramayana had 
rather more sinister and problematic implications and consequences.317 
 
4.6. Conclusion  
Valmiki calls the Ramayana the ‘Story of Sita’; however, this lip service is not 
followed through in his rendition. In the first book, Valmiki introduces the Ramayana in the 
following manner: 
I: 4:6-7. "A man who always fulfilled his vows, he taught them the whole of 
this great poem, the Ramayana, which is the tale of Sita and the slaying of 
Paulastya.” (I:4:6-7)318 
This turns out to be the only mention of Sita in 27 verses as Valmiki teaches the 
Ramayana to Kusa and Lava – Rama and Sita’s sons. This is reflective of the entire text’s 
approach to women. Great women, according to Valmiki, are passive actors; Sita has 
“surpassed even the most outstanding woman…” (V:4:22) for being fully devoted to 
Rama.319 On the other hand when Kaikeyi actively fights for her son Bharata’s rights, she is 
scorned and discarded by him; he goes so far as to say that “…I would kill this woman 
myself, this evil, wicket Kaikeyi...” (II:72:21).320  
In contrast, men are encouraged again and again to take action. This is reflected, 
particularly, in the Indian Independence movement, which drew from many of the ideals and 
themes of the Ramayana. Savarkar, a prominent and militant pro-independence activist, 
glorified the notion of warriorhood and disdains ahimsa (non-violence) as impossibly 
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naïve.321  As I will explore in my next chapter, the Ramayana and its characters, as outlined 
in this chapter, provided a framework and unifying force for the disparate groups fighting to 
end the British occupation. This influence, moreover, was to extend beyond independence, 
into the twentieth and twenty first century, and to play a significant role in shaping the social 
and political landscape of the emerging nation. 
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5. Independence, Nationalism, and Women in the 20th century 
Because of her asceticism, her truthfulness  
and her complete devotion to her husband alone, 
she might burn fire, but fire could never burn her. 
(The Ramayana, Sundarakāṇḍa, 53:23.)322 
5.1. Summary of argument 
The push for independence in the subcontinent and the growth of notions of ‘nation’ 
and ‘national unity’ is generally dated from the nineteenth century, but has its origins at the 
same time as the move by the British to gain economic, cultural, and political dominance 
over the region. While the nineteenth-century is not vital to understanding the role of the 
Ramayana in the development of Hindu nationalism, it does indicate the manner in which 
Hinduism and ideas of nationhood became strongly intertwined. Moreover, it is vital to 
consider the roots of a sense of national consciousness in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, particularly among Indian intellectuals who were aware of the European 
Enlightenment, and minor and major incidences of democratic revolution on the continent.323 
This chapter briefly outlines the progression towards independence, before exploring the 
postcolonial social and political context and discourse which laid the groundwork for the rise 
of the BJP and the prominence placed on the Ramayana. This chapter will also note the role 
of women in the Independence movement, and the obstacles faced in the move towards 
gender equality particularly as a result of gender paradigms established and reinforced by 
conservative Hinduism. 
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5.2. Twentieth century pre-Independence 
The early twentieth century saw the flourishing of the Indian Independence movement 
from its origins in the late nineteenth century British-educated Indian middle class, and the 
development of a more cohesive sense of national self and group identity. Previous to the 
arrival of and colonisation by the British, as earlier summarised, ‘India’ did not truly exist as 
a joint identity; rather as a disparate group of kingdom-states, with barely existent political 
connection or social unity. This was due to the multitude of differing religions, languages, 
and civilisations married to the colonial policy of leaving local potentates and maharajas in 
situ.324 Both contemporaries of the early twentieth century and modern scholars agree, 
however, that colonialism was a key cause of pan-national communication and the 
development of an ‘Indian’ identity.325  
The primary independence movement and its strength was driven by and based upon 
three key elements: the revival and assertion of classical arts and language; the centring of 
certain political and religious ideals as rallying points; and alliances between vastly different 
political movements and religious groupings.326 
The notion of the revival and reassertion of older arts, language, and culture – Hindu 
revivalism – played a vital role in this.  Raja Rammohan Roy (1772-1833), regarded as the 
Father of the Indian Renaissance, revived Vedantic philosophy and as an early English 
translator of Vedic scripts, used promoted a model of reformed and monolithic Hinduism 
with canonical texts, in response to the model of Christianity being preached by 
missionaries.327 This model was asserted and supported by leaders across the spectrum of the 
                                                 
324 R. A. Hume, “The Indian National Congress,” The Journal of Race Development 1, no. 3 (1911): 367. 
325 Hume, 368. 
326 Maya Tudor, “Explaining Democracy’s Origins: Lessons from South Asia,” Comparative Politics 45, no. 3 
(2013): 256. 
327 Schlensog, “Hinduism and Politics,” 164. 
91 
 
independence.328  Gandhi in particular framed the struggle against the British as a struggle 
against the evil of modernity, and the godliness of the ancient, evoking in particular the 
concept of ‘Ramrajya’ (a society founded on and guided by the principles of Rama as 
outlined in the Ramayana). 329  This was opposed by Nehru, who focussed on the promotion 
of ‘Indian tradition’, an apparently unifying tradition of Indian men and women across 
linguistic and cultural boundaries.330 That said, even Nehru was willing to use Hindu-centric 
rhetoric to solidify a model of the imagined community of India, referring to Hinduism as “all 
things to all men”.331   
In 1885, the Indian National Congress (INC) was launched by a group of Western-
educated intellectuals, most of whom are Hindu.332 Beginning on a moderate platform willing 
to use polite petitioning, resistance and apathy from the British government resulted in the 
organisation’s evolution into a powerful national movement fuelled by anticolonial sentiment 
and the desire for an independent state. By the start of the twentieth century, the INC had 
evolved into a nation-wide organisation, operating on a broadly democratic structure of 
election-like selections of representatives from provincial committees to join the National-
level committee.333 The organisation was dominated by Hindus, and in particular, by highly 
educated men of the Brahmin caste (a tiny percentage of the Indian population.)334 but was 
touted as a relatively secular, religiously tolerant group.335  
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 To achieve this end, a unifying ideological point was necessary – both for political 
activists and key players, and for their followers. They did this by reimagining the notion of 
the ‘Vedantic past’, supported by the revival of Sanskrit, and the literary, religious, and 
philosophical texts written in that language.336 As previously stated, a vital part of 
appropriating Hinduism for this movement was encouraged by prominent Hindu leaders such 
as Swami Vivekananda, who founded the powerful Ramakrishna Mission, as a universal 
tradition transcending sectarian boundaries.337  While in 1916, the INC formed a temporary 
alliance with the Muslim League via the Lucknow Pact, Hinduism was firmly centred as a 
core rallying point for pro-independence groups, and the narrative of India as a fundamentally 
Hindu homeland continued to feature heavily and gained widespread support for the 
movement.338  
Despite the common understanding that the Indian Independence movement was 
rooted in non-violent protest and pacifism, the truth is that violence and militancy played a 
significant role in the development of the movement. In this, right-wing nationalists featured 
heavily. This reflected a strong recurring element in the Hindu epics focussed around nobles 
and warriors: that the characters least deserving respect were “…the one who loses his male 
quality of heroic leadership and submits to the power of a woman”.339 Independence leaders 
were therefore implied to be unmanly and unworthy of leadership if they did not reflect 
qualities of militant strength, mirroring the male heroes of Hindu religious narrative. 
Conversely, the most valued women in this social narrative were those who mirrored the 
virtues modelled in traditional texts such as the Ramayana; supportive of their husbands’ 
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interests and ideologies, while remaining tied to the domestic sphere and adhering to a 
construct of fragile feminine purity in need of protection.340 
 
5.3. Gender and identity in the independence movement  
In the historical narrative of Indian independence, the key players whose names are 
recognised were all men – particularly Brahmin, English-speaking, and educated men. The 
treatment of women was heavily utilised by both the British and Indian independence 
activists to advance their cause. Traditional practices such as sati, dowry, and child marriage 
were derided by colonialists as barbaric while Indian nationalists claimed that liberal 
feminism was merely another forced colonial construct. Gayatri Spivak refers to this rhetoric 
as “white men saving brown women from brown men”; while many of the changes made by 
the British regarding the treatment of women were positive, a significant motivating factor 
for the colonialists was to support the notion of imperialism as a “civilising mission”.341 
Despite this, women were not at all passive players in the struggle for independence, and an 
active women’s movement developed in India through the early twentieth century. 
An ongoing narrative from the beginnings of British colonialism is that the British 
aimed to ‘liberate’ colonised women from apparently barbaric cultural and gendered practice 
(even though women did not achieve universal suffrage in the UK until 1928). Through 
colonialism, Indians were berated for their treatment of women and. This resulted in the 
imposition by the British – and supported by British women – of a middle class construction 
of English domesticity, which sought to confine women to the domestic sphere, reinforced by 
the resurgence of notions of an ancient Indian tradition of gender binary – supported, 
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apparently, by the framing of women in classical texts like the Ramayana.342 Combatting the 
idea that Hinduism was oppressive to women came to form part of the Indian nationalist 
movement, particularly when combatting the British narrative. The view was constantly 
maintained by nationalists that Indian women in fact had greater rights and liberation during 
precolonial India, dating back as far as an Indian ‘golden age’ in the BCE period (during 
which the Ramayana and Mahabharata are considered to have been written.)343 Partha 
Chaterjee contends that to a certain extent, the assertion of authority over the domestic sphere 
and the role of women was the real beginning of Indian nationalism. By clearly demarcating 
the domestic as innately Indian, under attack from the colonial attempts to regulate tradition, 
women came to stand as representatives of a pan-Indian identity.344 
The framing of women as passive representations of the traditional nation meant that 
women largely excluded from the majority of the independence movement’ activities. When 
the female voice and consciousness was highlighted, it was mainly during male-driven 
nationalist discourse where women were represented as passive symbols and signifiers of the 
concept of “Mother India”. 345 This is a practice that bears similarities to the discourse of 
other nationalist movements.346 Maitrayee Chaudhuri emphasises Benedict Anderson’s 
statement that “the nation is home and home is mother” in arguing that conceptualising the 
nation as feminine strongly reaffirms the fundamentally domestic and maternal role of 
women.347 
Negatively framing womanhood as weak was not reserved specifically to this kind of 
debate. For instance, Gandhi referred disparagingly to the British Parliament as “a sterile 
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woman and a prostitute” in criticising its inefficiency, and a political structure which allowed 
outside influences to sway ministerial allegiances and legal policy.348 A newspaper in 1910 
decried the apparent weakness the Indian community, asking “who prevents us from infusing 
into the masses the spirit of manliness, self-reliance and self-respect?”349 The clear 
implication was that the men of India needed to embrace their masculinity and defend women 
(and by extension ‘Mother India’ from Western influences and British imperialism.   
Despite this, women were an important part of the Independence movement – both 
when they were allowed to participate, and when they carved spaces for themselves. 
Women’s rights groups developed in regional areas, and were also advocated by particularly 
influential individuals – such as Pandita Ramabai Sarasvati,350 one of only ten female 
delegates to participate in the session of Congress in 1889.351 With the stressed importance of 
national unity against the British, the all-India women’s movement began to take shape in the 
1920s and 1930s, comprised of largely middle-class activists.352 Liberal Indian feminists 
aimed to fashion a new form of womanhood in preparation for incipient Independence. This 
envisaged model was intended to move beyond the nationalist construct of ‘Mother India’, 
where women were passive symbols of traditions, culture and history which needed to be 
protected from the incursion of Western modernity.353  
The All India Women’s Conference (AIWC) was the umbrella organisation agitating 
for these social reforms, particularly in the arena of education. In doing so they came up 
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against a problem which would reoccur in the postcolonial period; that discussing education 
entailed discussion of specific social problems such as dowry, child marriage, and widow 
remarriage.354 This led to the emergence of a key difficulty with engaging independence 
leaders in the fight for gender equality and women’s issues. Male activists feared that 
succumbing to what was considered a form of imperial paternalism (even though it was in the 
form of women’s rights) would alienate conservative religious groups and traditionalists.355 
Bills such as the Hindu Widows’ Remarriage Act (1856) and the Hindu Women’s Rights to 
Property Act 1937 were passed under British rule, and were thus seen as colonial impositions 
and the oppression of traditional Hinduism. 
Closer to independence, nationalist support for legislative reform began to grow as 
women’s organisations reframed moves towards gender equality as a validation of India’s 
readiness to become one of the world’s modern nations.356 The subcommittee ‘Women’s 
Role in Planned Economy’ was established in 1938 by the INC’s National Planning 
Committee, with an ambitious plan focusing on enabling women to participate in production, 
trade, and business on a large scale without being impeded by domestic duties.357 
Despite increased recognition of the women’s movement, the worry that ‘female 
emancipation’ would counteract the narrative of Indian traditionalist and national culture 
continued to affect the ability for women’s issues to attract widespread support on a national 
level.358 The continued fear of Western liberal feminism undermining ‘Indian’ narratives, 
particularly through questioning traditional texts and practices, thus meant that the move into 
the postcolonial period was fraught with difficulties and obstacles for women. 
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5.4. Forging a Secular Nation 
Undoubtedly, the most significant consequence of Independence was the partition of 
British India in 1947 into two independent dominions: India and Pakistan. Intended to 
separate the population into its Muslim and Hindu majority areas, the division of territory 
was arbitrary and hurried – an act that would have long-term consequences.359 The ensuing 
months, as the decision spread through the news media, government pamphlets, and by word 
of mouth, saw mass displacement (as citizens attempted to move into their ‘allocated 
territory’), the division of families, mass violence, and loss of life estimated to have been at 
least several hundred thousand, and possibly as much as two million.360 The act also set in 
motion significant territorial aggression and instability between the two states, which has 
permeated all aspects of culture and politics. Most significantly, however, was the 
fundamental role of religion in bringing about the existence of two separate states. While 
India is a nominally non-religious, democratic state, Pakistan adopted the official name 
“Islamic Republic of Pakistan” and did not officially adopt a Constitution until 1956.361 In 
1971,  the long-running Bengali nationalist movement in the area of East Pakistan resulted in 
what is considered by many scholars agree was a genocide of East Pakistani Bengalis.362 The 
and resultant attempted ethnic cleansing by West Pakistan resulted in the Bangladesh 
Independence War, and the establishment of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh in late 
1971.363 
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It is important to acknowledge the presence of Pakistan and the way in which it may 
have shaped the role of Hinduism as an underpinning force and binding concept in the new, 
postcolonial state of India. Prior to the Partition of British India in 1947, the continent was 
split into smaller regional nation states. Therefore, overlapping cultures, linguistic traditions, 
and populations required a barrier of some kind to delineate separation. Initially. the Muslim 
League had been framing Muslims as a minority within India whose rights needed protection, 
but who should remain part of the Indian nation after independence was achieved. This 
platform was altered when Muslim nationalist Mohammed Ali Jinnah took leadership of the 
League, however, who argued that India was in fact comprised of two nations; one Hindu, 
and one Muslim.364 Pakistan was therefore carved out with the specific purpose of being for 
Muslims in the subcontinent; an ironic fact considering that there are almost as many 
Muslims in India as there are in Pakistan. 365 As of the 2011 Indian census, there were 
approximately 172 million Muslims in the nation.366  
In contrast to Pakistan’s Islamic constitution, the postcolonial federal Indian state 
adopted many of the tenets of the English Constitution and its common law system, using it 
as a base for the development of their own (in the process unfortunately adopting several 
quite archaic regulations and practices that are still being dissolved/dismantled.) Throughout 
the development of post-Indian politics, the landscape was largely dominated by the 
Congress Party, founded by Nehru and Gandhi – meaning that their core identity is based on 
the principles of those two men. Though Nehru was non-religious, Gandhi was openly Hindu. 
Nevertheless, the party’s main philosophies and policies were based on a strong commitment 
to principles of pluralistic secularism. This, however, was an approach complicated by a 
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number of factors. Firstly, the concept of state values not rooted in a religious worldview was 
extremely new in the subcontinent. Further, Hinduism was wound up inextricably in the 
fabric of society – particularly in accounting for the caste system. Nehru and other Congress 
leaders “…believed that caste inequality would wither away as socialism was progressively 
established in India.”367  
The determination to form a secular state, however, was undercut almost immediately 
in the postcolonial period by the introduction of the Hindu Code Bill, which began 
development in the years immediately preceding Independence and passed in the 1950s. 
While the Bill is popularly referred to in the singular (as is the case in this thesis), it is 
actually made of five separate Acts: the Hindu Marriage Act 1955,368 the Hindu Succession 
Act 1956, and the Hindu Maintenance Act 1956, the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 
1956.369 B.R. Ambedkhar, the Minister of Law and Justice during Nehru’s prime 
ministership, believed that the Hindu Code Bill was as necessary as the Constitution, seeing it 
as the starting point for Hindu reform on both religious and social grounds.370 Regardless of 
Ambedkhar’s intentions, the Hindu Code Bill undermined the new Indian state and the INC 
on a fundamental level. Section 2 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955, for instance, states that: 
1. This Act applies - 
a. to any person who is a Hindu by religion in any of its forms or 
developments, including a Virashaiva, a Lingayat or a follower of the 
Brahmo, Prarthana or Arya Samaj; 
b. to any person who is a Buddhist, Jain or Sikh by religion; and 
c. to any other person domiciled in the territories to which this Act 
extends who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion, 
unless it is proved that any such person would not have been 
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governed by the Hindu law or by any custom or usage as part of that 
law in respect of any of the matters dealt with herein if this Act had 
not been passed.371 
 Despite founding the nation on a Constitution and rhetoric that was intended to be 
completely secular in consideration of the religious plurality of its citizens, the government 
had directly legislated in regard to religious and traditional customs. Moreover, the legislation 
grouped Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs in with Hindus, likely due to the fact that these religions 
also originated in the subcontinent. The decision to apply the Act to members of these 
religions which excluding others – particularly Muslims and Christians – entrenched the 
perceived ethnic lines that had already plagued pre-independence Indian politics.372  
 
5.5. The Hindutva movement and the origins of the BJP 
The Hindu right, as noted above, traces its roots to the Independence movement, 
basing their methods on and drawing inspiration from the grassroots organisations that 
featured in the early fascism of Italy and Germany.373 The group of organisations following 
Hindutva ideology, the Sangh Parivar, grew rapidly in the postcolonial period. Over fifty 
major organisations now exist, occupying significant space in social, political, religious, 
educational, and scientific arenas.374 This thesis refers mostly to the BJP, as the political 
organisation in the Sangh Parivar, however, it is vital to understand that these groups are 
closely interlinked, and that while organisations may claim to have no political affiliations, 
there is a long history of collaboration between them. There are also several cases of senior 
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members moving with ease between the leadership of groups.375 A common trait of Sangh 
Parivar organisations is the use of particular words and catchphrases. One of these is 
obviously Hindutva; however, this often goes together with the phrase ‘cultural nationalism’, 
which the BJP manifesto for the 1996 election stated is “the concept of one nation, one 
people, one culture…which alone can preserve the unity and integrity of our nation”.376  
The most prolific and controversial of these is the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh 
(RSS), which Nandini Deo describes as the “patriarch” of the Sangh Parivar.377 The RSS is a 
social organisation founded in 1925 which focusses on the creation and maintenance of youth 
groups promoting physical culture, athleticism, and masculinity. Critics of the RSS have 
observed that it has been modelled not particularly dissimilarly on the youth programs run by 
pre-war fascist Italy and Germany.378 It has traditionally contained elements blatantly 
associated with a particularly Hindu interpretation of Indian history and culture – to the 
exclusion of other religious influences, particularly those of Islam.379 
 Echoes of the European fascist organisations which inspired the RSS are quite also 
visible in the history and development of the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP), the religious 
wing of the Sangh Parivar, which was formed on the birthday of the deity Krishna, on 29 
August 1964.380 The VHP has long claimed that it has no political affiliations or links with 
the RSS. However one of the RSS’s founders, Shivram Shankar Apte, became the general 
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secretary of the VHP, and the VHP and RSS have been implicated numerous times in 
collaboration on right-wing and Hindu nationalist projects.381  
The main feat of the VHP in contributing to the cause of the Sangh Parivar was that it 
brought a number of Hindu religious leaders and factions – most notably the Vaishnavas 
(worshippers of the god Vishnu, and by extension his avatars who include Rama and 
Krishna), and the Shaivas (who worship the god Shiva.)382 While the organisation by no 
means actively pushed the RSS ideology of turning Hindus into a concrete socio-political 
community, it provided an avenue for those who shared sentiments along the lines of social 
conservatism and a desire to see a return to Hindu principles due to dissatisfaction with 
Nehru’s and the INC’s secular socialism.383 In doing this, the term ‘Hindu’ was intended by 
the VHP to be used (ostensibly) to refer to anyone identifying with the ‘core values’ (ethical 
and spiritual) that had apparently evolved in India – while simultaneously alienating and 
sidelining other religious groups, in particular Muslims and Christians.384 Thus, the VHP was 
instrumental to the creation of the term “modern Hinduism” as one used to define a Hindu 
entity/unity rather than a scripturally-based religion.385 
The VHP and RSS based their dislike of Islam and Christianity on their foreignness. 
Their approach to other South Asian faiths (Jainism, Buddhism, and Sikhism), meanwhile, 
employed the argument that Hinduism was an all-encompassing faith which accepted the 
practices and beliefs of other religions as valid paths to enlightenment. By using this line of 
thinking, the Sangh Parivar were attempting to absorb other South Asian faiths into an 
apparently overarching notion of the Hindu civilisation – something that is presented to both 
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Hindus and outsiders as a practice of tolerance, rather than one of erasure.386 As was outlined 
above, the assimilation of those religions into Hinduism was also reflected in INC legislation, 
which contradicted the fact that Indian law was, according to the Constitution, supposed to be 
secular.387  
The exclusion of Muslims and Christians from the Hindu Code Bill therefore gave 
Hindutva supporters another major talking point for anti-Muslim rhetoric, and further 
undermined secular ideology in the decades immediately following independence. Moreover, 
the ongoing conflict and friction between India and Pakistan – which boiled over in 1965 
under the reign of Indira Gandhi – left Hindus dissatisfied and resentful at the Muslim 
minority, who became scapegoats for problems in India and fed into the Hindutva agenda.388 
As earlier stated, this decline led to catastrophic results in 1967, and left a political vacuum 
that allowed the ideological Hindutva movement to garner political traction.389 
Growing discontent with the INC led to its defeat in the 1977 elections after the 1975 
state of emergency ended. The new government was made of an amalgam of political parties. 
One of these was the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS), a party founded in 1951 as the political 
arm of the RSS, and which aimed to protect what it conceived as the “Hindu cultural 
identity” of India, particularly against Islam and Muslim groups.390 After this coalition fell 
apart due to internal division and voter disenchantment, the BJP was formed. On occasion, 
the BJP has distanced itself from the RSS and Hindutva ideology; however, this distance has 
never been meaningfully maintained.391 Abdul Noorani claims that the BJP is “haplessly 
dependent on the RSS”; whether or not this is precisely the case, the next chapter will 
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demonstrate that the BJP and other members of the Sangh Parivar have a co-dependency 
based in a determination to implement Hindutva ideology and enforce a traditionalist and 
exclusionary brand of Hindu cultural unity at the expense of oppressed groups. 
 
5.6. Women in post-independence Indian politics and legislation 
In the period from the birth of the unified Indian women’s rights movement in the 
1920s to the Hindu Code Bills in the 1950s, the struggle for equality and gains in human 
rights was fought primarily by women themselves (through credit has often gone to the men 
who eventually passed the legislation.)392 In many ways it was the manner in which women 
participated in the Independence movement, and the manner in which this participation was 
framed by male leaders of the push for Independence, that led to the diminishment (or at the 
least, stagnation) of female rights and participation in politics in the post-colonial period.393 
Ironically, Usha Chandran blames this partially on the Gandhian legacy, where women were 
typecast as self-sacrificial and expected to be eager to forgo power or benefit on their part for 
an abstract notion of the common good.394 Another burden women faced in the postcolonial 
era was that, despite legal advances and the hard work of the Indian feminist movement, they 
were still considered to be “cultural emblems of the nation”.395 This was also reflected in the 
media landscape in the post-Independence period, which focussed on the establishment and 
veneration of myths around ‘Indianness’ – something which was epitomised in the 1957 film 
Mother India.396 This carries on from the leitmotif during the independence movement of 
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Bharat-Mata, where India was framed as sacred and pure, a feminine figure to be protected 
from the violation of Western colonialism and imperial influence.397  
The immediate post-independence era was characterised by the need to devise a 
sturdy Constitution.398 Part of this Constitution did involve a fulfilment of the promise to 
women’s rights activists of legal gender equality. The Indian Constitution as adopted in 1949 
prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth.399 Article 
16 of the same text prohibits discrimination on the same grounds in regards to employment or 
appointment to office,400 and Article 39 stipulates that the State will direct policy towards 
guaranteeing equal pay for equal work, regardless of gender.401 
The establishment of this Constitution, therefore, gave women official legal rights. 
However, issues relating to marriage, guardianship, and inheritance traditions remained 
significant enough to warrant the implementation of the Hindu Code Bill. These laws were 
aimed to reform archaic and patriarchal practices “…in relation to marriage and divorce 
(1955), adoption and maintenance (1956), minority and guardianship (1956) and succession 
and inheritance (1956), among others…”402 This undermined the political equality that 
women had fought for through the early part of the twentieth century – yet the undeniable 
official legal equality granted by the Constitution resulted in increased difficulties in 
approaching what was a complex sociocultural and economic issue. 
These laws were not as protective as they seemed to be. The Hindu Marriage Act 
1955, for instance, set minimum ages of marriage at eighteen for girls, and twenty-one for 
boys.  This reflected the belief that female sexuality developed earlier, and thus needed to be 
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restrained by marriage from an earlier date. The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956, 
despite modifying aspects of the earlier Act, maintained that the father would remain the 
natural guardian of their children, save in cases of neglect or child abuse.403  More 
significantly, these laws were not applicable to non-Hindus, due to the INC’s fear that this 
might impinge upon the rights of minorities. In doing so this contributed not only to 
continued inequality for non-Muslim women, but also carried a very particular implication: 
that the Indian government could legislate for Hindus as citizens of India, but defined non-
Hindus as “other”, or as outside the jurisdiction and definition of a “true” Indian citizen. 
Moreover, as previously mentioned the fading of agitational and nationalist-fuelled politics 
and activism meant that the remainder of pre-Independence feminist goals were left 
unfulfilled, and though female leaders attempted to push for further reform, apathy and 
increased resistance – particularly with the rise of Hindu conservatism – a number of legal 
changes were left unimplemented.404  
Legislation aside, whether the theoretical aims of the Hindu Code Bill would manifest 
in consistent action, was an entirely different question. Former INC president Madan Mohan 
Malaviya, during preliminary parliamentary debates over the Bills, stated that “…In the 
brahman society, the woman has been given the highest place. There is nothing higher than 
the mother.”405 Malaviya’s statement echoed the traditional understanding of gender roles 
within a patriarchal society that had, intentionally or not, become wound into the narratives 
around which the postcolonial nation had formed itself. Within this structure, the women’s 
movement had been heard to the extent that they managed to influence some legislative 
reform. However, in the greater scheme of the new nation, their words rang hollow. They had 
talked, but in speaking they had not been heard.  
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5.7. Women in the ‘secular’ Hindu state 
5.7.1. Archaic practices 
Two traditions which are often pointed to as examples of sexist and patriarchal 
practices are those of sati and dowry. Both were practices condemned by Hindu reformists; 
Gandhi vocally opposed them when he returned from Africa to become active in the Indian 
Independence movement.406 However, legislation and elite rhetoric had little impact on 
deeply ingrained cultural traditions.  
The practice of sati derives its name from that of the goddess Sati, who burned herself 
to death out of shame after her father humiliated her husband, the god Shiva. The practice 
was banned by the British under the Bengal Sati Regulation 1829.407 However, when the 
British banned the practice it was seen as an attack on the freedom of Indian women to 
martyr themselves, despite the practice never being universal or common.408  Gayatri Spivak 
highlights a key element implicit in this historical ritualistic demand for female self-
immolation; in appealing to a widow’s dharma of devotion, surviving family members would 
be able to rid themselves of her, as remarriage was either not allowed or highly 
stigmatised.409 This was further emphasised, Spivak says, by the belief that if a widow did not 
burn herself on her husband’s pyre, she would not be able to escape from a female body in 
her next reincarnation;  a theory that is inherently sexist.410 
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While it is no longer a common practice, it still occurred in the postcolonial period. 
The highly publicised case of Roop Kanwar’s death via sati in 1987 resulted in the 
subsequent enactment of the Commission of Sati (Prevention) Act in 1987.411 Kanwar’s death 
was variously seen as an admirable act of religious conviction, a violation of gender and 
human rights through the vehicle of fundamentalist religion, a murder committed under the 
masquerade of ritual suicide and/or an unfortunate incident that was nevertheless Kanwar’s 
right as a free and devout Hindu woman. 412 These murders, which are often passed off as 
ritual suicides, are either ignored or diminished by the police and/or district administration, 
are prosecuted poorly, and faced with hostile/indifferent courts, due mostly to the patriarchal 
structures and notions of cultural tradition which portray these women as martyrs/saints 
rather than victims of a system designed to remove female autonomy with the death of their 
husband.413  
In the mid-1970s, the Progressive Organisation of Women in Hyderabad began the 
first of a wave of protests against dowry burning; a practice also known as bride burning, 
where wives are killed or burned in ‘kitchen accidents’ due to inadequate dowry.414 Dowry-
giving had been another tradition derided by the British as savage.415 However, postcolonial 
Indian legislation, while legally stringent, was rarely implemented or to its full effect. The 
Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 had stated that “giving and taking dowry is an offence.”416 
However, as pointed out by protesters, the legislation was rarely enforced and easy to 
circumvent such as through the giving of gifts rather than money. In response to continued 
social pressure, the Act was amended twice in 1984 and 1986 to widen the scope of the 
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definition of ‘dowry’ and to be made more stringent.417 Nevertheless, the practice is still quite 
common, particularly in lower-class and rural areas where women are considered less 
valuable due to the view that they are less capable of work beyond the domestic realm, 
unable to operate independently, and are thus financial burdens to their families. 
 
5.7.2. Marriage and inheritance 
Valmiki tells us that, under the utopic reign of Rama, “…Nowhere in his realm do 
men experience the death of a son. Women are never widowed and remain faithful to their 
husbands…" (I:1:72). 418 This, as I have highlighted previously, is a suitable summation of 
the role of women in colonial and postcolonial ‘Hindu’ India. Marriage in India has featured 
the giving away of women as property for the purposes of social alliance and the biological 
union of families through offspring. Even beyond the patriarchal and oppressive dimensions 
of this process which frames women as items (and not even valuable items, as indicated by 
the practice of dowry), marriage is not based on the ideal of motherhood. Instead, it is 
specifically and primarily centred on motherhood of sons.419 The clear message therefore that 
all other interests and responsibilities should come secondary to this duty. This consequently 
means that a woman being self-supported and supporting her husband is antithetical to 
traditional understandings of a ‘good’ Hindu woman – a view that is also expressed by Sita in 
the Ramayana.420 Valmiki’s earlier declaration moreover, contains an important second 
stipulation of faithfulness and loyalty. This was considered from two angles in the 
Ramayana. The first was that women who are chaste are so goddess-like that they may be 
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endowed with divine powers. The second was that loyalty and fidelity to husbands should be 
the ultimate aim of women, regardless of the conduct of those husbands. 
Marriage, with its links to notions of purity and virtue, has been viewed as a 
cornerstone of ‘true’ Hindu cultural and religious life – meaning that, as stated earlier, the 
argument that offering equal economic rights in terms of agricultural property rights and 
inheritance law was often based or augmented by the role of women as current or future 
wives.421 Indeed, during the writing of the Bill, several delegates called for specific laws 
barring female heirs from inheriting either the main family house or agricultural property.422 
The key reason for this is that women have been regarded as a family’s property – either the 
family they are born into or the one they marry into. The latter is the primary justification for 
the dismissal of the Women’s Sub-Committee’s proposed protections of female inheritance in 
the late 1940s as the Hindu Code Bills were solidified; male Hindu conservatives (and even 
many liberals) were anxious to protect the patrilineal lineage of property inheritance from 
passing into the hands of a woman’s husband.423 
Another element to take into consideration is that marriage in Hinduism is 
traditionally considered to be the union of two families, rather than two individuals (hence 
the continued prevalence of arranged marriage and dowry).424 In doing this, a woman 
surrenders her autonomy to her husband. In Valmiki’s Ramayana, Rama tells his mother that 
“…So long as she lives, a woman's one deity and master is her husband..." (II:21:17)425 This 
reflects the view from classical India that adultery – as a primary deviation from the scaffold 
of marriage – was a major crime (though only if it was the woman straying outside the 
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marriage).426 Under Brahmanical law, indeed, the only valid reason for separation was 
adultery on the part of the wife, as her primary role and dharma was to produce and care for 
the sons of her husband. Male infidelity, on the other hand, did not compromise any levels of 
caste dharma or social function; and as the devotion and obedience of married women was 
required to be unconditional, consideration of a wife’s feelings was not necessary.427 
The framing of women as primarily wives and mothers was remarked upon and 
heavily criticised by the British colonial government.428 In 1891, a survey of Calcutta found 
that there were at least 10 000 girls under the age of four who were already widowed.429 This 
was despite the fact that the Age of Consent Act 1860 had set the age of consent at ten, and 
the Age of Consent Act 1891 raised this to twelve.430 In 1928, an official commission reported 
that approximately 42% of Indian girls were married by the age of fifteen; a statistic that was 
rooted in the notion of ritualistic purity.431 While this number did reduce by the time of 
independence, this reduction was by no means as significant as advances in women’s legal 
rights might have suggested. The issue of child marriage is also one which, while apparently 
legislated against in the 19th century, continued to occur on a regular basis.432 The continued 
presence of child marriage and widowhood paints a telling picture. A child bride is more 
likely to be chaste, and a widow (no matter her age) is rendered worthless as the assumption 
is that her virtue is irrevocably compromised. Just as Sita’s chastity was questioned not only 
by Rama’s citizens but by Rama himself, female autonomy comes second to assumptions of 
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the men around her. A woman’s honour and worth, therefore, is implied to be solely located 
in outside perceptions of her sexuality and chastity.433  
 
5.7.3. The value of a woman 
All of the above paint a telling picture of the considered value of women, as we move 
through the postcolonial period.  When Sita is convinced that Rama has abandoned her, she 
contemplates suicide.434 Her thought is reflective of the love value that is often placed on 
women who are unable to be useful to the men around them – not only by men, but also by 
women. The debates during the creation of the Hindu Code Bills focused strongly around the 
notion that the role of the mother should be celebrated as the highest achievement a woman 
can attain.435 Margaret Jolly observes that “maternity is, at least in Bengal and northern India, 
a cause for celebration only if it results in sons.”436  
There is little doubt that this contributes to the significant skew in child birth-rates. 
Despite the scientific statistical probability that slightly more foetuses are female than male, 
in 2001 there were just 933 female live births to 1000 male live births; down from 972/1000 
in 1901.437 This may also have contributed to the decline in the representation of women in 
the labour force in the immediate postcolonial period – from 34.44% in 1911 to 17.35% in 
1971.438 Other factors than the skewed birthrate had contributed to this. The likelihood was 
that boys are likely to be fed more, and in poverty-stricken areas it was often girls who are 
forced to go without food if needed; therefore, as they moved into adulthood they were more 
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likely to be susceptible to disease and malnutrition.439 Additionally, families did not offer the 
same level or quality of education to daughters that they did to sons, due to the perception 
that their predetermined roles as housewives rendered education beyond a basic level a waste 
of money and time.440 When combined with dowry as well as acute pressure to marry and 
give birth to sons as quickly as possible, these conditions perpetuated the same gross gender 
inequalities that had existed before independence. Despite the promises of independence 
leaders and the efforts of early Indian feminists, the roles of women were still undeniably 
shaped by the expectations of ideal womanhood reflected in the Ramayana.  
  
5.8. Conclusion 
It is important to consider the history of the BJP and the cultural milieu within which 
it is situated. The impact of the party’s presence in India became genuinely significant 
towards the end of the twentieth century, culminating in 1992 with a moment that would both 
encapsulate and define the nature and goals of the BJP in India, moving into the 21st century. 
Part of this was made clear in the relations between the BJP and Muslims, which has 
continued to be a problematic and oppressive paradigm in the twenty-first century. As I have 
indicated, this conservative trend is reflected in the shape of women’s rights in India. 
Maitrayee Chaudhuri posits that the post-Independence Indian state frames women in three 
ways: as passive recipients and occasional active agents of economic and social development, 
as citizens (albeit at least initially as second-class citizens), and as cultural and religious 
emblems.441 
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Incidentally, it is also interesting to note that the implicit inequality of the Hindu Code 
Bill and social understandings of a woman’s legal place, particularly in regards to 
inheritance, is by no means supported by classical Hindu legal texts. The Dharmaśāstras, a 
series of treatises on dharma that form part of the Smriti (secondary corpus of Hindu texts) 
make no distinction between the inheritance of an estate on the basis of gender.442 
Nevertheless, the Hindu Code Bill serves as a testament not only to the severe deficiencies in 
legal rights for women until they were passed, but also the socialised assumptions which 
framed the legislation that was passed. 
The 1974 Towards Equality: Report of the Committee on the Status of Women in 
India concluded that a significant proportion of Indian women had not benefited at all from 
the rights that were promised them both in the Constitution and in the spirit of 
Independence.443 The understanding of the female role in Indian society, while well-suited to 
the Independence movement, quickly became inadequate, particularly when used to fuel 
right-wing gendered rhetoric. A significant reason for this was the continued objectification 
of femininity for the purposes of nationalism.444 
 The women’s movement was therefore forced to reinvent itself, particularly to 
combat the very real issues of violence and social oppression that were discussed earlier. 
Moreover, most of the focus tended to be on specific issues – especially dowry, female 
infanticide, and marriage – meaning that efforts to combat gender inequality on a larger scale 
were limited.445 In 1987, the prominent women’s studies scholars Neera Desai and Maithreyi 
Krishnaraj attributed the stunted spread of feminism to the fact that “…women have been 
looked upon either as victims of social practices or targets for development as in the post-
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independence period, but never as participants in development..”446 Thus the struggle against 
the widespread effects of the patriarchal and exclusionary narratives upon which modern 
India is based have continued to shape the situations of Indian women in the 21st century. 
According to the National Crime Records Bureau of India, 8 618 women died in relation to 
dowry disputes in 2011.447 
The next chapter explores two key elements of the BJP’s exclusionary aims and 
policy as it rose to prominence in the 1980s. The first is that of the mobilisation of Hindu 
nationalists as a violently masculine force in the model of a carefully perceived 
understanding of Rama, to quash the rights of minorities and oppress non-Hindu interests and 
social elements. The second shows how this approach to masculinity has been reflected in the 
continued social and legal oppression and silencing of women. It outlines some of the 
legislative and social advances that have been made since the 1980s, and acknowledges that 
there has been some level of success in this war for women’s rights.448 However, the chapter 
also highlights the fact that the move towards equality has been slow and plagued not only by 
issues of society and culture, but also of opposition by political forces. 
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6. Four Decades of the BJP: the Ramayana, Violence, 
Nationalism and Gender since 1980  
Lovely lady, Rama is the guardian of the four classes of society. 
He is the guardian of his own conduct and of righteousness. 
(The Ramayana, Sundarakāṇḍa, 33:11.)449 
6.1. Introduction 
India’s Independence movement was driven by the unifying rhetoric of equality 
regardless of caste, creed, religion, and gender, with a basis in secular tolerance. However, as 
the previous chapter has shown, this promise of national unity was curtailed in the following 
decades. Part of this, as I have indicated, is due to the inability of the INC to manifest 
promises of economic and social reform and progress. Growing distrust of the Congress Party 
began to develop in the 1960s, highlighted by the general elections in 1967 where the INC 
faced unprecedented defeats at the state level.450 Problems were worsened rather than 
ameliorated by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s declaration of a state of emergency in 1975, 
which revoked individual rights such as the right to trial, and suspended elections until 
1977.451 Perhaps most indicative of this violation of democratic principles which the INC had 
touted since independence, was the  implementation of borderline-dictatorial programs, such 
as a forced sterilisation programme near Delhi organised by Gandhi’s son, Sanjay Gandhi.452 
Meanwhile, the gridlock of bureaucracy and political inaction resulted in frustration in the 
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lower classes and castes with the middle class and the INC, which was further fuelled by 
unfulfilled social and economic reforms.453  
In this landscape of corruption, abuse of power, and the denial of basic freedoms and 
rights, “liberal democracy” as espoused by Congress appeared a farce – and, indeed, a mask 
for widespread oppression. This impression was only furthered by economic troubles, rising 
food prices, and a decline in the rise of employment rates through the 1970s and 1980s.454 
Certainly, this was (and continues to be) the rhetoric used by the BJP during its rapid rise to 
widespread power. The renowned journalist and political analyst Praful Bidwai, in writing on 
their exponential success, referred to the BJP in 2005 as an “animal…that mutates from a 
Right-wing pressure-group on the margins with just two Lok Sabha [Parliament] seats in 
1984, to a major contender for power at the national level within a decade and which 
overtakes the Congress by 1996 and forms a government at the Centre two years later…”455 
While Bidwai was writing in 2005, this description of the BJP is prescient, particularly after 
Narendra Modi’s victory in the 2014 Indian general election (the party won 282, that is 
51.9%, of all seats).  
Rhetoric, of course, cannot be enough to propel a political party from a place in the 
radical minority into mainstream politics. So, what precipitated this growth, aside from the 
decline of the INC and the consequent power vacuum left behind? Certainly, until the early 
1980s it was a commonly held belief that the BJP would eventually have to moderate its 
views and political aims if it wished to become a mainstream party.456 This chapter 
demonstrates how, in fact, fact that the complete opposite occurred. Rather than de-
radicalising, the BJP capitalised strongly on the tensions that plagued postcolonial India as 
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the new nation sought out a way to apply a colonial secular nationalist model across a cultural 
and linguistic area with an identity largely defined by an opposition to those same colonial 
forces. Consequently, the BJP was able to push a Hindu nationalist agenda in line with the 
Hindutva doctrine with little opposition from the vague secularism of the INC – which was 
itself still shaped by the elements of Hindu unity that had been a key part of their rhetoric 
during the Independence movement. To pacify moderates and non-Hindus, the BJP drew 
upon the ostensibly accepting principle of Hindutva which stated that Indians were free to 
follow any religion (but only so long as they maintained a perceived notion of Hindu 
values).457 In 1991, for instance, the then-president of the BJP, Murli Monhar Joshi, stated 
that “…it is the basic culture of this country. I say that all Indian Muslims are Mohammadiya 
Hindus; all Indian Christians are Christi Hindus. They are Hindus who have accepted 
Christianity and Islam as their religion”.458 
Despite these superficial concessions to tolerance and pluralism, the BJP have both 
explicitly and implicitly continued to advocate for a return to a ‘purer’ past where, according 
to Hindutva ideology, India was entirely Hindu and its culture undiluted by secularism.459 
Simultaneously, they presented a way to move forward from what they presented as the 
corrupt state of modern India under the INC.460 As outlined in the previous chapter, the BJP’s 
desire for the application of traditional Hinduism in Indian society and law has been evident 
in their rhetoric and action since independence.461  Moreover, even with the move into the 
mainstream, the BJP has continued to heavily draw upon Hindu mythology and culture in its 
rhetoric – in particular, its deployment of the Ramayana. The Ramayana has played a large 
role in shaping, framing, and popularising the rhetoric that the BJP uses to justify and 
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promote its ideologies and policies.  Indeed, the role of the Ramayana and associated 
mythologies has had quantifiable social effects in India, particularly since 1985. This chapter 
will explore the scope of this role over the last three decades in aiding the rise of the BJP, 
despite initial beliefs that its violation of principles of secularism would render its influence 
short-lived.462 and the growing persecution of minorities – in particular Muslims – as a 
method of both consolidating Hindutva ideologies across the nation and perpetuating 
chauvinistic and oppressive practices and politics. 
While at first glance, the persecution and marginalisation of Muslims seems unrelated 
to the issues faced by women in relation to the party and its ideologies, this persecution is a 
key factor in establishing a militaristic, paternalistic structure of Hindu Indian (ideally BJP) 
leadership. By rejecting the “effeminate” in Indian society which had been imposed by the 
“masculine” Islamic conquerors of the mid-second millennium, the political presence of 
women has been simultaneously marginalised.463 When added to the politicisation of Islamic 
female bodies and identity – such as the key Hindu nationalist narrative that higher fertility 
rates among Muslims will result in a Muslim majority and ‘takeover’ (a narrative espoused 
by members of the BJP)464 – and the importance of considering these forms of 
marginalisation when examining the relationship between women and the BJP in modern 
India becomes apparent.  
The relationship between women and the BJP has remained fractious since 1985, 
particularly as the rise in its nationalist conservatism and notions of traditionalism clashed 
with the economic rise of women, their representation in the workforce, and efforts to combat 
specific issues of gender-based oppression that I elaborated upon in the previous chapter. 
Moreover, equally troubling is the way in which the BJP has weaponised the Ramayana to 
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not only support their views, but to cajole women into perpetuating their own oppression. 
After examining the cultural shifts around the rise of the BJP post-1985 and the increased 
militancy of Hindutva as a male-driven social ideology, this chapter will explore the 
relationship between the BJP and women in political discourse and voting, and the effect of 
such a relationship in the twenty-first century as women play a greater role in the Indian 
workplace and economy. 
 
6.2. Political and Cultural expansion of the BJP since 1985 
6.2.1. Shift in polls and voting patterns 
The support base of the BJP is situated in Hindi-speaking regions of North India.465 
There are three key reasons for this. Firstly, Hindi is far more widespread in North India than 
in the South, where strong notions of linguistic independence still linger. The presence of a 
shared language in the north therefore aids significantly in the dissemination of information 
and propaganda, as well as easing the process of navigating regional cultural differences.466 
Secondly, several languages in the south are from the Dravidian language group rather than 
the Indo-Aryan, meaning that learning Hindi is comparatively more difficult – and less 
meaningful or useful for South Indians – whereas North Indian languages, being 
linguistically more similar (and related to Sanskrit), have allowed for the spread of Hindi as a 
commonly used language. Thirdly, resentment over the choice of Hindi as the official 
language of legalese also means that many South Indians are averse to the idea of learning or 
speaking Hindi. 
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Since 1985, however, the increase in popularity of the BJP in the north has spread into 
southern India. This is due in part to the increased use of comparative methods and 
approaches to electoral politics and the influence of regional cultures across the country, 
which allowed political parties a greater understanding of methods of framing policies and 
propaganda to greater success. 467 In 2009, the BJP managed to gain the highest number of 
seats in the state election of the southern state of Karnataka.468 The state, which includes the 
major cities of Bangalore and Mysore, did not offer the BJP enough seats for a clear majority 
(it won 110 of 224 seats), but the vote. However, this represented a clear shift away from the 
popularity of the INC, which won 80 seats. While this by no means equals the widespread 
influence of the party in North India, it is indicative of the fact that the BJP’s nationalist 
ideological appeal has begun to overshadow regional linguistic and cultural differences.469 
 
6.2.2. Cultural shifts 
As stated earlier, the BJP’s rise in influence concurred with the decline in the 
Congress party’s national popularity. With the swell of Hindu nationalism through the 1980s, 
supported and stimulated by the repopularisation of religious narratives – notably the 
Ramayana – this rise in power became more rapid.  Before 1980, and moving through that 
decade with its official inception into mainstream politics, the BJP actively sought to 
differentiate itself from its predecessor the BJS, and its overt Hindutva and anti-Muslim 
politics. The party’s manifesto during the 1984 Lok Sabha election extolled the importance of 
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unity in diversity. 470  Yet, even this movement was rooted in the idea of India as an 
inherently Hindu country: 
Alongside, in the 1980s, the BJP launched the Ram Mandir movement…the 
BJP propagated the concept of Ramrajya, an idyllic time when the upper and 
lower castes will supposedly live together in harmony. Rama and the 
Ramayana were projected as symbols of unity between the Dalits and the 
upper castes; the Dalits were told how Ram was associated with deprived 
people and how the Ramayana was centred around them…These were actually 
the so-called deprived communities of today, who had succeeded in searching 
out and rescuing the soul of India.471 
By centring Indian identity on Hinduism, the notion of the ‘other’ became firmly 
Muslim; a tactic to create a binding element for Hindus that unified rather than divided them 
into Savarna and Avarna (‘with caste’ and ‘without caste’ respectively.) This also provided 
security of identity for Savarnas as the caste system began to slowly lose its potency, and as 
the perceived threat of non-Hindus (particularly Muslims) became more pressing and 
powerful than the threat of the dissolution of their caste identities.472  Despite the BJP’s 1984 
manifesto and its emphasis on tolerance and diversity, a series of Hindu-Muslim riots and 
efforts to propagate Hindutva ideologies were the principal reasons for the BJP’s consequent 
success in the 1991 general election.473 This demonstrates the troubling extent of tokenism in 
the party’s rhetoric – exemplified in their support for a Uniform Civil Code, allowing for the 
government to pass common reforms regarding marriage and other religious practices, where 
previously Hindus and Muslims were allowed self-governance (hence the Hindu Code Bill.) 
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Support for these measures also alienated Muslims by portraying their practices as inherently 
chauvinistic and sexist compared to the apparently accepting and progressive approach to 
women and marriage taken by Hindus.474 The BJP’s support for a Uniform Civil Code was 
designed to signal to the voting public that Hindus accepted secular law, and that the INC 
was subject to the whims of religious fundamentalists.  
Despite active efforts by the BJP to moderate their tone, therefore, the rise of the BJP 
was fuelled largely by a growing backlash against the perceived threat of social deterioration 
via the ‘weak-minded’ INC and external influences of Westernisation and Islam. A growing 
interest in the reclamation of ‘traditional’ Hindu sites, such as that of Ayodhya, became more 
widespread with the release of Sagar’s Ramayan. The serial, as a product of state-run 
television, was sponsored by a INC-led government, most likely with the aim of mobilising 
the Hindu vote for themselves. Indeed, the actor playing Rama, Arun Govil, campaigned as 
his character on behalf of the INC.475 Nevertheless, both the broadcasting of the serial and the 
politicisation of it violated a key Nehruvian principle upon which the INC was founded – that 
government institutions should remain secular. The Ramayan, released as the BJP gained in 
popularity, offered that party a much more potent opportunity to harness and (importantly) 
encourage Hindu nationalism in a way that the INC, with its secular roots, could not.476 The 
power and influence of the serial was particularly illustrated when Deepika Chikhalia, the 
actress playing Sita, became a Member of Parliament after campaigning as a BJP candidate in 
the 1991 national elections.477  
The production allowed the BJP to cite the Valmiki text as an appeal to the text’s 
traditional roots and cultural elements while drawing implicitly upon the references and 
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knowledge instilled in the population by the television serial.478 The Valmiki text by itself 
offered a certain sense of communalism, and served as a link to the notion of the “antiquity of 
the Indian identity, civilisation, and nationalism...”479 However, in providing this singular 
narrative en masse to hundreds of millions of Indians, that mythic connection was reinforced 
and brought into a contemporary context, thereby solidifying and maintaining the ‘imagined 
community’ of Hindu India. 
Additionally, there are other, more sinister undertones to the resurgence in the 
Ramayana’s popularity, than a general swell of nationalist sentiments.   Accompanying this 
rapidly expanding sense of Hindu communalism was a backdrop of masculine militancy as 
depicted in the Ramayana and the Ramayan, particularly via the promotion of the Kshatriya 
warrior model.480 These were highlighted in two key incidents, which I have previously 
mentioned: the first of which was the destruction of the Babri Masjid in 1992; and, a decade 
later, the Gujarat riots in 2002.481 Both incidents were rooted in the exploitation of distrust 
and discrimination against Muslims, rather than women; however, both contained a strong 
and troubling strain of violence against, and scapegoating of, in particular, Muslim women. 
Each of these events is examined below, considering the role of gender and the Ramayana in 
BJP actions and reactions. 
 
6.3. The ‘Ayodhya Incident’: The Destruction of the Babri Masjid in 
1992 
The Babri Masjid (Mosque of Babur) was located in Ayodhya, India, and was one of 
the largest mosques in the state of Uttar Pradesh. The mosque was built in 1528CE, on the 
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orders of the Mughal emperor Babur.482 A common understanding among citizens was that 
the mosque’s construction involved the destruction of a temple of Rama on the same site, and 
in the decades leading up to 1992 there had been a dedicated and growing movement among 
Hindutva supporters calling for the destruction of the mosque, or at least the allocation of part 
of the site to Hindu worshippers for constructing a Hindu shrine to Rama.483 This narrative 
was widespread and presented as objective fact by Sangh Parivar groups; for example, a 
cultural knowledge exam taken by students at all RSS schools includes the following section: 
Q: Which Mughal invader destroyed the Ram temple in 1582? 
A Babur 
Q: From 1582 till 1992, how many Rambhakts [Rama worshippers] sacrificed 
their lives to liberate the temple? 
A: 350, 000.484 
There is in fact no tangible evidence supporting the pre-existence of a temple at the 
Ayodhya site, and whether any potential demolition was related to the consequent 
construction of the Babri Masjid.485 Even if this were true, the notion that 350 000 Hindu 
lives were lost in attempts to ‘liberate’ the area is somewhat ridiculous. Nevertheless, this 
popular myth contributed particularly to the rise of populist Hindu nationalism and to the 
construction of a historical narrative where the Mughal Empire represented an egregious 
attack by Muslims on the traditional Hindu homeland.486 This narrative also ignores claims 
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by Jains and Buddhists that the mosque was built over religious constructions of their 
respective faiths. In any case, this led to a Muslim-exclusionist narrative. 
Anti-Muslim resentment specifically related to the Babri Masjid had been slowly 
building even from pre-Independence; a Hindu-Muslim riot in 1934 resulted in some damage 
to the mosque. Throughout the post-Independence period, Hindu organisations and Hindu 
nationalists attempted to enact claims on the grounds as a rightful place of Hindu worship. 
This was exemplified in 1984 by a campaign by the VHP to allow Hindu access to the Babri 
Masjid, as well as other buildings that had apparently been built over Hindu shrines and 
temples. In 1986, Hindus were given access to the site and the mosque, and the area began to 
operate in some ways as a Hindu temple. Sangh Parivar groups and Hindutva proponents 
were not the only ones to use the disputed territory as a political tool. The INC chose to 
unlock the site, to launch their 1991 electoral campaign from a town near Ayodhya, and 
allowed the laying of foundation stones for a future temple to Rama near the Babri Masjid.487 
This culminated in on 16 December 1992, when BJP, VHP and RSS representatives 
offered prayers at the site. Following this, a large number of young male volunteers from 
these militant Hindu organisations attacked the mosque. The Babri Masjid, a 464-year-old 
structure, was destroyed in five hours, the volunteers managing to construct a makeshift 
temple to Rama in its place by the time government forces eventually took control of the 
site.488  
 The riots that ensued in the immediate aftermath of the incident and which continued 
through January 1993 resulted in the mass deaths, most of whom were Muslims. 489 While 
exact death tolls were different to ascertain at the time, particularly as violence broke out in 
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other parts of the country, at least 1000 people died and estimates were as high as 3000.490 
Government action was belated – somewhat due to the fact that it had relied on assurances 
from the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, Kalyan Singh, a BJP party member.491 Singh 
instead ensured that government troops did not arrive at the site till after the demolition 
before resigning from his position as Chief Minister.492 While Prime Minister Narasimha Rao 
eventually acted decisively by banning the RSS, the VHP, and Bajarang Dal (the militant 
youth wing of the VHP), this was largely ineffective and criticised as dictatorial.493  
The Liberhan Commission was established after the event to investigate the 
demolition. After a delay of 17 years, in 2009 the report confirmed that senior figures of the 
BJP, RSS, and VHP were at least partially responsible for the demolition. This correlated 
with accusations from Muslim groups that the attack had been pre-planned and involved state 
government collusion.494 The event in Ayodhya served nevertheless as both publicity and 
propaganda for the BJP.495 Despite the consequent archaeological findings that there had 
been no standing temple at the time of the construction of the Babri Masjid, and the 
implication of BJP members in the event, this myth continues to serve as fuel for the 
conservative narrative of Muslims as invaders and destroyers of classical India. 
The temple-mosque issue in Ayodhya indicates the way in which the political agenda 
of the BJP was revealed to be explicitly bound up in the principles and ideologies of the VJP 
and RSS, in a process that almost wiped out the Muslim population in Bhagalpur.496 Later 
findings aside, the episode indicated a rapidly growing trend towards citizens identifying 
themselves predominantly as Hindus rather than as Indians, with the eventual hope of 
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merging the two.497 Due to this, the Ayodhya dispute continued to offer the BJP political and 
social support, allowing them to ride the wave of Rama-based popularity that brought them to 
prominence in Uttar Pradesh.498 While this influence waned somewhat over the following 
decade, it was dramatically reinvigorated with the 2002 Gujarat incident. 
 
6.4. Godhra, Gujarat 2002 
On 27 February 2002, a fire broke out in a train carriage stopped at Godhra station in 
the state of Gujarat, after Hindu pilgrims returning from Ayodhya reportedly harassed 
Muslim shop owners on the station platform. The fire, apparently a deliberate act of revenge 
by the Muslims, resulted in fifty-eight passengers burning to death.499 Though police initially 
argued that the fire had been the result of a conspiracy formed by a group of 15 to 20 people, 
senior police officials later characterised the attack as a spontaneous reaction to the events on 
the station platform.500 Moreover, the allegation that the fire was started by the Muslims 
involved was later cast heavily into doubt by forensic examinations.501 As with the incident 
of the Babri Masjid, however, these facts were completely overshadowed by the 
interpretation of these deaths as a direct strike by Muslims (fuelled by the rumours of a 
Pakistani conspiracy) on devout Hindus and, by extension, Hinduism. Before any considered 
responses or detailed information could be provided, vocal anti-Muslim sentiment on the part 
of both the police and government officials resulted in reprisal attacks on Muslims which 
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spread throughout the state – resulting in almost 2000 deaths and almost 150 000 left 
homeless.502  
Unlike the destruction of the Babri Masjid, however, the Gujarat riots did not result in 
repercussions for Sangh Parivar organisations or their leadership. Narendra Modi, who at the 
time was the Chief Minister of Gujarat, claimed the events of Godhra were a Pakistan-
supported conspiracy and deliberate attack. According to some accounts, he also told his 
administrative officials to allow the riots to continue in the name of justice, and to remain 
inactive during communal violence.503 
 Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee (a relatively ‘moderate’ representative of the 
BJP party) later supported Modi’s claim of conspiracy, blaming the violence against Muslims 
on the initial train burning, and excusing the subsequent hate crimes as an understandable, if 
condemnable, response.504 He went on to claim that “…Wherever there are Muslims, they do 
not want to live in peace with others. Instead of living peacefully, they want to propagate 
their religion by creating terror in the minds of others.”505 The timing of the attacks, less than 
six months after the September 11 attacks in the USA, further seemed to justify Vajpayee’s 
harmful rhetoric. 
The then-Gujarat State Minister for Home Gordhan Zadaphia (who had been a senior 
VHP member for fifteen years before joining the BJP) stated that “…We will teach a lesson 
to those who have done this…No one will be spared and we will make sure that the forces 
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behind this act will never dare to repeat it.’”506 Some VHP members even boasted that they 
were supported in their endeavours by the police, being given cartridges and weapons.507 
Beyond the use of masculine militant language to justify and fuel these attacks, gender was 
also exploited in other ways by the Hindu right.  Two major newspapers in Gujarat, Gujarat 
Samachar and Sandesh, published false and inflammatory accounts of attacks on (Hindu) 
women.508 In doing so, Muslims were presented as not only raping Indian women, but also of 
violating sacred Mother India herself. In this way, subsequent violence enacted by Hindu 
men against Muslims was framed and justified by the traditional role of men as protectors of 
their women, and men as soldiers of the state. The reverse was the case; women in Muslim 
communities particularly suffered targeted and vicious victimisation. In recorded interviews, 
one of the leaders of the Bajrang Dal (the youth wing of the BJP) boasted that “…we didn’t 
spare a single Muslim shop…there was this pregnant woman, I slit her open…”509 Bilkis 
Bano, a pregnant Muslim woman, was gang-raped by a mob of Hindutva supporters during 
the same riots. The use of sexual violence was not reserved to the Gujarat riots; Himani 
Bannnerji links the events of 2002 to the growing use of gang rape in anti-Muslim attacks, 
where rape morphed “…into public, collective, spectacular acts.”510 By using sexual violence 
against women, militant Hindutva supporters enacted the ideology that masculine violence 
was an appropriate and even noble response to the perceived threat of Islam towards Hindu – 
and by extension, Indian – values and culture. 
The BJP had always been popular in Gujarat; however, in the aftermath of the 
Ayodhya dispute, their appeal escalated dramatically. The “laboratory of Hindutva” has since 
been a phrase used – primarily by BJP opponents – to describe Gujarat in the aftermath of 
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this event.511 Certainly, the violent and exclusionary rhetoric and actions of the BJP and its 
associated organisations only served to increase their popularity in the state in the 2003 
elections. The party won 126 of 181 seats in the state assembly – with its largest vote shares 
coming from the areas that experienced the most violence against Muslims.512 Despite a 
general understanding that Modi’s administration was complicit in the riots, he remained 
popular. Indeed, when he was unable to obtain a USA visa in 2005 due to his complicity in 
the Gujarat riots, he was likened to Rama and the USA to Rama’s father, King Dasharatha. 
The implication was that the USA had been deceived into denying Modi – a noble warrior 
who had fended off the invasive forces of Islam – a visa by the duplicitous Indian national 
government.513 With this support base, Modi continued to serve as the state’s Chief Minister 
till his assumption of the Prime Ministership in 2014 (making him the longest-serving chief 
minister of a state).514  
 In both disputes, the BJP exploited a narrative which was introduced through British 
colonialism of a false history of constant enmity between Hindus and Muslims in the Indian 
subcontinent, to consolidate an exclusionary agenda based around recasting Indian identity as 
fundamentally Hindu. This was further augmented by the use of gendered rhetoric, which 
framed Hindu women and ‘feminine’ India as in need of protection from the inherently 
invasive forces of Islam.515  
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6.5. Women and men in the BJP – propaganda, policy, and social 
discourse  
The changing cultural dynamic in the 1980s and the growing popularity of the BJP 
meant that, despite its promotion of discriminatory and bigoted ideologies, the party began to 
take support and votes from the INC and secular centrists.516 A key impediment to attracting 
further support, however, was that it was difficult for the BJP to extricate or distance itself 
from the patriarchal and gendered rhetoric used by its associated organisations. The party 
benefited from the fact that female participation in the electoral process was quite limited; 
nevertheless, women still represented a significant voting minority. For this reason, the BJP 
had been careful to emphasise an interest in women’s issues and demonstrate a desire to 
improve the state of women’s affairs. The extent to which these are sincere efforts is 
questionable, particularly when underlying motivations are examined and when language 
surrounding other aspects of policy is examined.517 Their actual positions on women and 
women’s issues (dowry, sati, female infanticide, rape) are dubious.518 This has been reflected 
in aspects of social discourse by party members; perhaps most tellingly epitomised by the 
BJP official website’s “Women’s Empowerment” page, which states as its central message 
that “When you empower women, you empower a family.”519 
Despite these issues, the party has demonstrated increasing popularity with women, 
despite a patriarchal and conservative agenda.520 This has made it even more difficult to 
address those issues of employment equality and equality in marriage. A key example of this 
is the party’s approach to the Universal Civil Code (UCC). The UCC has been a key agenda 
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item for the BJP, particularly since its election in 2014. Part IV of the Indian Constitution, 
“Directive Principles of State Policy”, specifies that a UCC should be implemented in 
keeping with the citizen’s right to equality and freedom.521 This is in response to the Hindu 
Code Bill, which was constitutionally allowed because Articles 25 to 30 of the Constitution 
states that religious communities have the right to self-govern in regard to “personal laws”; 
marriage, inheritance, and guardianship rights. As outlined in the last chapter, therefore, the 
Hindu Code Bill introduced ‘reforms’ to Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, and Jain communities; 
however, these reforms were still discriminatory against women. 
Lobbying for the UCC by the Hindu right was initially based on the notion of 
“national integrity”. However, as the women’s movement became more prominent in the 
1970s and 1980s, the BJP started to frame the issue as a women’s rights issue. The party 
claims that the UCC is necessary to free Muslim women from apparently oppressive customs, 
perpetuating the notion that Hindu Indians already have equal rights. As Nivedita Menon 
points out, however, implementing a UCC would merely mean the further homogenisation of 
communities under laws that “were assumed to be “Hindu” norms, but what were, in fact, 
North Indian, upper-caste practices…in the process destroying existing and often more liberal 
customary provisions.”522 
This establishment of the idea that Hindu law is non-discriminatory and even 
empowering to women is a deliberately cultivated fallacy which has allowed the BJP to 
distract attention from their own gendered and patriarchal rhetoric, perpetuate bigotry 
towards Muslims, and promote Hindutva as a far more tolerant and accepting ideology than it 
is in reality.523 The push for such a Code comes in line with an attempt to achieve a complete 
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ban on cow slaughter, as well as to introduce more aspects of “Hindu pride” into the school 
curriculum, based on a portrayal of the past that is by no means historically accurate.524  
The BJP has long claimed to support women’s representation in parliament and the 
practice of reserving a third of seats for women; this was the subject of enthusiastic support in 
1996 and the proposed Women’s Reservation Bill, Constitution (81st Amendment Bill).525 
The Bill was intended to build upon the 1994 Constitutional Amendment Bill (73rd and 74th 
Constitutional Amendments) which reserved 33% of seats on local councils being reserved 
for women.526 The Women’s Reservation Bill proposed that 33% of constituencies, chosen on 
a rotating basis, would be obliged to run only women candidates. However, there were 
numerous criticisms of this: including that it would encourage parties to run women 
candidates only in those allocated areas, thereby pitting women against women; and that this 
could quite possibly curtain career advancement for women due to the rotation of these 
constituencies.527 
The proposal was withdrawn by the end of the same year.528 The next government, led 
by the BJP, introduced the 84th Amendment Bill in 1998, which also fell through. This 
occurred two more times, in 2000 and 2003.529 The BJP were of course not the only party to 
develop cold feet; however, this clearly indicated that BJP declarations of their commitment 
to the empowerment of women in work and politics was a tool that was not intended to be 
actualised.  As with a great number of the issues explored in this chapter, the INC were by no 
means innocent in the failure of the implementation of reservation of seats for women. The 
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INC generally nominates more women candidates, and most female members of parliament 
belong to that party as well.530 
The cases of the UCC and female representation in parliament are not outliers in their 
reflection of the BJP’s patriarchal, Hindu-centric mindset . Using seemingly progressive 
policy to undermine minorities with a disregard for the women they claim to represent is an 
agenda that comes through much more clearly in their discourse. 
In the speech given by Modi in 2015 mentioned earlier in this chapter, he used the 
example of the character Jatayu as evidence of the Ramayana’s apparent message of respect 
for women, and the need to protect a woman’s honour with “fearlessness”.531 While intended 
as an expression of support for women, this statement and interpretation undermined the 
notion of female autonomy. In the example offered by Modi, Sita becomes a stolen 
possession in danger of destruction (at least, of her virtue) by her thief, Ravana. This centres 
a woman’s honour as the most important aspect of her being, eradicating any notion of 
individuality surrounding an archaic notion of purity. On 8 February 2018, the Prime 
Minister responded to female INC MP Renuka Chowdhury’s laughter at one of his statements 
with the following words: “I request you not to say anything to Renuka ji. After the Ramayan 
serial, we got the privilege of hearing this kind of laughter only today”.532 The statement was 
widely read as a derogatory reference to the character Surpanakha and her demonic, coarse 
laughter. The ease with which Modi made this statement, as well as the mainstream 
understanding of its significance, indicates both the cultural influence and prolific spread of 
the Ramayana, and the treatment which female politicians (and women in general) receive if 
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their behaviour transgresses the normative feminine. This is reflected by the fact that, despite 
the apparent commitment to gender quotas in politics that the BJP had demonstrated, in 2004 
(a year after the fourth failure of the Women’s Reservation Bill) women made up only 8.24% 
(30/364) of the BJP’s candidates.533 Only 9% of BJP candidates were women in the 2014 
election, compared with 12% of Congress candidates.534 The party itself has been relatively 
unpopular among women compared to its support among men, as women tend to favour the 
INC and left parties.535 
During the early rise of the BJP – particularly the early 1990s – the party nevertheless 
gained significant support from middle-class and upper-class women, who were far more 
engaged with the Hindutva cause than they were with women’s issues, as they were mostly 
not drawn from women’s organisations or movements.536 Certainly, the BJP vote among 
women has traditionally come from upper class, more privileged women who are more 
concerned with issues of national identity, as opposed to the more marginalised (including 
Muslim women) who tend to vote in larger numbers for the INC.537 Women were, for 
instance, actively involved in the movement for the destruction of the Babri Masjid.538 They 
have also been actively involved in grassroots campaigns, and there have long been female 
subgroups of Sangh Parivar organisations.539 In engaging women in these organisations – 
particularly in militant groups such as the Rashstra Sevika Samiti (the female wing of the 
RSS), traditional gendered roles for women, particularly motherhood, have been positioned 
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“…as a site for female agency…”540 While framed as a means of female empowerment, this 
form of recruitment and activism has served as a subversive continuation of oppressive 
constructs, as will be expanded upon later in this chapter. It also reflects the fact that in large 
part, the ideologies of Hindu nationalism and the Hindu right in general relied on being able 
to define exactly who and what the ideal Indian woman should be.541 Meera Sehgal highlights 
a key reason for the success of the Samiti; that its organisers are celibate single women, 
whose authority is rooted in their desexualisation. This reinforces the idea that female 
sexuality must be contained either within normative heterosexual and patriarchal structures, 
or else eschewed entirely.542 Uma Bharati (Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh, 2003-2004) is 
a particularly prominent example of the way in which women in positions of power in the 
Hindu right come to reinforce exclusionary norms; Bharati was present at the demolition of 
the Babri Masjid and was indicted by the Liberhan  Commission for inciting a mob. While 
acknowledging her moral culpability and the political benefits the BJP received in the wake 
of the destruction, Bharati has insisted that she does not regret her participation in the 
movement.543 
One clear indicator of the BJP’s association between masculinity, Hinduism and the 
Indian identity is indicated in their response to the appointment of Italian-born Sonia Gandhi 
as head of the INC in 1998 after. Sonia Gandhi, who was the wife of Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi (assassinated in 1991) and the daughter-in-law of Indira Gandhi, faced considerable 
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criticism from the BJP and other members of the Sangh Parivar. In 2002, four years after 
Gandhi took over as president of the INC, the president of the BJP’s youth wing stated that 
“…it is really tragic that the party which ruled for more than 50 years has chosen its leader 
who has foreign origins”.544 K.A. Sudharshan, a senior member of the RSS theorised that 
“certain foreign powers, who did not want India to emerge as a strong nation” had been the 
reason for Sonia Gandhi’s entry into politics.545 Despite  her foreign origins, Gandhi has been 
a popular and respected political figure by the majority of Indians; until 2009 polls indicated 
that Sonia Gandhi was preferred as prime minister over Modi.546  
It is hard to gauge the extent to which Gandhi’s gender has played a role in the 
hostility directed her way by the BJP. The emphasis on the fact that she is Italian-born is 
strongly indicative of the importance that the Hindu right wing places on ethnicity and ethnic 
nationalism. As per Indian and Italian citizenship law, she renounced her Italian citizenship 
upon gaining Indian citizenship in 1983. 547 Moreover, the BJP strongly criticised the role of 
family and internal political ties in establishing Gandhi as the INC’s president; however, as 
Gunhild Hoogensen points out, “…men have used such connections for years and no one has 
complained or made an issue with this.”548 
Despite the BJP’s public support for the advancement of women, particularly in 
politics, it has become increasingly obvious that there is no particular drive or incentive for 
this to be carried through into implemented policy or meaningful reform. While female 
representatives of the BJP do hold office, their allocated roles are often the kind that are 
considered ‘feminine’ or ‘soft’ (as such). Moreover, women holding political positions with 
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the BJP have perpetuated elements of the gender paradigm in publicly supporting the party’s 
rhetoric around the importance of motherhood to female identity. Mridula Sinha, the national 
president of BJP Mahila Morcha (the BJP women’s organisation) stated that “…for Indian 
women, liberation means liberation from atrocities. It doesn’t mean that women should be 
relieved of their duties as wives and women”.549  
Ultimately, there is one key difficulty with gauging the amount of support the BJP 
actually holds among women. There has certainly been a rise in women’s involvement in 
elections since the 1990s.550 Unsurprisingly, however, there is no way to clearly discern 
whether women make their voting choices autonomously or whether their husbands, as heads 
of the household, make those decisions for them. According to Sanjay Kumar, fieldwork 
indicates that uneducated women are more likely to cede to their husbands’ political opinions, 
particularly in regard to affairs outside the domestic realm; a perpetuation of the confinement 
of female action and autonomy to the household.551 The problem stems from the intersection 
of class and gender here and reflects Gayatri Spivak’s argument that “the subaltern has no 
history and cannot speak, the subaltern as female is even more deeply in shadow”.552  
 
6.6. Education, employment, and social life in BJP India 
As has been made clear in the previous chapter’s exploration of marriage and the 
education of women in India, the social discourse relating to women in the post-
Independence period has led to the development of generations of women who, while being 
legally allowed to work and entitled to the same wages as men, did not have the social or 
                                                 
549 Basu, “The Gendered Imagery and Women’s Leadership of Hindu Nationalism,” 71. 
550 Deshpande, “How Gendered Was Women’s Participation in Election 2004?,” 5431. 
551 Sanjay Kumar and Praveen Rai, Measuring Voting Behaviour in India (New Delhi: Sage Publications India, 
2013), 106. 
552 Asha Nadkarni, ed., “Severed Limbs, Severed Legacies: Indira Gandhi’s Emergency and the Problem of 
Subalternity,” in Eugenic Feminism: Reproductive Nationalism in the United States and India (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 177. 
140 
 
cultural resources to do so.  Women who are socialised not to air their opinions and needs, 
particularly in front of men, lacked confidence in their abilities and initially found it difficult 
to take charge in social or work situations.553 In these circumstances, legal equality has not 
led to equality in education, employment, and social life; hampered as they are by prevailing 
assumptions of gender roles. The continued prevalence and reverence of texts such as the 
Ramayana, and their continued use in political discourse does not help this situation. 
The control and shaping of education in India has been a key tool used by Hindutva 
organisations affiliated with and often funded by the BJP and ancillary groups to instil an 
understanding of India as an inherently Hindu nation, and a traditional patriarchal social 
model as the only way to ensure a peaceful and pure society. As the previous chapter 
highlighted, the education of women – or the lack thereof – has historically played an 
important role in reinforcing and perpetuating gender structures. Without formal education, it 
is extremely difficult for women to surmount the barriers of gender and class. In 1986 (thanks 
largely to the advocacy of women’s studies scholars), the National Policy on Education 
(NPE) placed significant stress on education as a powerful interventionist tool in socially and 
economically empowering women.554 
This was made particularly apparent in the 1991 census, where the nation-wide 
literacy rate was 52.11%; but with men at 63.86%, and women at 39.42%, a disparity of 
24.44% that was truly alarming.555 In the 1991-2 school year, the number of boys in 
secondary school was double that of girls.556 The literacy rate for women, even at the start of 
the 21st century, did not reach 50%.557 As of the 2011 census, the nation-wide literacy rate 
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had risen to 63.07%, - men to 69.76% - and women to 55.97%.558 The majority of educated 
girls, particularly at the secondary school level, belong to the upper castes. The rise in literacy 
has contributed to an increase in gender parity in schools.559 Beyond the initial problem of 
access to schooling, a key issue is the quality and content of the education provided.  The 
expense of education outside of the government education system – which is fraught with 
teacher incompetence and underfunding – means that a number of those schools are provided 
by organisations associated with the Sangh Parivar, and may be the only option even for non-
Hindu students.560 
The Ramayana is taught in most schools, and its infusion in regional, state, and 
national culture means that despite the low rate of education and literacy, most children and 
adults have a strong awareness of the epic.561This is even more the case in Sangh Parivar-
associated schools.  In September 2017, Huffington Post India journalist Betwa Sharma 
reported on the routines of Muslim children in RSS schools, run by the non-profit 
organisation Vidya Bharati. The report quoted Vidya Bharati’s national secretary Shiv Kumar 
as saying: 
The entire history of this country depends on Hindus, so everyone must learn 
about it. Hinduism is not a religion but a way of life. You see, Hindus have 
never been rigid and that is why so many religions have flourished here. We 
are not against any religion, but conflict happens only when they (Muslims) 
                                                 
558 Mukherjee, “How Will Women in India Fare under a Modi BJP Government?” 
559 Ronald C. Wimberley and James A. Christenson, “Civil Religion, Social Indicators, and Public Policy,” 
Social Indicators Research 10, no. 2 (February 1, 1982): 63. 
560 Devika Saha, “In 5 Years, Private Schools Gain 17 Million Students, Government Schools Lose 13 Million,” 
Hindustan Times, April 17, 2017, https://www.hindustantimes.com/education/in-5-years-private-schools-gain-
17-million-students-government-schools-lose-13-million/story-6FV1ic7RLttmWc0ZkhBQBM.html. 
561 Mangharam, “Rama, Must I Remind You of Your Divinity?,” 75. 
142 
 
are rigid. If they become more tolerant and less rigid, what's wrong with 
that?562 
Sharma also noted several references to the Ramayana in school materials and 
activities; she described a performance of the Hanuman Chalisa, a well-known devotional 
hymn celebrating the god Hanuman and his devotion to Rama, which some Muslim children 
were involved in. Drawings of Rama and Sita were pinned on noticeboards, and textbook 
questions included “which ideal woman sets an example for virtuous women?”563 RSS 
schools have even introduced some gendered classes, where girls are taught ‘household’ 
skills such as sewing and cooking – with the implication that these are necessary to be “good 
housewives and mothers”.564 This reinforces the gender divide perpetuated by BJP education 
and rhetoric, which is focused on discouraging women from engaging in the public sphere in 
favour of confining them to the household in line with ‘traditional’ understandings of gender. 
Schools managed by Sangh Parivar organisations – and mostly overseen by the RSS – 
were heavily driven by religious and nationalist ideology. Unsurprisingly, considering the 
earlier part of this chapter, the state of Gujarat was one of the first to see revisions of their 
textbooks by the BJP government along Hindutva lines.565 One of these revisions is 
referenced earlier in this chapter, where the false understanding that there had been a temple 
underneath the Babri Masjid has been inserted into a textbook as fact. A mathematics exam 
question given in the state of Uttar Pradesh in the early 2000s asked “if it takes four sevaks 
[followers or volunteers] to demolish one mosque, how many does it take to demolish 
twenty?”566  Mridula Chauhan lists some problematic elements with the syllabus issued by 
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the RSS such as: the introduction of alphabets and phonetics via the names of religious texts; 
gender construction in instructional narratives and pictures; and the introduction from 
kindergarten of religious rhymes and stories.567 
Chauhan also details the intensive study of the Ramayana which begins from Grade 
Two. Unsurprisingly, the textbook used emphasises the traditional and narrow reading of the 
Ramayana perpetuated by Hindutva ideologues since its rise. Rama is presented as virtuous, 
obedient, physically strong, attractive, kind, and a powerful leader.  Sita’s virtues, however, 
mostly relate to her obedience and devotion to Rama. Moreover, there are few mentions of 
any love or devotion felt by Rama towards his wife. The textbooks also emphasise the 
importance of chastity and the severe punishment that women may incur if their chastity is 
compromised.568 The introduction of these concepts from such a young age (as in Australia, 
Grade Two children in India are seven years old on average) instils fundamentally sexist and 
patriarchal worldviews, as well as presenting the Hindu nationalist version of history and 
Indian culture as fact. 
Another issue which is seemingly minor but quite telling is that of sex education, 
which is regarded as essential by women’s rights organisations but criticised by other social 
groups as an example of the corrupting influence of Western colonialism.569 The BJP and 
RSS have strongly opposed sex education in schools. The president of the state of Tamil 
Nadu’s BJP claimed that sex education in state run schools was “a conspiracy of the US to 
bring in degraded values under the guise of AIDS awareness”.570 The prioritisation of vague 
notions of tradition and reactive nationalism over public health (especially as it primarily 
affects women) indicates that the party is willing to sacrifice the wellbeing of female citizens. 
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Equality in the workplace is somewhat more common among the upper class in urban 
areas. As of 2010, women comprise 36% of the total Indian workforce, 6% of senior 
management roles, and 4.9% of board of director positions.571 The low percentage of women 
in leadership roles is hardly surprising, as masculine hegemony in the workplace is an issue 
even in countries which have a higher level of female representation in senior 
management.572 
Women have higher representation in non-profit organisations; however even in 
these, they are under-represented in senior management and do not have gender parity.573 
This further emphasises the recurring theme throughout this chapter, where women are 
typecast into ‘carer’ roles even in full-time professions. The arts/science divide is also one 
which plagues the Indian education system; boys are encouraged to study ‘hard’ subjects 
such as science and engineering, while women are encouraged to study ‘soft’ subjects such as 
domestic sciences, history, and languages.574 The exception to this is medicine, as the 
seclusion of women has necessitated the training of women as doctors and other medical 
professionals. 
For many women, particularly those involved with Hindutva ideologies and the BJP, 
the areas of employment and the social intersect in a manner which perpetuate sthe social 
understanding that women are unable to perform ‘hard’ tasks – those that are intellectually or 
physically heavy. This particular approach to women in work was reflected in the passive 
involvement of women in the Ayodhya campaign; their roles were primarily centred around 
activities like making food for the Hindu volunteers and militants.575 
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Just as female politicians in the BJP are often allocated ‘soft’ portfolios, working women in 
India have a tradition of being cast in narrowly defined ‘feminine’ roles. In the federal 
government in 1992, for instance, Chhaya Bera was the only woman in a Cabinet of twenty-
three, and was assigned the Relief and Social Welfare portfolio.576 While there have been 
powerful women in government in India (notably Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and her 
daughter-in-law Sonia Gandhi who was President of the INC from 1998 to 2017), the role of 
family connections and political dynasties have been a significant part of their success.577 
Just as there exists a dichotomy between the role and involvement of women and men 
in the workplace, so too is there one between men and women in social, cultural, and political 
life. In a reflection of the level and nature of participation of women in workplaces and 
employment, women tend to occupy a more passive role in social life.  Working outside the 
home (particularly for lower-class women) continues to carry a certain social stigma. The 
patriarchal assumption that women should stay at home (or, as is the case with high-caste 
women, within the protective field of family companies and enterprises,)578  is driven by two 
key factors. The first is that paid work is not considered the purview of the woman unless 
necessary; therefore, it is associated with familial financial trouble, and thus with lower caste, 
‘shameful’ behaviour.579 The other is somewhat reflective of Sita’s situation in the 
Ramayana, where her time spent away from Rama is automatically assumed to equate with 
infidelity. This follows on to her exile after the citizens of Ayodhya assume that her children 
cannot be Rama’s. Reluctance to allow women outside of the domestic or familiar fear 
continues to be driven in part by a desire to preserve traditional lines, and by the fear that 
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with female autonomy naturally comes an increased chance of infidelity and disruption to the 
paternal lineage.580 
This is reflected in the participation of women in not only employment roles with 
NGOs, but also in volunteer positions, thereby removing a significant number of ‘workers’ 
from the formal economy.581 The lack of remuneration for their work emphasises and 
perpetuates the social understanding that women are natural carers and therefore do not need 
to be paid for this work. By doing so, women are likely to sacrifice education and career 
opportunities, even while often volunteering in endeavours which aim to empower women. 
Aditi Mitra observes that many of these women are upper-class citizens, while lower-class 
women (who need to work to support their families) have more freedom to participate in 
wider society.582 As a woman’s early adulthood is expected to be devoted to childbirth and 
parenting, urban Indian women often enter the workforce at a much later age than most 
men.583 
Educated working women undoubtedly enjoy a higher status than economically 
dependent housewives, however, working women are also expected to adhere to the 
patriarchal social structure and often must occupy dual roles of housewife and employee.584 
Domestic work and family responsibilities (including taking care of elderly relatives) still 
remain in large part the purview of female members of the household. In addition to this, 
familial and social pressure coerces mothers to impart the same expectations of submissive 
behaviour and devoutness to daughters, to avoid facing judgement as a ‘bad’ parent.585 Even 
                                                 
580 Visweswaran et al., “The Hindutva View of History,” 314. 
581 Hindustan Times, “How Indian Men Are Keeping Women out of the Workforce,” Hindustan Times, May 30, 
2017, https://www.hindustantimes.com/editorials/how-men-are-keeping-indian-women-out-of-the-
workforce/story-LY9nlpnJpzQWAleVBUGCFO.html. 
582 Aditi Mitra and J. David Knottnerus, “Sacrificing Women: A Study of Ritualized Practices among Women 
Volunteers in India,” Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 19, no. 3 
(2008): 245. 
583 Raka Ray, Fields of Protest: Women’s Movements in India (New Delhi: Zubaan, 2000), 26. 
584 Vasavada, “A Cultural Feminist Perspective on Leadership in Non-Profit Organisations,” 467. 
585
 Chandran, “A Woman’s World,” 296. 
147 
 
women who are able to earn an independent income and who hold full-time professions cite 
Sita as a role model; while they are aware of the unfeasibility of the Sita ideal in 
contemporary everyday life, there is still a strong social pressure not to question problematic 
and oppressive aspects of that very ideal.586 The model of the virtuous woman in religious 
narrative is only augmented by opposing models of women who forsake their dharma to their 
husbands, or break the model of prescribed womanhood.587 An example from the Ramayana 
of the former is Kaikeyi in the Ramayana, who forces her husband to follow her bidding and 
finds herself consequently despised by her family and the kingdom. The latter is best 
epitomised by Surpanakha; not only is she physically unattractive, but she openly approaches 
Rama and Lakshmana. As a result, she is verbally humiliated and physically mutilated.588 
The expectation that women should place family first, Kanchan Mathur observes, also 
extends to women’s health. According to Mathur, women are “…expected to eat last, leave 
the best food for the men of the family and to ignore their own illnesses, while managing the 
entire household.”589 This also ties into the problem of domestic and sexual violence, which 
also plays a part in shaping the autonomy of women in Indian society. The continued 
perception that a woman must eventually marry – and stay in that marriage – means that 
women are often compelled to stay in abusive relationships, particularly when this coincides 
with a lack of property rights, education, or employment.590 The role of the domestic sphere 
in constraining and oppressing women even when they have legal rights in the fields of 
education and employment is similarly mirrored in the Ramayana. Sita is powerful with her 
own birthright and royal lineage; however, she is ultimately forced to be subservient to Rama. 
Meanwhile, Rama is consistently compassionate and respectful to almost every character 
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other than Sita; reflecting the notion that men are judged on their actions as active social and 
political players, while the value of women is ultimately tied to their ability to abide by a 
strict model of virtuosity and obedience. 
 
6.7. Conclusion 
So far, this thesis has emphasised that the BJP narrative relies an essentialist historical 
vision which venerates a pre-colonial pure ‘original’ Indian nation.591 As this chapter has 
demonstrated, there are two key reasons for the success of this narrative. 
Congress’s decentralisation as a political party, which started centre-left but has 
become a representation of bureaucracy and vague secularism absent of any clear ideology or 
clear program for India’s future, left a void in political power that allowed for the exponential 
growth of the BJP through the 1980s and 1990s.592 They have, in direct and deliberate 
opposition to Congress and the secular narrative, been calling for a national culture which 
privileges the “Hindu” origins of the nation.593 Evoking Islam as an aggressive force 
threatening the sanctity of Mother India as a Hindu state, the BJP were able to use events 
which would normally be extremely detrimental to a political party – namely the destruction 
of the Babri Masjid and the Gujarat riots – to support and advance their own 
agenda.594Amalendu Misra refers to the idea that “…India is the only country where the 
majority community is still afraid of the minorities.”595 The claim that India is the only 
country with this problem is no longer necessarily true (Misra’s paper was written in 2000). 
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Nevertheless, it is significant that those words are applicable to the entirety of postcolonial 
Indian history. 
It is important to note that the women’s movement has been instrumental in pushing for 
dramatic legislative reforms and drawing political and social attention to gender inequalities. 
Along with this, they have focused heavily on the importance of empowering women in 
personal and family life. At the same time, however, research continues to show that gender 
discrimination is still pervasive in the social and cultural conditions of women from all castes 
and classes in Indian society.596 Irma Clots-Figueras suggests that this is a cyclical problem, 
pointing out that female political representation actually increases the level of educational 
attainment in the district represented by those politicians.597 Educational disadvantages to 
women, however, limit the pool of female political candidates as well as their potential to 
advance to senior political positions. When access to education is available, the use of the 
Ramayana as a conservative education tool further entrenches rigid gender structures and 
prioritises the maintenance of Hindu tradition over women’s rights and inclusive secularism. 
This problem is one which reflects key issues that plague efforts to bring women into the 
workforce for longer-term periods, especially in middle class and/or leadership positions, as 
well as a primary reason for the continuation of roadblocks on the path to encouraging 
personal autonomy among Indian women. The issue is that culturally, women do not have 
agency in the public domain, and even in the domestic sphere they take on the roles of 
caregivers rather than leaders.  
Despite a sizeable body of feminist writings and numerous well-known female politicians, 
women have continued to be largely absent on a national level in debates about economics, 
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trade, and global politics. Once again, Spivak’s theory that women may talk but, for the most 
part, not speak and be heard, appears to ring true.598 
Moving into the second decade of the twenty first century, it has become all the more 
important to unpack the extent to which the BJP and its associated organisations and 
ideologies are embedded in the political and cultural fabric of modern India. There was 
violence around the polling stations in the 2014 election where the BJP took federal power.599 
The regime has been facing a swell in criticism from cultural and literary figures in India, as 
well as from human rights watch groups outside of India, and has been compared to the 
Taliban in a number of recent publications.600 Since before the election of Modi, however, 
there have been numerous attempts to re-examine or rewrite the Ramayana with the aim of 
addressing the assumptions of gender and patriarchal social structure that continue to shape 
modern gender relations in India. 
Mangala Subramaniam makes the claim that all social and cultural movement in India 
since the 1980s has been to some extent influenced by the rise of Hindutva organisations and 
the BJP.601 In the next chapter, I will explore some of these efforts in India, before examining 
issues of obstructionism on a microcosmic level. 
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7. Fighting and rewriting tradition in society and culture 
Do you remember what my father said when you took my hand in marriage? 
She will follow you like a shadow. That is what he said. 
(Fire to Earth: A Story of Rama and Sita, Act 1 Scene 9.) 
7.1. Introduction and context 
Opposition and problematising of the Ramayana is not actually a new development. 
Indeed, the highlighting of the Valmiki Ramayana at the expense of the others is a method by 
which oppositional narratives and tellings of the Ramayana are sidelined and dismissed. Part 
of this is due to the fact that Sanskrit has been elevated as the language of Hinduism and of 
scholarship, meaning that other tellings are restricted to certain groups without pan-Indian 
significance and limited dissemination.602 There are exceptions to this; the final book, where 
Rama banishes Sita from the kingdom, is left out by both Kamban and Tulsidas, who end 
their works with the triumphant return from Lanka and the coronation of Rama and Sita.603 
Moreover, cultural and ethnic differences mean that concepts of class and gender have 
evolved and shifted in the treatment of the Ramayana.604 
The opening of English schools and colleges in the colonial period, furthermore, led 
to a generation of students trained to question key elements of the story. Whether these were 
issues with the narrative (how there could have existed a complex civilisation of monkeys 
able to communicate with humans), or thematic issues such as those of Brahminic elitism and 
patriarchal structures, by the start of the twentieth century a tradition of questioning the 
Ramayana had begun to develop.605 In doing so, the social issues explored in earlier chapters 
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which has persisted due to the norms established and emphasised by conservative readings of 
the Ramayana have also come to face strong opposition.  
The reclamation of womanhood and the process of separating female life and identity 
from its relation to men has been an ongoing process since the advent of early feminism in 
India. Part of this has involved a need to distinguish Indian feminism from Western 
feminism, and to develop an understanding of feminism and gender equality moulded to the 
internal framework of India and Hinduism as distinct from an enforced by-product of 
colonialism. Therefore, rather than simply discarding elements of culture and history 
generally viewed as ‘native’ to India – namely, those embedded and represented in the 
canonical philosophies and narratives of Hinduism – there has been a strong history of 
reimagining these narratives. 
In 1993, part of the Indian Independence Day celebrations included an exhibit centred 
on a traditional Pali narrative, Dasaratha Jataka, which tells a Buddhist version of the 
Ramayana where Rama is an incarnation of the Buddha.606 In response, fifteen members of 
the VHP destroyed this part of the exhibit, and BJP members later attempted to charge the 
organizers of the festival for misrepresenting the Ramayana. In doing so, both the VHP and 
BJP expressed the notion of the Ramayana as inherently “Hindu”, and this “Hinduness” as 
being intrinsically wound with ideas of Indian nativeness.607  
Their actions also reflected a dislike of associations between the Ramayana and other 
countries; the Hindu nationalist agenda relies heavily on the exclusivity of the narrative to the 
mythic history of Hindu India. A sometimes-neglected aspect of the study of gender and 
religion in India is the way in which it feeds into and is in turn fed by its impact on the 
diaspora community and Hindus with limited ties to the ‘homeland’ of India. A long history 
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of Indians in England and a growing presence in Western countries (especially Australia, the 
USA, and Canada) has resulted in the rise of Hindu communities where a significant number 
may not have been born in, or even ever been to, India. Nevertheless, their lives are still 
impacted by practices and gender constructs at work in India.608 
This chapter focuses upon three specific endeavours to represent the Ramayana in 
consideration of its rich multi-narratival history, and their results. Each of these has been 
chosen for their reflections of different aspects of the Ramayana tradition in unconventional 
and non-normative settings.   
The first is the 2008 film Sita Sings the Blues by the American animator Nina Paley in 
collaboration with Indian actors and artists, which received international attention after 
premiering at the 2008 Berlin Film Festival. The second is the late A.K. Ramanujan’s 1987 
essay “Three Hundred Ramayanas: Five Examples and Three Thoughts on Translation”, an 
academic contribution to the field of Ramayana studies which was placed on the University 
of Delhi’s history syllabus in 2006. Finally, I will outline and reflect upon the 2014 play Fire 
to Earth: A Story of Rama and Sita which I wrote and directed in conjunction with the 
University of New South Wales Indian society after struggling to do the same with the 
organisation Chinmaya Mission Australia (established by VHP founder Swami 
Chinmayananda). The play was a one-off performance to an audience of approximately four 
hundred and fifty Australians, most of whom were members of the Sydney Indian-Australian 
community. Here, I will apply an auto-ethnographic lens to analyse the production of this 
play within the context of the diaspora and how it demonstrates the reverberations of 
Hindutva and Hindu nationalist ideology across national borders. 
                                                 
608 Marian Aguiar, “‘Forced Marriage’ and a Culture of Consent,” in Arranging Marriage, Conjugal Agency in 
the South Asian Diaspora (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2018), 70. 
154 
 
Each of these works and their reception indicate the multiple ways in which the 
Ramayana can be – and has been – read and interpreted, the reception that they receive in the 
longer term, and the difficulties presented by conservative Hindus. I will explore the 
microcosmic experience of Hindu nationalism and prevailing gender paradigms as 
perpetuated by the conservative reading of the Ramayana, what these reflect in parallel with 
the wider social actions of Hindu nationalists, and the difficulty that single oppositional 
voices face in making meaningful change. 
 
7.2. Sita Sings the Blues (Nina Paley, 2008) 
In 2008, the cartoonist Nina Paley wrote and directed the animated film Sita Sings the 
Blues. The work, which premiered at the Berlin Film Festival, retells the Ramayana through a 
framework of colourful animation and musical interludes. The film uses a mix of animation 
styles including the manipulation of painted figures in in the 18th century Rajput painting 
tradition, Balinese shadow puppets, and modern vector animation. Sita Sings the Blues 
positions Sita as the protagonist of the film. As the film uses copyrighted music by American 
jazz singer Annette Hanshaw, Paley released it under a Creative Commons license, meaning 
that it free to access and view.  
The narrative starts from Rama and Sita’s exile, and follows their return from Lanka 
after Rama defeats Ravana. The film includes the sometimes-ignored seventh book Valmiki’s 
Ramayana when Sita refuses to return to Ayodhya with her children and is swallowed by the 
earth.  This pared-down telling of the Ramayana intertwines with a semi-autobiographical 
excerpt from Paley’s own life. In this second narrative, a woman named Nina moves to India 
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from New York to join her husband who is temporarily employed there. However, he treats 
her callously and ignores her, eventually ending their relationship by email.609  
Paley attributes the story to Valmiki in the opening credits, and covers most of the 
poem’s narrative. While this would normally be difficult, the story is narrated in the style of a 
conversation between three shadow puppets, who bicker over more nuanced aspects of the 
narrative and explain certain details that are otherwise often glossed over. For instance, one 
of the puppets criticises Sita’s decision not to allow Hanuman to rescue her, instead 
preferring to wait for Rama to defeat Ravana. 
These puppets also question areas of the story that Paley clearly finds problematic; 
most notably, Rama’s treatment of Sita. The film depicts Sita as self-sacrificing and devoted, 
in sharp contrast to Rama who treats her largely with indifference particularly after he defeats 
Ravana. After Sita survives the funeral pyre, the film’s dialogue is as follows: 
Rama: Oops, I guess you were pure after all…so, will you forgive me Sita? 
 Sita: Of course, Rama, I live only for you. 
One of the puppets points out that Rama is still not convinced by the trial. Another 
protests that Rama was convinced, and that “peer pressure” was the reason that he exiles Sita 
years later. The animation indicates that the puppets are not convinced. This scepticism only 
strengthens when Sita is banished by Rama, his demands represented as unrealistic and 
hypocritical in consideration of Rama’s behaviour and Sita’s unwavering devotion.610 As in 
Valmiki’s Ramayana, Paley’s Sita is later tested once again in public and humiliating ways, 
is banished while pregnant, and constantly faced with suspicion.611 The puppets observe in 
response to this that “she shouldn’t love someone who doesn’t treat her right.” This is both an 
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acknowledgement of Sita’s devotion and a criticism of the constant theme in the Ramayana 
that women should, as Valmiki says in the original text, “…a woman who has regard for 
righteousness should hold her husband, whether he is virtuous or not, to be a deity 
incarnate…” (II:56:5.)612 
It is unsurprising that Paley’s film would receive public scrutiny, as a somewhat 
eclectic interpretation of a religious text. Sadly, the backlash she received was significant. 
Critics of the film accused Paley of desecrating the Ramayana, and she received hate mail 
and death threats.613 The San Jose Museum of Arts (SJMA) announced an intended screening 
of the film in 2011; a decision which earned the museum protests from local Hindu groups, as 
well as pan-American organisations such as the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) of America, 
and the Forum for Hindu Awakening.614 While the SJMA went ahead with the screening, a 
screening in New York City earlier in the year was cancelled.615  
There were likely other elements at play than a disagreement with the portrayal of 
Rama and Sita. There were significant differences between Paley’s criticism of Rama and 
those that were mentioned above. Firstly, the film was a blatantly transnational product; it 
was a classical religious narrative written and animated by an American, voiced by Indians, 
featured 1920s jazz music, and used representations of Balinese shadow puppets to depict its 
narrators. Thus, it was aimed at a more international and probably more Western audience 
(especially considering that it premiered at the Berlin Film Festival).616 While this in and of 
itself might not necessarily have incurred outrage, Sharmila Lodhia points out that the film’s 
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availability to a larger audience may have exposed “…certain religious and national 
insecurities”.617 
There are legitimate criticisms of Paley’s film that may be made; the work received 
accusations of cultural imperialism – Paley is a white American of Jewish descent – and the 
commodification of the Ramayana through associated merchandise which is available for 
purchase on the film’s website.618 Nevertheless, rather than engaging Paley in active 
conversation about parts of the film that were offensive, protesters took an approach that is 
all-too familiar in incidents relating to perceived insults to the Ramayana.  This reflected a 
fervent desire to silence Paley’s views rather than objecting to them, indicating a lack of 
interest in active engagement with her ideas. The unwillingness to accept alternative readings 
or presentations of the Ramayana also reflects the fact that Hindu nationalists believe 
themselves to have ultimate and unequivocal ownership of the Ramayana and arbiters of its 
‘true’ meaning. 
 
7.3.  “Three Hundred Ramayanas: Five Examples and Three Thoughts 
on Translation” (A.K. Ramanujan, 1987) 
The essay “Three Hundred Ramayanas: Five Examples and Three Thoughts on 
Translation” (“Three Hundred Ramayanas”) was written for a University of Pittsburgh 
conference in 1987 by the late scholar AK Ramanujan. The work explores the multiplicity of 
Ramayana traditions across religions, languages, and countries. Ramanujan bookends the 
essay with two folktales; the first about the fact that there are thousands of Ramayanas and 
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thus thousands of Ramas, and the last about the power of the Ramayana to entrance till 
“…the line between fiction and reality is erased.”619 
The opening of Ramanujan’s essay asks the following questions: 
How many Ramayanas? Three hundred? Three thousand? At the end 
of some Ramayanas, a question is sometimes asked: How many 
Ramayanas have there been?620 
This establishes the main theme of the rest of the essay, which goes on to list a long 
list of languages across South and Southeast Asia in which versions of the Rama story have 
been told. He also points out that, including mediums such as the various popular and 
classical theatrical and dance tradition, at least three hundred tellings (at least) of the 
Ramayana may be counted.621 The essay explores the various pathways that the story 
followed in being disseminated throughout the subcontinent and into Southeast Asia, as well 
as suggesting the trade and sea routes along which the narrative travelled.  
Unsurprisingly, Ramanujan’s essay was somewhat controversial when it came to the 
attention of Hindu nationalists. As this thesis has established, the Hindutva ideological view 
in regards to the Ramayana has been focused on unity and the maintenance of one clear 
narrative path, intertwining the Ramayana with the story of India as one nation. Ramanujan’s 
essay, in pointing out the multiplicity of languages and locations in which the story has been 
situated over history, discredited this. By outlining different tellings of this story and alternate 
interpretations of characters, “Three Hundred Ramayanas” was also seen to undermine the 
veracity of the Ramayana as a ‘true’ religious text, particularly through its exploration of 
versions of the narrative where Rama is depicted as flawed and human, and where the 
treatment of Sita is criticised rather than justified.  
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One key focus of Ramanujan’s is that the normative understanding of the Ramayana, 
particularly when the Valmiki Ramayana is viewed as the ‘original’ text, ignores and erases 
the narrative’s presence in South India, as well as the fact that Valmiki’s version is quite 
focused on North India to the exclusion of the South. Kamban’s twelfth century Tamil-
language poem incorporates several the regional folk Ramayanas from South India, and 
generated its own adaptations and interpretations.622 For instance, the Tamil 
Satakantharavana depicts Sita as an active heroic character; when Rama kills the ten-headed 
Ravana, a hundred-headed version manifests, terrifying Rama. Sita therefore takes up arms 
and destroys this new evil in her husband’s place.623 “Three Hundred Ramayanas” 
emphasises the fact that these narratives are all not only important in their own right, but also 
vital to the perpetuation and wide-spread appeal of Valmiki’s Ramayana. 
Ramanujan also focuses on the example of the Thai Ramakirti or Ramakien, which is 
similar to Valmiki’s Ramayana but adds dramatic alterations to the reunion between Rama 
and Sita after the battle of Lanka, and Sita’s banishment. These alterations cast Rama in a 
much more critical light, as well as giving Sita a much more active role. The Ramakirti is 
regarded as a popular text rather than a religious work, and Rama is depicted primarily as a 
human hero rather than the incarnation of Vishnu as identified as Valmiki.624 
It was the second part of Ramanujan’s claim, however, which was particularly 
challenging to the normative view. This thesis referred earlier, in passing, to the presence of 
the Ramayana in other religions than Hinduism. “Three Hundred Ramayanas” does not shy 
away from this. Ramanujan explores the significant differences between Jain tellings of the 
Ramayana and Valmiki’s own. Jain texts “…express the feeling that the Hindus, especially 
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the brahmans, have maligned Ravana, made him a villain…”625 In this story, Ravana is killed 
by Lakshmana, who goes to hell for breaking the primary Jain edict not to take a life. Rama, 
meanwhile, is on his final birth and has reached enlightenment, meaning that by leaving the 
slaying of Ravana to Lakshmana, he is able to find release.626 
 “Three Hundred Ramayanas” was first published in 1991, and was primarily of 
interest as a significant work in the relatively niche academic field of Ramayana studies.627 
However, in 2006, the essay was added to Delhi University’s history syllabus. By 2008, 
protests against its inclusion began, spearheaded by the student wing of the RSS (who were 
supported by the BJP) who claimed the versions of the narrative explored in the essay were 
offensive to Hindu beliefs.628 The Organiser, an online weekly publication by the RSS, 
claimed in 2008 that “Rama is worshipped by all believing Hindus. For us he is God…Hence 
it hurts the sentiments of Hindus when Rama is spoken of with anything but reverence”.629 
The emphasis placed on this was likely driven by the fear that the introduction of questioning 
this central narrative into the university syllabus could very well destabilise the basis for the 
‘imagined community’ of the Hindutva. 
After the Supreme Court ordered that an expert committee of academics be formed to 
look into the essay’s inclusion, in 2011 Delhi University’s academic council decided to 
remove Ramanujan’s essay from the syllabus; even though three out of the four committee 
members decided that the essay should remain in the curriculum, and the one who voted 
against it had only done so due to a worry that teachers at Delhi University would be able to 
adequately explain the complex backgrounds of the versions of the Ramayana depicted.630  
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BBC journalist Soutik Biswas noted shortly after the removal of “Three Hundred 
Ramayanas” that the successful application of pressure for censorship by right-wing Hindu 
groups was not an isolated occurrence. In 2010, Mumbai University removed the Booker 
Prize-shortlisted novel Such a Long Journey (Rohinton Mistry) from their curriculum after 
protests by the regional Hindu nationalist party Shiv Sena.631 In the same year, Gujarat 
banned the book Great Soul: Mahatma Gandhi and His Struggle With India (Joseph 
Lelyveld) on the basis of false claims that the work denigrated Gandhi.632 As with 
Ramanujan’s essay, it is unlikely that the Hindutva activists actually read the works they 
were protesting; K Paddayya points out that if they had, then it would have been obvious by 
the conclusion of “Three Hundred Ramayanas” that Ramanujan recognises and respects the 
“enthralling effect on the minds of people” that the Ramayana produces.633 Despite this, the 
RSS and other Hindu nationalist groups were successful in having the article removed against 
the wishes of the committee assigned to examine it. This indicates that the Sangh Parivar, 
who have in the years since independence increasingly represented themselves as the 
custodians of ‘correct’ Hinduism and protectors of Hindu tradition, are powerful enough to 
impede academic freedom to further their own agendas based on the maintenance of 
hegemonic Hindu tradition.634 That this occurred four years before the rise of Narendra 
Modi’s popularity and his election victory in 2014, moreover, is further proof of the fact that 
Hindutva ideologies have maintained a popular appeal in Indian society. The university’s 
decision to capitulate to Hindu nationalist forces is another example of the power of those 
                                                 
631 Prachi Pinglay, “Booker Author Rohinton Mistry in Mumbai University Row,” BBC News, October 19, 
2010, sec. South Asia, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-11572445. 
632 Soutik Biswas, “Ramayana: An ‘epic’ Controversy,” BBC News, October 19, 2011, sec. South Asia, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-15363181. 
633 K Paddayya, “The Ramayana Controversy Again,” Bulletin of the Deccan College Research Institute 72/73 
(2012): 348. 
634 Ashwin Anshu, “Ramkatha, Rambhakts and the University,” Economic and Political Weekly 46, no. 46 
(2011): 14. 
162 
 
same political and cultural beliefs, and their impact even in spheres that might be expected to 
resist them. 
 
7.4. Fire to Earth: A Story of Rama and Sita (Suvarna Variyar, 2014) 
In 2013, the organisation Chinmaya Mission Australia announced its intention to 
stage a production of the Ramayana, to celebrate Ramayana week leading up to Ram 
Navami. Chinmaya Mission was established in 1953 in India, by followers of Swami 
Chinmayananda Saraswati (born Balakrishna Menon.) The organisation has become a 
worldwide non-profit with branches in a number of countries, including the USA, the UK, 
and Australia, and is currently headed by Swami Swaroopananda. Its mission, as provided on 
the organisation’s official website, is:  
The inner transformation of individuals through knowledge of 
Vedanta, spiritual practices and service to society, resulting in a happy 
world around them.635  
The organisation runs classes for children, teenagers, young adults, and adults, which 
all place a strong emphasis on the study of the normative Hindu texts and derive many of 
their philosophical teachings from the Ramayana and the Mahabharata. The mission 
emphasises that its teachings are not only for Hindus and are applicable across faiths and 
philosophical beliefs. However, Swami Chinmayananda was conferred with the Hindu 
Renaissance Award and the “Hindu of the Year” title in 1992 by Hinduism Today, a quarterly 
US magazine aimed at promoting an understanding of Hinduism.636 While Chinmaya Mission 
has no official political affiliation, Swami Chinmayananda was one of the founders of the 
                                                 
635 Chinmaya Mission, “Chinmaya Mission Australia,” Chinmaya Mission Australia, 2016, 
http://www.chinmaya.com.au/. 
636 Himalayan Academy, “Chinmayananda: 1916-1993,” Hinduism Today Magazine, October 1993, 
https://www.hinduismtoday.com/modules/smartsection/item.php?itemid=1176. 
163 
 
VHP. Indeed, the first World Hindu Conference held by the VHP in 1966 was planned and 
negotiated at a Chinmaya Mission property centre in Bombay.637  
As an Australian with Hindu Indian-born parents from the state of Kerala, I was 
exposed to Hinduism from a young age. Due to my family’s involvement with Chinmaya 
Mission both in India and abroad, I participated in classes with the Sydney branch of 
Chinmaya Mission Australia from a young age. This was the method by which I became 
deeply familiar with the normative Hindu texts such as the Ramayana and the Mahabharata, 
as well as other narratives relating to the polytheistic pantheon. It was also my primary 
interaction with the Sydney Hindu Indian community. However, I was in a somewhat unique 
situation where my parents had only limited involvement with Chinmaya Mission and the 
social life in which most of its members partook. I was therefore not exposed to the same 
degree of interaction and communal time as the majority of my peers. As my parents are from 
South India and speak Malayalam (the official language of the state of Kerala), moreover, I 
could not speak or understand Hindi. This augmented my disconnect from a significant 
number of Australian-Indians, and also meant that I did not experience Indian cultural 
products like Bollywood film, television, or music in the same quantity or depth. The slight 
bias against South India by North Indians and Hindi speakers, as touched upon in earlier 
chapters, further strengthened feelings of isolation from the broader Indian-Australian 
community. 
From a young age, I was uncomfortable with the subtle gender biases that were 
displayed, often in the form of rituals – many of which may only be performed by men. This 
issue became more prominent after a change of leadership, to a brahmachari (a man who has 
taken vows of renunciation and is in training to become a guru), who will be referred to by 
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his chosen name at the time, Br (brahmachari) Gopal.638 Despite this, I was encouraged by 
my family to continue classes, which I did until 2013, when the intention to stage a ‘new 
interpretation’ of the Ramayana was floated. My proposition of a gender-swapped production 
was immediately rejected by Br Gopal despite initial support from other members, on the 
grounds that Rama and Sita’s identities and virtues were inherently linked with their genders. 
While I did not truly expect my proposal to be accepted, I was taken aback by the ease with 
which both Br Gopal and young men in the organisation fell back on gender essentialist 
arguments that would have been easily refuted in other creative spaces in Australia.  
Br Gopal instead requested the creation of a production focused on Sita’s life, 
intended to clarify discrepancies and questions surrounding Sita’s role in the narrative and its 
negative portrayal of women. After I persisted in asking that I be given a significant role in 
the production, Br Gopal allowed me the position of director. The written script when it was 
provided to me, however, represented Rama and Sita in a similar light to that of the original 
narrative. The following is an email from Br Gopal to myself and other members of the 
production team: 
August Play will be through the eyes of Sitaji hence appropriately called 
"Sitayana". Where we will look at how equality was shown, how the decisions 
were made looking different dharma etc as well as the actual story thru sitaji's 
eyes starting from her birth from King Janaka. We will not be modernising the 
play etc or having scenes in current life but we are planning to show the 
authentic story which will automatically show us application in our life.639 
This script continued to perpetuate the narrative of Rama as the infallible 
representative of masculinity, while forcing Sita – as the focus of this play – to highlight her 
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own perceived flaws and weaknesses, while simultaneously extolling and justifying Rama’s 
treatment and abandonment of her. This reflected the relationship between Chinmaya Mission 
and its founder Swami Chinmyananda, the VHP, and the RSS. While the VHP has been more 
inclusive and less blatantly male-driven than the RSS, the organisations are fundamentally 
still closely linked by Hindutva ideologies.640 
Moreover, the inexperience of the writers and the local leadership’s insistence on a 
script which did not allow for Sita’s experiences and emotions outside the original text meant 
that sustaining a coherent narrative rather than simply portraying the segments of Valmiki’s 
narrative within which Sita features was extremely difficult. Finally, the implication both in 
the above email and throughout the time I worked with Chinmaya Mission was that the 
values of the Ramayana as framed by Valmiki were automatically and universally applicable, 
rather than to a large extent the product of historical and cultural context. 
This culminated in my being fired from the production by Br Gopal, partially at the 
behest of elder members of Chinmaya Mission. I was however almost immediately given the 
opportunity by the lead actor (who quit his role in protest) to write and direct my own script 
for the UNSW Indian Society, of which he was President, and access to the society’s funding. 
The society had previously staged productions relating to significant figures, specifically 
Gandhi and Ashoka. The play I was to write would be the first staged by the society that was 
based on a religious text, as well as the first with a female protagonist. 
I was given almost unlimited creative license in the writing and directing of this 
production, titled Fire to Earth: A Story of Rama and Sita (Fire to Earth).641 Instead of 
focusing purely on scenes featuring Sita, I decided to write a script which explored the 
personal dynamic between Rama and Sita as individuals rather than framing them as avatars 
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of gods. Therefore, the script begins with the first meeting of Rama and Sita, and ends with 
Sita’s return to the earth. This means that a number of storylines and characters from 
Valmiki’s Ramayana are (deliberately) excised: most notably Hanuman and the other 
monkey characters, and Ravana’s brother Vibhishana.  
The script grants Sita an active voice. While still extremely devoted to Rama, she 
directly questions his actions and language. Her decision to step directly into fire to prove her 
purity and fidelity to Rama is a decision driven not only by love and submission, but also as a 
need to defend her own dignity and name. In light of this, Rama’s (and Valmiki’s) 
justification of Rama’s refusal to take Sita back until she proves her purity as one that is 
rooted in his own ego and fear of judgement by his populace. In Fire to Earth, Lakshmana’s 
devotion to Sita is amplified; he actively attempts to dissuade Rama from exiling Sita, and 
shows active resentment over Rama’s treatment of Sita. The aim here was to retain the key 
themes and character traits of Valmiki’s text as well as drawing directly from the Sanskrit 
poem, to demonstrate the inherent flaws of the normative Ramayana. 
I met with not insignificant opposition on some of these interpretive decisions from 
members of the Indian Society, particularly from students who had lived in India for some 
time. 
; most significantly my representation of Rama as inherently flawed, and the criticism 
of particular elements of judgement making. The original text praises Rama for abandoning 
his duty to his wife in favour of a perceived duty towards his kingdom. Fire to Earth aimed 
to demonstrate the inherent flaw in this – that Rama’s inability to fulfil his personal dharma 
had negative effects on his consequent ability to establish a positive precedent for the state. 
By depriving Sita of the equal personhood she should have shared with him in an ideal utopia 
of equality and fairness – which Valmiki claims Rama’s kingdom was – Rama becomes a 
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flawed character, rather than the idolised god which proponents of Hindutva and of normative 
Hinduism hold him up to be. 
The excision of Hanuman also received criticism, particularly as Hanuman is a 
revered figure who appears in both the Ramayana and Mahabharata, and who has a body of 
oral and written literature in his own right. The choice was primarily made because Hanuman 
did not add to the dynamic or personal narrative of Rama and Sita in any meaningful way that 
could enhance the thematic exploration that the play intended. 
This was particularly controversial to some cast members as the key reason I gave for 
removing Hanuman was to make room for Urmila, Sita’s sister who marries Lakshmana but 
is left behind when the main trio go into exile. Urmila’s conspicuous absence from both the 
wider story and Lakshmana’s own narrative is further indicative of the fact that the ideal 
woman, according to Valmiki, is one who sacrifices her own interests and desires to 
accommodate the men in her life. Indeed, some observers of the Ramayana believe that 
Urmila is a better example of ideal womanhood than Sita, as she obeys without question 
Lakshmana’s directive that she stay in Ayodhya, whereas Sita demands that she be allowed to 
accompany Rama on exile. 
My efforts to overcome the opposition I faced during staging the production were 
eventually largely overcome, albeit with a certain amount of resentment at the way in which I 
exercised my leadership role. This was not unexpected, particularly considering the text we 
were interpreting. A considerable proportion of production members were either born in India 
or raised in Australian-Indian households, and therefore exposed from a young age to the 
gender constructs engrained in understandings of Hinduism and Indian identity that have 
been discussed in this thesis.642 
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 In the post-production period, other issues appeared which were indicative of the 
difficulties inherent to problematising and questioning accepted normative narratives that are 
socially embedded. A review of the production in Indian Link, an Australian newspaper 
targeted at Australian Indians, stated in its opening that “…the essence of the Hindu epic 
Ramayana lies in its prescription of rules for a healthy and ordered society.”643 Though the 
premise of Fire to Earth had been to question that very statement, the journalist went on to 
focus on elements such as costuming and music, rather than the interpretive approach itself. 
The review also took pains to point out that the actress playing Kaikeyi was “a student of 
Asian origin” – once again situating the text firmly within a specifically Indian Hindu 
context, implicitly tying nationhood and religion together.  
Also troubling was the fact that funds from the production were donated to the Ekal 
Vidyalaya Foundation (EVF).644 The foundation is a non-profit organisation addressing 
literacy among children in India which is associated with the RSS. However, the EVF has 
been criticised numerous times for openly promoting Hinduism, often at the expense of 
minorities. In the early 2000s, a study revealed that government funds were being 
misappropriated to support EVF schools, and to “…generate hatred toward minorities, and 
condition the minds of children”.645 Despite my heavy involvement in the production, and my 
vocal opposition to the BJP, RSS, and other members of the Sangh Parivar, I was not 
consulted in this decision and did not discover this until a week after the staging of the play.  
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7.5. Conclusion 
In each of the efforts outlined above, it is obvious that there have been sincere 
individual efforts made to combat – or at least question – the social and cultural narrative of 
the Ramayana in consideration of the elements most likely to perpetuate issues of gender 
assumptions and roles. However, all of these were obstructed (or in some cases derailed) by 
similar issues reflecting larger-scale issues on the individual and local level.  
Nina Paley’s film aimed to make the Ramayana available to a wider audience, while 
problematising the depiction of Sita in the original text. Her film was quite successful on an 
international front; however, its reception by right-wing Hindus was excessive. It raised the 
valid argument that Western attempts to reinterpret or problematise the Ramayana will be 
less potent, as cultural imperialism and appropriation is an issue that extends to academia as 
well. Nevertheless, the willingness of Hindu groups in Western nations to call for the film to 
be banned on hearsay indicates that the concern was not so much with the actual content, but 
with the fear that it could deviate from their established narrative of the Ramayana and the 
gender constructs it entails. 
Ramanujan’s “Three Hundred Ramayanas” was a landmark piece of academic 
writing, and was lauded as such to the extent that it was placed on the history curriculum at 
the University of Delhi. K Paddayya points out that Ramanujan made no attempt whatsoever 
to support or detract from any of the versions of the Ramayana he chose for study, and that it 
was primarily a contribution to the field of literature more than any other discipline.646 
While Ramanujan’s essay did not criticise Valmiki’s Ramayana, the fact that it faced 
significant enough opposition that it was removed from the university’s curriculum is telling. 
Hindu nationalists objected to the notion that the Ramayana is not only not a singular 
narrative, but also that it has strong affiliations with other religions and countries. This, to 
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them, undermined the place of the Ramayana as vital to their narrative of India as 
intrinsically Hindu.  
In the case of Fire to Earth, the second attempt at a production after the failure with 
Chinmaya Mission was considerably more successful. However, resistance by some of the 
male cast members to the critical elements of the script meant that the desired effect on the 
audience was minimised. Its aftermath was undermined both by the review the play received 
and by the donation of funds to an organisation with close links to the very problem that the 
production was aiming to confront.  This demonstrated that efforts to subvert traditional 
narratives, while sometimes effective on a local scale, are often derailed or rendered 
unsuccessful in the face of system and institutional biases. 
The next, and final, chapter, examines the key issues that have been highlighted both 
above and throughout this thesis. It highlights some of the recent advancements in gender 
equality, the BJP’s attempts to distance itself from the exclusionary rhetoric of the wider 
Sangh Parivar, and continued problems faced by the complicated interactions of Hindu 
nationalism, gender, and narrative.  
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8. Conclusion  
…Thus did Rama regain Sita and recover his kingdom. 
(The Ramayana, Bālakāṇḍa, 1:70.)647 
8.1. Summation of Argument 
In 1981, the Supreme Court Justice Hidayatullah opened a national conference on the 
Ramayana with the following quote from a Hindu scholar:  
“The Ramayana is a mirror of the highest ideals of Hindu culture and 
civilisation. Herein is described the ideal hero Sri Ramachandra who is not 
only the exemplar for all living and dutiful sons, but who is the ideal husband 
and king…Sita is the noblest flower of Indian womanhood, devoted to her lord 
in thought, word and deed…There can be no better text-book of morals which 
can be safely placed in the hands of youths to inspire them to higher and 
nobler ideals of conduct and character.”648 
In many ways, this encapsulates the place of the Ramayana in the postcolonial Indian 
landscape. Hidayatullah was the first Muslim Chief Justice of India; a secular role in a 
multifaith country. Yet his words explicitly tied in Hinduism with India, positively framed 
the restrictive gender binary inflicted upon women, continued the Hindu nationalist narrative 
of classical India as a ‘golden age’, and reinforced the notion that the Ramayana is a moral 
and ethical textbook. In doing so, the BJP have perpetuated and promoted a monotheistic 
form of Hinduism, one which is inextricably intertwined with what it means to be a ‘true 
Indian’. This has been further emphasised and strengthened by the stigmatisation of Muslims, 
in order to consolidate the image of India as being a fundamentally Hindu nation. 
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Hidayatullah said these words almost four decades ago, and only one year after the 
formation of the BJP; but the implications for wider Indian society remain disturbingly 
relevant. Since independence, India has continued to cling to a rigid and gendered 
interpretation of the Ramayana as a community-binding narrative, which is used by Hindutva 
organisations and the BJP to serve an exclusionary and traditionalist agenda at the expense of 
India’s multi-faith community. Christophe Jaffrelot, in examining the rapid growth of 
militant Hinduism from the 1950s to the 1990s, points out that “the essential characteristics 
of Hinduism scarcely lend themselves to a closed and monolithic radicalism of the type 
associated with Muslim, Jewish or Christian ‘fundamentalisms’”.649  By reframing Hinduism 
along monotheistic lines through, among other things, the centring of the Ramayana as a 
primary religious tract, the Sangh Parivar and BJP succeeded in overcoming this hurdle. 
This thesis has established that Hindu nationalism was deeply entrenched in the 
independence movement, both in the form of radical Hindu nationalists who were fighting for 
cultural and religious hegemony, and in the rhetoric of Indian National Congress secularists. 
Hindutva ideology has been demonstrated to be undeniably potent. I have argued that without 
a significant power vacuum and continuous mistakes by the INC, the Sangh Parivar’s 
Hindutva vision could not have flourished in the way it has.650 By framing the Independence 
movement with Hindu-based rhetoric, Gandhi and Nehru (however well-intentioned) set the 
scene for the establishment of a secular state with a national identity formed through the 
evocation of religious ideals.651  
This thesis has further contended that Hindu nationalism has been based on the 
idealisation of an imagined ‘golden age’ of Hinduism, which is apparently depicted in 
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religious texts such as the Ramayana. By evoking the image of a shared past, the Hindutva 
ideology has used the Ramayana’s pervasiveness as a narrative embedded in regional and 
widespread culture and language to establish and reinforce an ‘imagined community’, which 
was augmented considerably by the enormous reach and popularity of Ramanand Sagar’s 
1987 television serial Ramayan. 
The imagined shared traditions and culture promoted by the BJP and other 
organisations of the Sangh Parivar have, since the beginning of the independence movement, 
been deeply intertwined with patriarchal and oppressive gender narratives. Part of 
establishing a normative understanding of Hindu tradition has been the evocation of 
normative gender roles and an emphasis on notion that a woman’s primary function is 
motherhood and caregiving. In relegating women to the domestic and private spheres, their 
voices have been significantly minimised even as they have been granted legal equality in the 
postcolonial period.  
By framing the construct of ‘real India’ as intrinsically Hindu and based on Hindu 
tradition and culture, Hindu nationalism has framed, and continued to frame, the state as 
inherently feminine and need of protection from outside forces. This has further fuelled their 
exclusionary attitudes and actions, particularly towards Muslims. The combination of 
xenophobia and sexism has meant that attacks against Muslims are in many ways expressions 
of male chauvinism – based as they are on a vague desire to protect the feminine, thus 
justifying their violence to themselves. This has also resulted in the weaponisation of sexual 
violence, where women are injured, assaulted, or killed because they represent a slight to the 
ideal of the Hindu feminine embedded at the core of Hindu nationalism.  
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8.2. The Bharatiya Janata Party in 2018 
The culpability of this, however, ultimately rests with the BJP and other members of 
the Sangh Parivar. It is telling that during both the destruction of the Babri Masjid and the 
Gujarat riots, the Chief Ministers of the states involved were BJP members. It also cannot be 
a coincidence that in both cases, the situations and consequent violence were exacerbated 
considerably by the slow reaction of government forces to quell violence and enact legal 
actions. 
While the BJP has made efforts to shift towards some level of moderation, it is still 
difficult for the party to shed the baggage of anti-minority, cultural nationalist and 
conservative politics that has defined it since its inception.652 Despite general assumptions by 
spectators and other politicians that the BJP’s popularity would wane – particularly as Hindu 
nationalism seemed to operate in absolute contradiction to the post-independence secular 
political sphere – the party continued to attract support without having to move away from 
defining itself as a Hindu nationalist party.653 The fact that Narendra Modi was Chief 
Minister of Gujarat during the Gujarat riots was a key point of criticism during the 2014 
election – however, it was not enough to stop the party from achieving a landslide victory of 
243 electoral seats to the INC’s 44, and handing Modi the prime ministership.654  
Token nods to secularism are also undermined by the fact that it is common for BJP 
leaders to lace public addresses and stump speeches with direct references to and quotations 
the Ramayana.655 Modi spoke in October 2016 at a Ramlila event in Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh, 
where he performed aarti (ritual of worship) to Rama, Lakshmana and Sita, and accepted a 
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model of Hanuman’s Gadaa (mace).656Additionally, in a departure from tradition, Modi 
aschewed the customary three loud chants of “Jai Hind” (Victory to India) with “Jai Sri 
Ram” (Victory to Rama).657 
The success of the attempt to establish an imagined community of Hindu India, 
reinforced by narrative of the Ramayana particularly in the aftermath of Sagar’s Ramayan, 
indicates the increasing power of media in informing and influencing understandings of 
national identity. Increasingly, however, this has been complicated by the explosion of the 
digital and social media landscape, which has the potential in its diversity, and ability to 
represent previously unheard voices, to challenge dominant cultural understandings in India. 
This thesis highlighted Sita Sings the Blues as an example of the ways in which digital media, 
intertextuality, and the global accessibility of the internet have provided a platform to 
communicate anti-establishment and non-dominant forms of interpretation and thought.  
 
 
8.3. Looking past 2018: what now for women’s affairs? 
In 1950, the Indian Constitution prohibited discrimination on grounds of religion, 
race, caste, sex, or place of birth. Nearly seventy years later, in 2016, the Government of 
India’s Ministry of Women and Child Development released the draft National Policy for 
Women. The document stated that “…the growing acknowledgement of gender rights and 
equality is juxtaposed against increase in reporting of various forms of violence against 
women such as rape, trafficking, dowry etc…”658 The Prohibition of Child Marriage Act 
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2006 came into effect in November 2006, and prohibited the marriage of men under twenty-
one and women under eighteen. Until 2017, however, it was legal for men to have sex with 
their underage wives, so long as the wife was over fifteen years old.659 The Supreme Court 
decision overrode the loophole to age of consent laws – marital rape is still not considered an 
offence under Indian law. While arranged marriage has come under increased scrutiny from 
feminists and the global community, the practice still occurs regularly.660 Increasingly, 
women are resisting pressure from relatives and social circles to abort female foetuses or kill 
female babies; but the pressure and stigma is still widely prevalent.661 
There are certainly several advances that have been made over the past decade. The 
number of women in education has risen dramatically, particularly at the tertiary level, with 
42% of graduates being women in 2017. Despite this, the World Bank’s India Development 
Report 2017 ranked India’s female participation in the workforce at 120th among 131 
countries.662 This is most likely due to the continued prioritisation of marriage, domestic life, 
and motherhood, even in upper classes. Another key reason for this is that employers often 
tend to hold conservative views regarding female employees. In early 2017, a legislative 
panel in Bangalore, Karnataka, recommended that information technology companies should 
assign night shifts to men where possible, despite the state government’s landmark decision 
in 2016 to remove restrictions on women working night shifts, which had been in place since 
the under the Shops and Commercial Establishments Act 1961.663 
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Social media has also made a significant impact on Indian feminism and the ability 
for women to both speak and be heard. Devaki Jain states that “social media has given a 
voice to those who were previously denied one…given individuals a chance to express their 
opinions…and potentially reach out to other feminists.”664 This was clearly demonstrated 
after the highly-publicised vicious gang rape on December 16, 2012 of young female student 
Jyoti Singh on a bus, who later died as a direct result of injuries sustained during the attack. 
Increased access in India to global media networks and online social platforms meant that the 
Indian government was, for the first time in years, forced to address the issue of gender 
violence and injustice. World media did move away from the issue in a few months, 
unsurprisingly when considering the increasingly fast-paced news cycle.665 Simultaneously 
however, the spread of the internet has meant that women increasingly face significant levels 
of online abuse, ranging from sexual harassment to rape and death threats.666 This is 
reflective of the fact that Indian women live in a paradoxical society; increasing gender parity 
is being matched by increasing gender-based violence.667 
There is substantial literature on the cultural and political underpinnings of sexual 
offences, domestic abuse, and dowry. For instance, Veena Talwar Oldenburg’s Dowry 
Murder: The Imperial Origins of a Cultural Crime considers the links between cultural 
changes in the colonial period, masculinity, and economics in shaping phenomena of dowry 
death and female infanticide.668 A key lacuna here, however, is the lack of current 
quantitative data relating to these problems. While a number of small-scale and subnational 
studies do exist, there are obvious numerous difficulties in endeavouring to conduct nation-
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665 Tara Atluri, ed., “Can the Subaltern Tweet?: Technology and Sexual-Textual Politics,” in ĀZĀDĪ: Sexual 
Politics and Postcolonial Worlds (Ontario: Demeter Press, 2016), 57. 
666 “Women and Gender in a Changing India,” 6. 
667 Poulami Roychowdhury, “‘The Delhi Gang Rape’: The Making of International Causes,” Feminist Studies 
39, no. 1 (2013): 286. 
668 Veena Talwar Oldenburg, Dowry Murder: The Imperial Origins of a Cultural Crime (Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 18. 
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wide statistical analyses of these issues.669 It remains difficult, however, to ascertain the 
actual rate of sexual violence, as the majority occurs within the private sphere, and the 
population of India is rapidly expanding. Moreover, women are still not valued in the same 
way as men, and gendered violence in the domestic sphere is still not widely considered 
worth combatting.670  
Even without delving into the myriad other religious narratives available under the 
umbrella Hinduism – both those considered part of the core popular canon, and those that are 
less-known – Valmiki’s Ramayana is a rich source which holds the potential for alternate, 
inclusive interpretations. Mukti Lakhi Mangharam, among others, stresses the fact that 
Valmiki’s text is open to sexual, feminist, and queer readings which draw the Ramayana 
away from the patriarchal, intolerant, and exclusionary narrative promoted by Hindu 
nationalists and the BJP.671 However, so long as India’s ‘imagined community’ impinges 
upon inherently gendered readings of narrative and the idealisation of traditions that are 
fundamentally discriminatory, conceptions of Hindu and Indian nationalism will be 
intrinsically rooted in the confinement of women to domesticity and motherhood. Without 
rewriting and reinterpreting the basis of Indian national identity, women will either be 
pressured to adhere to an idealised mould of purity, motherhood, and obedience. Or, failing to 
meet that standard, they will inevitably continue be silenced and devalued by proponents of 
‘Hindu’ India, as Sita is by Rama. 
  
                                                 
669 Hackett, “Domestic Violence against Women,” 268. 
670 Once again, I refer to the fact that marital rape is not a criminal offence in India. 
671 Mangharam, “Rama, Must I Remind You of Your Divinity?,” 76. 
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